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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three chapters on human capital development in
Bangladesh. The first chapter provides microeconometric evidence that access to
electricity has a positive impact on the nutritional status of children under five in
rural Bangladesh. It further investigates the casual pathways and shows that the
positive impact of electrification partially comes from increased wealth. Chapter 2
examines the intrahousehold gender gap in education expenditure. By construct-
ing a three-part model, which decomposes the households education decisions into
enrollment, conditional education expenditure and share of education expenditure
allocated to the core items that are directly related to the quality of education,
we find a pro-female bias in enrollment decision but a pro-male bias in the latter
two decisions. We then study the role played by the Female Stipend Programs (F-
SPs) in explaining this apparent inconsistency of gender bias pattern. Chapter 3
experimentally studies the impact of a job training plus program in the ready-made
garment (RMG) sector on female empowerment in northern Bangladesh. The treat-
ment components include information, skill training, stipend and internship. The
results obtained are mixed. We find that the training “plus” program tends to in-
crease the women’s social status and mobility and improve men’s attitude towards
gender equality. On the other hand, it tends to lower women’s perception of female
empowerment and weaken women’s decision power. We also find that the estimated
treatment effect change over time.
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Introduction
This dissertation contributes to the literature on human capital development in
Bangladesh. Human capital accumulation is essential for the achievement of sus-
tainable development, especially for countries like Bangladesh that are experiencing
rapid economic growth but still face challenge in poverty alleviation. Based on the
2016 Human Development Report produced by the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP), 40.7 percent of the population (65 million) are multidimension-
ally poor and 18.5 percent are living below the income poverty line. On the other
hand, the rapidly growing economy is increasingly dependent on the development of
human capital. For example, the Ready-Made Garment (RMG) sector is expanding
at an average annual growth rate of 12 percent, and it is predicted to have a shortage
of 1.5 million skilled workers by 2020 (Rahman and Hossain, 2017). Without proper
development of human capital, it is impossible to achieve and sustain the country’s
economic growth and improvement in people’s living standard. Thus, my research
focuses on three topics related to the human capital development in Bangladesh,
namely children’s nutritional status, intrahousehold education expenditure, and vo-
cational training program.
The first chapter examines whether access to electricity improves the nutritional
status of children under age five. The paper ”Impact of Electrification on Children’s
Nutritional Status in Rural Bangladesh” (with Tomoki Fujii and Abu Parves Shon-
choy) is published in World Development in 2018. Using five rounds of Bangladesh
Demographic and Health Survey from 2000 to 2014, we find that access to electricity
has a positive impact on the nutritional status of children under five as measured by
height-forage Z-score (HAZ) by around 0.1 to 0.2 points. To address the potential
endogeneity issue, we adopt the instrumental variable (IV) approach and also check
the robustness of our main results with respect to plausible levels of selection on
unobservables. Our results consistently indicate that rural electrification positively
affects children’s nutritional status in Bangladesh. We then investigate the impor-
tance of four possible causal channels, namely increased wealth, reduced fertility
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through the change in time use, spread of information through technology such as
TV, and improved health care services. While our analysis of causal pathways is
limited by the data availability, it suggests that the positive impact of electrifica-
tion partially comes from increased wealth. For some years, the positive impact
can also be attributed to reduced fertility and information exposure through TV
viewing. On the contrary, we find little evidence that the impact is attributable to
the improvement of local health facilities.
In the second chapter, ”Intrahousehold Gender Gap in Education Expenditure
in Bangladesh” (with Abu Parves Shonchoy and Tomoki Fujii), we investigate the
intrahousehold gender gap in education expenditure. To achieve this, we first con-
struct a three-part model, which decomposes the households’ education decisions
into the following three parts: enrollment, conditional education expenditure, and
share of education expenditure allocated to the core educational items, or items
directly related to the quality of education. The model further incorporates the
possible interdependence across these three decisions. Using four rounds of the
Household Income and Expenditure Survey from 1995 to 2010, we find a pro-female
bias in enrollment decision but a pro-male bias in the decisions on the conditional
expenditure and core share in education expenditure from 2000 onwards. This ap-
parent inconsistency of gender bias seems to be partly driven by the Female Stipend
Programs (FSPs). FSPs have played an important role in promoting girls’ enroll-
ment in secondary schools but did not help to close the gender gap in conditional
expenditure and core share allocation. Furthermore, the FSPs did not help narrow
the gender gap in timely graduation from secondary school among primary-school
graduates. Taken together, our empirical evidence suggests that the gender gap in
the investment in the quality of education persisted in Bangladesh.
The third chapter1 experimentally studies the impact of a job training “plus”
program in the ready-made garment (RMG) sector on female empowerment in north-
ern Bangladesh, where the program features the provision of information, stipend,
and on-the-job training in addition to the skills training. We find that the training
1”Can a Vocational Training Program Empower Women? Experimental Evidence from North-
ern Bangladesh”(with Tomoki Fujii and Abu Parves Shonchoy).
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“plus” program tends to increase the women’s social status and mobility and im-
prove men’s attitude towards gender equality. On the other hand, it tends to lower
women’s perception of female empowerment and weaken women’s decision power.
We also find that the estimated treatment effect change over time.
3
1 Impact of Electrification on Children’s Nutri-
tional Status in Rural Bangladesh
1.1 Introduction
Access to electricity can potentially play a significant role in poverty reduction
and the promotion of economic growth in developing countries.2 It is an essential
element for the adoption of information and communications technology, provision
of improved education and health care services, and a range of industrial activities.
Moreover, one can use electric lights at night and the extended hours with light can
be used to engage in various gainful activities that were previously difficult. Despite
this importance, the coverage of electricity supply still remains low in many parts
of the developing world, even though recent decades have witnessed a significant
expansion in access to electricity.
In Bangladesh, recognizing the importance of electrification for rural develop-
ment, the Rural Electrification Board (REB) was established as early as 1977 to
provide access to affordable and reliable electricity in rural areas. However, because
of lack of resources and capacity, the availability of electricity in rural areas remained
limited until the end of the last century. The Bangladesh Demographic and Health
Survey (BDHS) for the year 2000 shows that only 21 percent of rural households had
access to electricity in Bangladesh (NIPORT et al., 2001). However, the coverage
increased substantially thereafter and 51 percent of rural households had access to
electricity from the national grid in 2014 (NIPORT, Mitra and Associations, and
ICF International, 2016).
This significant improvement in the access to electricity coincided with a no-
ticeable improvement in the nutritional status of children. In the year 2000, about
47 percent of rural children under five were stunted, or abnormally short for their
age and gender (NIPORT et al., 2001). The prevalence of stunting in rural areas
2For example, Yang (2003) and Shiu and Lam (2004) find that electricity consumption leads
to poverty reduction and economic growth in China. In Bangladesh, a similar finding is made by
Ahamad and Islam (2011). Also see Cook (2011) for a review of the related literature.
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dropped to 38 percent in 2014 (NIPORT, Mitra and Associations, and ICF Interna-
tional, 2016).
One may argue that the spread of access to electricity and improvement in chil-
dren’s nutritional status have simultaneously occurred because of the continuous
development efforts by the Government of Bangladesh or possibly by pure coinci-
dence. However, there are at least four reasons to believe that a causal relationship
may exist between them. First, access to electricity may create new income oppor-
tunities. As a result, households may be able to have more and better food and
medication, which in turn leads to better nutritional status. Second, the use of
electric lights allows people to use time differently, particularly at night. This in
turn may have an impact on fertility (Fujii and Shonchoy, 2015) and improve the
nutritional outcome through the effect of the quantity-quality trade-off for children.
Third, nutritional status may improve through the spread of information. In
particular, mass media such as TV could act as a powerful device for spreading
important information about child care and nutrition to rural households.3 Finally,
the quality of health care service provided in local clinics and hospitals may improve
as a result of electricity access, because many of the basic equipments in modern
medicine require electricity.
Using five rounds of the individual-level BDHS data from 2000 to 2014, we study
the impact of rural electrification on the nutritional status of children under five by
comparing the children in households with and without access to electricity after
controlling for various covariates. One obvious issue here is the potential endogeneity
of the households’ access to electricity. To address this, we adopt the instrumental
variable (IV) approach and also check the robustness of our main results with respect
to plausible levels of selection on unobservables. Our results consistently indicate
that rural electrification positively affects children’s nutritional status in Bangladesh.
We then investigate the importance of the four possible causal channels dis-
3For example, a popular TV show called Ujan Ganger Naiya (Sailing Against the Tide),
which was first broadcast in May, 2014, aims to improve maternal and newborn health through
improved knowledge (http://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/where-we-work/asia/bangladesh/
mch accessed on March 1, 2017).
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cussed above, even though our analysis is speculative due to the data limitation.
Our results appear to indicate that the household’s wealth is an important channel
through which the household’s access to electricity affects children’s nutritional s-
tatus. Fertility and TV channels also appear to matter, even though the evidence
for these channels is weaker. In contrast, we find little evidence that the positive
impact of electrification on children’s nutritional status is due to improved local
health facilities.
As discussed further in Section 2.8, there may be other causal channels. The
data limitation does not permit us to test the relevance of each of these channels,
but they may explain why unexplained positive impact of electrification remains
even after controlling for a rich set of covariates. To the best of our knowledge, this
is one of very few studies on the impact of rural electrification on the nutritional
status of children and the first study to analyze four distinct channels of causality
going from rural electrification to improved nutritional status of children.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 reviews related studies and dis-
cusses our study’s relevance to and difference from existing studies. Section 1.3
provides some background information on rural electrification in Bangladesh. Sec-
tion 2.4 describes the data and presents key summary statistics. Section 1.5 dis-
cusses the econometric specification and identification strategy. Section 2.5 presents
our main empirical finding and conducts a range of robustness and reality check-
s. Section 1.7 explores the channels through which electrification affects children’s
nutritional status and Section 2.8 concludes.
1.2 Review of Related Literature
The motivation for this study partly comes from Fay et al. (2005), who ran regres-
sions of child health indicators on, among others, a basic infrastructure index—a
principal component made from indices of floor material, sanitation, and access to
water and electricity—using aggregate data from 39 countries and five asset quin-
tiles. They find broadly positive effects of basic infrastructure on child health, even
though their results are not robust (Ravallion, 2007) and do not directly show the
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impact of rural electrification. In a study of a number of developing countries,
World Bank (2008) also reports that the impacts of rural electrification on nutrition
is largely positive, if not always statistically significant.
However, as documented by Bernard (2012) in the context of Africa, the impacts
of rural electrification on health and education, among others, remain largely un-
documented. His point also applies to many other parts of the developing world.
From a macroeconomic perspective, it is in general unclear whether a large infras-
tructure investment has a positive effect because it may be done at the expense of
current expenditures and could become unproductive (Devarajan et al., 1996). As
Straub (2011) argues, the productivity-boosting effect of infrastructure may mate-
rialize only in the presence of certain conditions such as the right set of incentives
and a critical mass of suitable human capital. Therefore, more research is clearly
needed to fully understand the impact of basic infrastructure. We contribute to
the literature on the impact of basic infrastructure by providing microeconometric
evidence.
In particular, this study contributes to a growing body of literature on the impact
of rural electrification in developing countries. In this literature, researchers have
investigated various aspects of the socioeconomic impact of rural electrification. For
example, positive employment or income effects were found in Bangladesh (Khand-
ker et al., 2009), Kenya (Kirubi et al., 2009), Benin (Peters et al., 2011), South
Africa (Dinkelman, 2011), and Nicaragua (Grogan and Sadanand, 2013). Several
studies show that rural electrification is associated with lower fertility in Bangladesh
(Fujii and Shonchoy, 2015), Brazil (Potter et al., 2002), Colombia (Grogan, 2016),
Indonesia (Grimm et al., 2015), and Coˆte d’Ivoire (Peters and Vance, 2011). Studies
also indicate that the schooling of children is positively associated with rural elec-
trification in Bangladesh (Khandker et al., 2009), Brazil (Lipcomb et al., 2013) and
Colombia (Grogan, 2016). Improved quality of electricity is associated with higher
vaccination coverage in India (Chen et al., 2016). In Brazil, rural electric access is
found to reduce deforestation (Tanner and Johnston, 2017). Our study adds to this
growing body of literature by examining a new dimension of impact that was not
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previously studied.
This study also makes a contribution to the extensive literature on the determi-
nants of the nutritional status of children. Our nutrition model is underpinned by
the UNICEF conceptual framework for child nutrition (UNICEF, 1990; Black et al.,
2008), which has been widely used for more than two decades. This framework iden-
tifies three layers of causes. The immediate causes of malnutrition are inadequate
dietary intake and disease. These causes are affected by underlying causes such as
food insecurity, inadequate care, and unhealthy household environment and lack of
health services, which in turn are affected by basic causes such as lack of human
and physical capital.
Our nutrition model draws from existing studies on child nutrition in Bangladesh
such as Headey et al. (2015, 2016) and Srinivasan et al. (2013) that are consistent
with the UNICEF framework. The covariates in our model reflect the underlying
and basic causes and include those covariates that were found to be among the most
important determinants such as indicators of parental education, sanitary condi-
tion, demographic information, vaccination, antenatal care (ANC) visits, and asset
index. We also include community-level characteristics in most specifications as
these variables are also potentially important (e.g., Banerjee et al. (2004) and Al-
derman (2000)). Our models are also broadly consistent with existing models of
malnutrition (e.g., Frongillo et al. (1997); Haughton and Haughton (1997); Li et al.
(1999); Victora et al. (2010)).
Despite a large body of literature on the determinants of the children’s nutri-
tional status, the research on child nutrition tended to focus on nutrition-specific
interventions targeted at the immediate causes. However, there is a dearth of stud-
ies on the impact of investment in infrastructure such as rural electrification, which
may have a broad development impact. Therefore, this study contributes to the
child nutrition research by highlighting the potential importance of infrastructure
investment, which was traditionally out of its scope.4
To our knowledge, Glewwe et al. (2004) is the only study that has any discussion
4We thank a reviewer for highlighting this point.
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on the nutritional impact of electrification. Even though the primary interest of
their study was not in the impact of electrification, they found that the lack of
electrification in the commune health center is negatively associated with children’s
nutritional status. However, this effect was not statistically significant.
This study differs from Glewwe et al. (2004) in several aspects. First, we address
the endogeneity of the electrification. Second, we consider the impact of electrifica-
tion at the household level rather than at the level of commune health center. Third,
unlike Glewwe et al. (2004), we examine four channels of causality and conduct a
range of robustness and reality checks.
This study also relates to the body of literature on the consequences of child
undernutrition. Nutritional status during early childhood is known to play a signifi-
cant role in the determination of children’s physical and cognitive development and
various studies have underscored the importance of early childhood investment in
the literature (see, for example, Heckman and Masterov (2007) for the case of the
US and Nores and Barnett (2010) for a review of non-US studies). Studies have also
indicated that good nutrition is an essential element for good performance in school
(e.g., Glewwe et al. (2001) in the Philippines, Alderman (2006) in Zimbabwe, and
Maluccio et al. (2009) in Guatemala). While the current study focuses on the im-
pact on the nutritional outcome of children and not on their educational outcomes,
our results suggest that rural electrification may have an indirect long-term posi-
tive impact on schooling through improved nutritional status in addition to a direct
impact through better lighting and access to various electric devices for studying.
Finally, this study relates to a body of empirical studies in developing countries
on the quantity-quality trade-off for children (Becker and Lewis, 1973). The existing
empirical studies so far provide mixed evidence on the presence of a quantity-quality
trade-off. For example, Qian (2009) and Angrist et al. (2010) found no empirical
support for the existence of a quantity-quality trade-off. In contrast, the number of
siblings is found to have a negative effect on children’s education (Li et al., 2008;
Rosenzweig and Zhang, 2009) and height (Liu, 2014) in China, which is consistent
with the quantity-quality trade-off theory. Similarly, a quasi-experimental study by
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Joshi and Schultz (2013) evaluated the impact of the Maternal Child Health and
Family Planning program in the Matlab subdistrict of Bangladesh and found that
the treatment area had a significantly lower fertility and significantly higher school
attainment, a result which is deemed to be consistent with the quantity-quality
trade-off. Our results are consistent with their findings.
1.3 Rural Electrification in Bangladesh
After the independence in 1971, the Government of Bangladesh took a major ini-
tiative to expand electrification, especially in the rural areas, under the scheme of
“Total Electrification Program” in 1975 and established the Rural Electrification
Board (REB) as a new national agency under the Ministry of Power, Energy and
Mineral Resources under the Rural Electrification Board Ordinance, 1977. This
ordinance was replaced by the new Rural Electrification Board Act, 2013 and the
REB is now called the Bangladesh Rural Electrification Board. However, because
most of our analysis is done before this change, we simply use REB in the remainder
of this paper.
The operational functionality of REB is organized through Palli Bidyut Samity
(PBS), or rural electric associations or cooperatives. The PBSs are modelled after
the Rural Electric Cooperatives in the United States. They are semi-autonomous
entities approved by and registered under the REB. The establishment of new PB-
Ss depends on REB’s various priority criteria such as road infrastructure, number
of households, state of industrial and commercial development, existing social and
community institutions, number of pumps, rice mills, and tube wells for irrigation,
and percentage of the area prone to flooding. Adequate capacity at the grid sub-
station and accessibility to the 33kV line of the Bangladesh Power Development
Board (BPDB), which is a body responsible for a major portion of generation and
distribution of electricity mainly in urban areas except Dhaka and the West Zone
of the country, are also considered necessary for establishing a new PBS (Murphy
et al., 2002).
The typical area of coverage for a PBS is 5-10 subdistricts, covering an area of
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1,500-2,400 square kilometers with a consumer base of around 35,000 to 270,000
individuals. There are currently 78 PBSs approved and registered with REB, dis-
tributing electricity to over 69,000 villages through 767 substations. The PBSs
own, operate, and distribute electricity within their areas of operation with opera-
tional, technical, management, and financial support from the REB (See also Fujii
and Shonchoy (2015); Murphy et al. (2002)). The REB provides electricity to end
users through PBSs. Most of them are domestic consumers but they also include
commercial, industrial, and irrigation users.5
The PBSs typically purchase power from the BPDB and then distribute the
electricity within their areas of operation.6 Once a PBS is established and starts
operating, it uses its own substation to distribute electricity and gradually expands
the area of coverage over time. Therefore, the PBSs play a central role in the
distribution of electricity in its area of operation. In particular, because the main
33KV substations are usually located in the PBS headquarters or the areas adjacent
to these headquarters, the distance to the PBS headquarters is one of the key factors
that determines the connectivity with the national grid for the end users of electricity
such as households (See also Khandker et al. (2009) for further information about
rural electrification in Bangladesh).
While the REB was established four decades ago, it was not until this century
when the process of electrification gained a momentum. In 1977 when the REB was
established, the connectivity was less than 10 percent (Khandker et al., 2009). The
proportion of households with electricity increased only modestly to 21 percent in
2000 (NIPORT et al., 2001). However, with an accelerated progress in electrification,
the REB serves over 15 million households through PBSs today, a number that is
more than twice what it was a decade ago. About 78 percent of the population
in Bangladesh is now under electricity coverage and the Government of Bangladesh
aims to bring all citizens under the power coverage by 2021.7 The rural electrification
5See http://www.reb.gov.bd.
6The PBSs may also obtain electricity from other authorities like the Dhaka Electric Supply
Authority and private power producers through the BPDB. See also Endnote 8.
7“Govt to continue support for flourishing private sector: PM” Daily Star, December 21, 2016.
Dhaka, Bangladesh.
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Table 1: Peak demand shortfall, maximum load shedding, and generation-to-sales
gap of electricity in Bangladesh.
Period Peak demand Maximum Generation-to-
shortfall (%) load shedding (MW) sales gap (%)
1996-2000 14.1 660 20.1
2000-2004 13.7 569 12.9
2003-2007 20.2 976 9.9
2007-2011 27.4 1,263 12.2
2010-2014 23.4 1,051 14.5
Note: Peak demand shortfall is calculated as one minus the max-
imum demand over the present capacity (derated). Generation-to-
sales gap is calculated as one minus the sales over generation. The
annual figures reported Bangladesh Power Development Board (2016)
are converted into five-year moving averages to match the cohorts of
children included in the BDHS data used in this study.
program under the REB has been widely viewed as one of the most successful
government programs in Bangladesh (Khandker et al., 2009) with substantially lower
system losses than other major electricity distribution bodies like BPDB and Dhaka
Electricity Supply Company (DESCO) and an excellent bill collection record (Alam
et al., 2004).8
Despite this success, rural electrification in Bangladesh is not without challenges.
Because of the rapid economic growth in recent years, the demand for electricity has
also increased sharply, creating a higher peak demand shortfall than before despite
the efforts to increase the generation capacity. Correspondingly, the load shedding
has also become more common as shown in Table 1, even though the situation may
have improved over the last few years. The generation-to-sales gap, which measures
the proportion of electricity that was generated but not sold, also increased in recent
years, suggesting the potential presence of management problems associated with
the demand and supply of electricity. Such problems are epitomized by the massive
blackout occurred on November 1, 2014, which was triggered by a sudden spike in
8DESCO is a company which distributes electricity at the Northern parts of Dhaka City and
Tongi Town of Gazipur District. REB, BPDP, and DESCO all belong to the Power Division of
the Ministry of Power, Energy and Mineral Resources in Bangladesh but they differ in the main
geographic areas of operation and relative importance of generation, transmission, and distribution
in their operations.
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demand and left 100 million people without electricity for 10 hours.9
So far, we only discussed electricity from the grid. However, it should be not-
ed that solar electricity has become increasingly common in Bangladesh in recent
years. Solar electricity was almost negligible until 2007. However, the annual in-
stallation of solar home system (SHS) exceeded 200,000 in 2008 and one million in
2011 (Khan and Azad, 2014), which is a sizable figure both in absolute terms and
relative to the total of 31.7 million households in 2011. By 2011, four percent of the
household reported to use solar power as a source of electricity in rural Bangladesh
(Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, 2012). By 2014, the corresponding figure increased
to 15 percent (NIPORT, Mitra and Associations, and ICF International, 2016).
Because the electricity from the grid remains the major source of electricity and
its power and reliability exceed those of solar electricity from a typical SHS, we
are primarily interested in grid electricity. However, we do not distinguish between
grid and solar electricity in most of our regressions, because the BDHS data do
not allow us to make this distinction except for 2014. For the year 2014, we also
consider a regression specification in which the effects from grid and solar electricity
are distinguished.10
1.4 Data
We compile data from multiple sources. First and foremost, we use five rounds
of the BDHS data for the years 2000, 2004, 2007, 2011, and 2014. The BDHS is
a nationally representative survey and a part of the worldwide Demographic and
Health Survey program. The BDHS data primarily focus on the women in their
reproductive period and their young children. Therefore, we use the records for
children under the age of five with a mother aged between 15 and 49 residing as a
regular household member in the rural area, where the rural electrification program
9For the unfolding of this event, see “Bangladesh blackout 2014” Daily Star, November 3, 2014.
Dhaka, Bangladesh. See also, “Committee says Bheramara trip set off grid failure”Dhaka Tribune,
November 28, 2014. Dhaka, Bangladesh.
10We do not consider independent power systems or generators, because only one percent of rural
households have them even in 2014 (NIPORT, Mitra and Associations, and ICF International,
2016).
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is relevant.11
The BDHS datasets contain demographic and child’s nutritional indicators, in-
cluding the height-for-age Z-score (HAZ)12 based on the WHO standard, which
is a widely used indicator for a long-term nutritional status of children (Behrman
and Deolalikar, 1988) and supposed to be comparable internationally. The BDHS
datasets also include a number of other individual- and household-level variables.
About 3.7 percent of records with a biologically implausible value of HAZ or missing
covariates were dropped from the sample across the five rounds.
In what follows, we categorize the main household- or individual-level covariates
other than the asset index as the “basic” covariates. Some of the basic covariates
reflect the demographic characteristics of the household such as the child’s age and
sex, the mother’s age, and birth spacing. The basic covariates also include indicators
of sanitary conditions, mother’s anthropometric indicators, and parental education
as well as the quality and quantity of antenatal care (ANC) visits by the child’s
mother and the chld’s vaccination status.13 In addition to these basic covariates,
we also include the asset index, which is a principal component score of housing
conditions (basic wall, roof, and floor) and ownership of assets that are not directly
related to electricity (radio, bike, scooter, homestead, and land). The asset index is
designed to be comparable across years and households where higher scores represent
wealthier households.14 In most regression specifications discussed subsequently, we
also include “community” covariates, which are the time to district headquarter,
the ratio of certified doctors, the distance to the nearest health facility, the exis-
tence of pharmacy in the community, and the distance to the nearest pharmacy.
These community-level variables reflect the remoteness and health environment of
11See the BDHS reports for additional description of the data (NIPORT et al., 2001, 2005, 2013;
NIPORT, Mitra and Associations, and ICF International, 2016).
12To be precise, length-for-age Z-score is used for children under 24 months but we do not
distinguish height-for-age and length-for-age Z-scores.
13The information on the ANC visits is available only for the last pregnancy during the last
three years. In all of our regressions, we always include an indicator variable for the availability of
this information whenever basic covariates are included in the model. When the child’s vaccination
card is not seen by the enumerator, the information on whether the child ever had a vaccination
is obtained from the child’s mother.
14Note that the wealth index included in the BDHS data is not suitable for our purpose. Further
details on this point and the construction of the asset index are given in A.1.
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the community and available in all BDHS rounds except for the year 2000.
Table 2 presents summary statistics for HAZ, asset index, and basic covariates for
BDHS 2000 and 2014 disaggregated by the electrification status of the household,
where a unit record is a child under the age of five. The first row of Table 2
shows that children in electrified households are on average better nourished than
those in nonelectrified households by 0.491 and 0.386 points in HAZ in 2000 and
2014, respectively. This difference is significantly different from zero by the t-test of
equality of means at a 1 percent significance level for each BDHS round.
The difference in the nutritional status of children between electrified and non-
electrified households reported in Table 2 cannot be attributed to the household’s
access to electricity because electrified and nonelectrified households are systemat-
ically different. As Table 2 shows, the asset index for electrified households is on
average significantly higher than that for nonelectrified households.
Table 2 also shows that electrified and nonelectrified households are very differ-
ent in basic covariates. Children in electrified households are more likely to have
vaccination and born in a medical facility than their counterparts in nonelectrified
households. Their mothers are also taller and their parents are both better educated.
They also have better health environment as measured by the share of households
with open defecation in the community and the indicator that the household obtains
drinking water from a pipe. The demographic condition is also favorable for children
in electrified households as their households have lower dependency ratio and fewer
other children to compete with. The patterns mentioned here are also applicable to
other years.15
Even after controlling for a rich set of observable characteristics, there may
remain omitted variables that simultaneously affect the household’s electrification
status and nutritional status of children. Therefore, as elaborated in the next section,
we attempt to address this problem by instrumenting the household’s access to
electricity with the distance to the nearest headquarters of Palli Bidyut Samity
(PBS) as a key instrumental variable.
15Summary statistics for BDHS 2004, 2007, and 2011 are generally between the corresponding
figures for years 2000 and 2014 and shown in Table 35 in the Appendix.
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To this end, we compiled the geographic coordinates (longitude and latitude) of
the PBS headquarters from Google Maps (http://map.google.com/) by searching
the name of each PBS. We then calculate the great circle distance in kilometers to
the nearest PBS headquarters from each household by these coordinates and the
coordinates of the community the household belongs to, the latter of which were
collected together with the individual-level BDHS data.16
Two cautions about the distance measure are in order. First, the coordinates of
the BDHS communities available to us are garbled to protect the anonymity of the
survey participants. Second, because of this and because we do not have a reliable
digital boundary data for each PBS, we are unable to identify the PBS that serves
each household. Thus, our distance measure may or may not coincide with the
distance to the PBS serving the household.
In addition to the distance to the nearest PBS headquarters, we also compiled the
system loss from the grid for each PBS from the Management Information System
collected by the REB. This information is available at the time of each BDHS round
except for the year 2000. We interpret the system loss from the grid as an indicator
of the efficiency of service delivery. As we shall argue in the next section, this
variable also provides a potentially exogenous source of variation in the access to
electricity.
In most of our analysis, we use the binary indicator of household’s access to elec-
tricity as a key covariate. This indicator, however, does not take into account the
quality of electricity that the household receives. Because load-shedding is common
in Bangladesh as mentioned in Section 1.3, the quality of electricity may be impor-
tant. To address this issue, we also use the data collected by a consortium comprising
Bangladesh Engineering and Technological Services Ltd and Bangladesh Unnayan
Parishad (BETS-BUP) under the Socioeconomic Monitoring and Impact Evaluation
of Rural Electrification and Renewable Energy Programme in Bangladesh in the year
2005. These data contain, among others, the information on the frequency of out-
age experienced by each household in a week prior to the survey. We aggregate this
16We do not observe the coordinate of each household in the BDHS data.
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information to the PBS level such that we have the average outage frequency in a
week at the PBS level.17 Using the distance information discussed above, we find
the average outage frequency of the nearest PBS for each household.
Finally, we also use the Administrative Division of Bangladesh (ADM) dataset18
and merge it with the BDHS dataset by the geographic coordinates. The combined
BDHS-ADM dataset allows us to find the district that each BDHS household belongs
to, which in turn allows us to include district-level fixed effects in our regressions.
1.5 Econometric specification
The basic nutrition model we adopt in this study is as follows:
HAZi = βEi + γ
TXi + i, (1)
where HAZi is the height-for-age Z-score for child i and Xi is a vector of covariates,
which may include the basic covariates listed in Table 2, asset index, and community
characteristics. The dummy variable Ei takes one if child i lives in a household with
access to electricity and zero otherwise. The coefficient β on Ei is the main coefficient
of interest.
We aim to capture a relatively long-term relationship between HAZ and its
covariates in eq. (1). This is because we do not observe how long the household has
an access to electricity and because households typically continue electricity access
once they have one. Therefore, the short-term impact is both difficult to measure
and practically irrelevant. As a result, we choose to use HAZ as the main outcome
variable of interest because it is well known to reflect a long-term nutritional status
of children.
Because of this choice, the covariates Xi should capture the characteristics of the
households that are stable in the long run. Therefore, we include those covariates
17The frequency ranges between 0 and 14 across different PBS with an unweighted average of 5.4.
For additional information on the data, see Bangladesh Engineering and Technological Services Ltd
and Bangladesh Unnayan Parishad (2006) and Khandker et al. (2009).
18The ADM data was extracted from the GADM database, version 2.0, December 2011. See
www.gadm.org/country for further details.
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which are both widely accepted in the literature and likely to remain stable, on
average, over a span of several months or years (rather than several days or weeks).
When the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimator is used to estimate eq. (1), the
estimated coefficient is biased if i is conditionally correlated with Ei. For example,
suppose that the standard of living of the child’s household is not controlled for.
Then, it is likely that i is correlated with Ei as richer households are more likely to
adopt electricity. At the same time, children in richer households tend to enjoy more
food variety and nutritional intake as well as better sanitation and hygiene standards.
In this case, the OLS estimate of β will be biased upward because it also captures
the effect of higher standards of living. To tackle this issue, we additionally include
a rich set of social, economic, and demographic characteristics of the households and
children and several community-level variables in most specifications. Further, we
also include fixed-effects terms at the division level or lower administrative levels to
mitigate the heterogeneity that may exist across different areas of Bangladesh.
While the inclusion of a rich set of covariates is likely to lessen the potential con-
cerns about the omitted-variables bias, it is not possible to exclude the possibility
that i is still conditionally correlated with Ei. For example, it may be the case that
children in electrified households enjoy better nutritional status because their par-
ents are the type who would take better care of children than their counterparts in
nonelectrified households. In this case, the estimated coefficient of β simply reflect-
s the unobserved heterogeneity in parenting between electrified and nonelectrified
households.
To address this issue, we use the distance of the community of residence to the
nearest PBS headquarter as a key instrumental variable (IV) for the household’s
access to electricity. The distance to the nearest PBS headquarter is a relevant
instrument because electricity infrastructure tends to expand from the areas closer
to the PBS headquarters, which functions as both administrative offices and opera-
tional centers.19 The distance variable also captures the cost of electricity adoption
because the connection cost charged to households by the PBSs are higher for house-
19Note that PBS headquarters do not necessarily coincide with district centers.
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holds that are further away from the grid-line (Khandker et al., 2009).
The validity of this instrument depends on how the location of PBS headquarters
are chosen. As discussed in Section 1.3, the establishment of a new PBS is clearly not
random. However, the necessary conditions such as the accessibility to BPDB’s 33kV
line and adequate substation capacity are plausibly exogenous to the nutritional
status of children. On the other hand, other indicators such as road infrastructure
and percentage of areas prone to flooding may have direct impact on the nutrition.
Further, PBS headquarters tend to be located in more central and accessible places
within the rural areas, where the quality of health facilities and health environment
may be more favorable.
Therefore, we also include the system loss from the grid for the nearest PBS
as an additional instrument. This variable is potentially relevant to the adoption
of electricity because the system loss from the grid is affected by how well the
PBS is managed and reflects the efficiency of service delivery. Further, it is also
plausible that it is conditionally uncorrelated with the nutritional status of children
and factors such as the quality of local health facilities and disease environment.
For both the distance to the nearest PBS and system loss from the grid, we include
their interactions with key characteristics such as parental education, child’s sex,
and asset index.
We conjecture that our instrumental variables plausibly mitigates the endogene-
ity issue. However, the location and timing of the establishment of new PBS are not
random and it is difficult to rule out the influence of endogeneity issue. Therefore,
we adopt the method developed by Oster (2016) and apply it to our context to
further examine the robustness of our results with respect to the omitted variables
bias. We show that our main results cannot be overturned unless the selection on
unobservables at the household level is relatively strong.
1.6 Main Results
In this section, we present our main result indicating that the household’s access to
electricity has a positive impact on children’s nutritional status. We start with OLS
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regressions but also consider alternative methodologies and specifications to address
the potential endogeneity of the household’s access to electricity. We also conduct
various subsample analyses to show that this positive impact is observed commonly
across different types of households. To further bolster our main finding, we also
conduct some reality checks.
Baseline OLS regression results
Table 3 shows the OLS regression of child’s HAZ on the household’s access to elec-
tricity based on eq. (1) with different sets of covariates. It reports the coefficient
β on the household’s electrification status for various specifications and for each
round. The set of covariates is specified at the bottom of the table. Basic covariates
include those variables listed in Table 2 under this heading except that the mother’s
age in years and child’s age in month are included in the form of dummy variables.
All specifications except column (1) include the division-level fixed-effects terms and
the dummy variable for missing ANC visit information (See also Endnote 13). The
asset index and community variables are those discussed in Section 2.4. The regres-
sion results are qualitatively similar if the asset index is replaced with its component
variables.
In all specifications, a constant term is included and standard errors are clustered
at the community level. The sample weights are omitted in our regressions because
we expect that the measurement error in individual height would be an important
source of errors. However, the results are similar even when the sample weights are
applied.
Column (1) in Table 3 shows that there is a strong positive relationship between
the household’s electrification status and child’s nutrition status. Without any other
covariates, the HAZ for children in electrified households tends to be higher than
children in nonelectrified households by 0.361 or larger, depending on the survey
round.
Obviously, this correlation is partly driven by the systematic difference between
electrified and nonelectrified households. Thus, we include basic covariates in col-
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Table 3: OLS regression estimate of the coefficient on the household’s
access to electricity (all households).
Dep var: HAZ (1) (2) (3) (4) Obs
BDHS2000
Electrified household 0.517*** 0.207*** 0.181*** 3566
(0.059) (0.061) (0.062)
F -test [3.31*]
BDHS2004
Electrified household 0.476*** 0.238*** 0.195*** 0.215*** 3727
(0.056) (0.051) (0.052) (0.053)
F -test [14.27***] [0.81]
BDHS2007
Electrified household 0.397*** 0.218*** 0.186*** 0.176*** 3088
(0.056) (0.054) (0.057) (0.058)
F -test [3.95**] [1.13]
BDHS2011
Electrified household 0.361*** 0.131*** 0.099** 0.097** 4735
(0.047) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041)
F -test [10.95***] [2.21*]
BDHS2014
Electrified household 0.375*** 0.131*** 0.104** 0.102** 4324
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.045)
F -test [10.39***] [2.02*]
Controls
Basic No Yes Yes Yes
Asset Index No No Yes Yes
Community No No No Yes
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 per-
cent levels. Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported in
parentheses. Basic covariates are those listed under these headings (child age
in months and mother age in years are represented by dummies) in Table 2,
division dummies, and dummy variable for missing ANC visit information
(See Endnote 13). Community variables are the time to district headquar-
ter, the ratio of certified doctors, the distance to the nearest health facility,
the existence of a pharmacy in the community, and the distance to the near-
est pharmacy. The numbers of observations in column (4) are slightly smaller
than those reported in the table because the community-level variables are
not observed for some communities. F -test statistics in the square brackets
are the test statistic for the test of joint significance of the covariates added
from the column immediately to the left (i.e., asset index, and community
covariates for columns (3), and (4), respectively). Detailed results for colum-
n (4) are reported in Table 36 in the Appendix.
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umn (2) to control for important household- and individual-level variables such as
demographic characteristics, parental education, mother’s anthropometrics, child
care, and sanitary conditions. Once these variables are included, the point estimate
reduces by 45-65 percent. When we additionally control for the asset index, the
point estimate declines modestly. The point estimates are around 0.2 for the first
three rounds and around 0.1 for the last two rounds as reported in column (3).
Column (4) shows that the addition of community-level covariates does not alter
the estimated coefficient much. Table 3 clearly shows that the estimate remains
both statistically and economically significant even after controlling for a rich set of
covariates.
Because we are primarily interested in the coefficient β on the household’s access
to electricity Ei, we choose to report only the estimate of β in Table 3 and most other
regression tables. However, the coefficients on other covariates are also of interest.
Thus, we briefly discuss the general patterns that are found in our regressions.20
First, older children tends to be more malnourished. This may be because y-
ounger children are healthier particularly during the period when they are breast-fed
(See also Victora et al. (2010)). Second, the coefficient on mother’s height is highly
significant, which would reflect both the genetic information and living conditions
of the household. Third, the coefficient on ANC visit to a doctor is often found
positive and significant. Finally, the coefficient on the asset index is mostly positive
and significant when it is included. These results are broadly consistent with what
was found in the literature.
Our regression results appear to indicate that the community-level covariates
are not very important particularly for the years 2004 and 2007. First as men-
tioned above, the inclusion of community-level variables does not change much the
absolute value of the coefficient. Second, community-level covariates are individu-
ally mostly insignificant and no consistent pattern is found across years. Finally
the community-level covariates are jointly insignificant for 2004 and 2007 by the F -
statistics. However, because they are significant, even though just marginally, for the
20Complete regression results for column (4) of Table 3 is presented in Table 36 in the Appendix.
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years 2011 and 2014 as shown in Table 3, we choose to include the community-level
covariates in most of the regressions reported below except for the year 2000.21
Subsample analysis
The results presented in Table 3 do not take into account the unobserved hetero-
geneity that may exist between electrified and nonelectrified communities. One way
to address this issue is to restrict our sample to a subsample of households in elec-
trified communities. As shown in Table 4, the results are similar both quantitatively
and qualitatively to Table 3. Therefore, there is no evidence that the results in Ta-
ble 3 are driven by the unobserved difference between electrified and nonelectrified
communities.
It is also plausible that the impact of electrification on the nutritional status of
children may be positive only for certain type of children. For example, electric-
ity may be used in different ways between younger and older children or between
boys and girls. Educated mothers may use electricity differently from uneducated
mothers. Households with sufficient amount of food may use electricity differently
from households with chronic food deficit. Households in different divisions may
use electricity differently. These differences, in turn, may mean that the impact of
electrification is heterogeneous across households.
Therefore, we conduct several subsample regression analyses in which the regres-
sions are run separately by the age of the child, the sex of the child, the education
level of mothers, food security and division (See the Appendix). We find that an
overwhelming majority of the point estimates of β are positive even though they
are not always significant. Most point estimates of β in these subsample analyses
are within their respective standard errors of the corresponding baseline OLS es-
timate in the same round and around 0.1 or above. Therefore, even though the
point estimate varies across subgroups, we have no strong evidence of substantial
21The omission of the community covariates for the year 2000 is unlikely to matter much, because
the estimated coefficient on the household’s access to electricity is generally similar whether or not
the community covariates are included in each BDHS round. This is particularly true for earlier
rounds of BDHS.
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Table 4: OLS regression estimate of the coefficient on the household’s
access to electricity (households in electrified communities only).
Dep var: HAZ (1) (2) (3) (4) Obs
BDHS2004
Electrified household 0.531*** 0.281*** 0.222*** 0.233*** 2300
(0.062) (0.061) (0.063) (0.065)
F -test [13.75***] [0.57]
BDHS2007
Electrified household 0.355*** 0.182*** 0.147** 0.152** 1832
(0.065) (0.064) (0.067) (0.068)
F -test [2.95*] [1.27]
BDHS2011
Electrified household 0.353*** 0.130*** 0.102** 0.095** 3548
(0.055) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048)
F -test [7.76***] [1.20]
BDHS2014
Electrified household 0.387*** 0.144*** 0.111** 0.098* 3165
(0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057)
F -test [10.98***] [1.58]
Controls
Basic No Yes Yes Yes
Asset Index No No Yes Yes
Community No No No Yes
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels. Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported in
parentheses. See the table notes of Tables 2 and 3 for the definitions of basic
and community covariates. The numbers of observations in column (4) are
slightly smaller than those reported in the table because the community-level
variables are not observed for some communities. F -test statistics in the
square brackets are the test statistic for the test of joint significance of the
covariates added from the column immediately to the left (i.e., asset index,
and community covariates for columns (3), and (4), respectively). Detailed
results for column (4) are reported in Table 37 in the Appendix.
25
Table 5: OLS regression estimate of the coefficient on the household’s access to
electricity with various fixed effects.
Dep var: HAZ
Panel A 2000 2004 2007 2011 2014
Community fixed effects
Electrified household 0.186** 0.216*** 0.084 0.077 0.060
(0.082) (0.068) (0.069) (0.051) (0.053)
Observations 3,566 3,727 3,088 4,735 4,324
R2 0.301 0.320 0.323 0.304 0.322
Panel B 2000 2004 2007 2011 2014
District fixed effects
Electrified household 0.138** 0.224*** 0.137** 0.073* 0.076
(0.070) (0.054) (0.059) (0.042) (0.047)
Observations 3,566 3,650 3,002 4,735 4,183
R2 0.257 0.274 0.278 0.241 0.256
Panel C Pooled, 2004-14 Pooled, 2004-14
Fixed effects District & Time District by Time
Electrified household 0.132*** 0.117***
(0.024) (0.024)
Observations 15,570 15,570
R2 0.231 0.245
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively. Basic covariates and asset index are included in each regression.
Community covariates are also included in each regression in panels B (except
for 2000) and C. See the table notes in Tables 2 and 3 for the definitions of the
basic and community covariates. Standard errors clustered at the community
level are reported in parentheses.
heterogeneity in the impact of electrification on children’s nutrition.
Fixed-effects models
While Table 4 addresses the heterogeneity that may exist between electrified and
nonelectrified communities, it could be argued that our regression results suffer from
an omitted variables bias because some unobserved location-specific characteristics
such as the development of local economy, local road network, and local disease
environment may simultaneously affect the household’s electrification status and
nutritional status of children.
Therefore, we also run fixed-effects regressions by including community-level or
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district-level dummy variables in the set of regressors. As reported in panel A
of Table 5, even when the community-level fixed-effects terms are included, the
coefficient on the household’s access to electricity is positive for all years. However,
the statistical significance disappears for later rounds.
Community may be too small to capture the level of local economic development.
Further, with the community-level fixed effects, we can only identify the effect of
electrification from the variations within each community. This may partly explain
why the coefficient is no longer significant in the last three rounds.
Therefore, we also run district-level fixed-effects regressions as reported in pan-
el B. The coefficients are all positive and significant except for the year 2014. One
advantage of including fixed effects at the district level rather than the community
level is that almost all districts in Bangladesh are included in each round of the
BDHS dataset. This allows us to run pooled fixed-effects regressions as reported
in panel C. We report the results for models with district-specific and time-specific
fixed effects and district-time-specific fixed effects. The latter controls for, among
others, the heterogeneity in the change in the level of development across districts.
The estimated coefficients reported in panel C is broadly consistent with the results
presented in Table 3 and statistically significant.
The results reported in Table 5 indicate that our baseline results are unlikely to
be driven by unobserved location-specific characteristics that simultaneously affect
the household’s access to electricity and nutritional status of children, particularly
for the earlier two rounds.
However, the fixed-effects regressions do not address the issue of potential en-
dogeneity at the household level. That is, those households that have access to
electricity may be systematically different from others in some unobservable house-
hold characteristics, which also affect the children’s nutritional status. We aim to
address this issue below.
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Table 6: GMM IV regression estimate of the coefficient on the
household’s access to electricity.
Dep var: HAZ 2004 2007 2011 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Electrified household 0.007 1.302* -0.158 0.849***
(0.415) (0.750) (0.358) (0.300)
Endogeneity test [0.217] [3.674*] [0.595] [4.539**]
OIR test [4.967] [7.565] [7.100] [12.063]
First-stage F [2.521] [1.254] [2.995] [5.225]
Controls: basic and community covariates and asset index
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at
the community level are reported in parentheses. See the table
notes in Tables 2 and 3 for the definitions of basic and commu-
nity covariates. The instrumental variables for the electrified
household dummy are distance to the nearest PBS headquar-
ters, system loss from the grid, and their interaction terms with
the mother’s education, father’s education, boy dummy, and
asset index. The endogeneity and overidentification restriction
(OIR) test statistics are reported in square brackets. The de-
tailed first-stage and second-stage regression results are report-
ed in Table 43 and Table 44 in the Appendix.
IV regression results
A common approach to address the endogeneity issue is to use IVs. As discussed in
the previous section, we use the distance to the nearest PBS headquarters and system
loss from the grid as instrumental variables. Table 6 reports the IV estimation of
eq. (1) using the generalized method of moments (GMM), where the household’s
access to electricity is instrumented by the distance to the nearest PBS headquarters,
system loss from the grid, and their interactions with parental education, child’s sex,
and asset index.
The IV regression results vary across years. As the results of the overidentifi-
cation restriction (OIR) test based on the Hansen’s J-statistic suggest, we detect
no evidence of misspecfication. For the years 2004 and 2011, the estimates are not
statistically significant but the null hypothesis for the test of endogeneity cannot be
rejected. For the years 2007 and 2014, the null hypothesis for the test of endogeneity
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is rejected. In these cases, the coefficient on the electrified household is positive and
significant and larger than the OLS estimate. However, our instruments are weak
as indicated by low first-stage F -statistics. This is because the distance and system
loss measures do not vary within each community. Therefore, our IV estimates of
β may be exaggerated in absolute value and appear implausible. Because of this
and because the standard errors of the IV estimates are large, the results reported
in Table 6 should be interpreted with caution. Nevertheless, Table 6 provides no
evidence that our OLS estimates are biased upwards.
It should be noted that the validity of IV estimation rests on the assumption that
the distance to the nearest PBS and the system loss from the grid are exogenous
to the children’s nutritional status. While we have no empirical evidence indicating
otherwise, it is also difficult to firmly establish the validity of these assumptions.
One could argue, for example, that children are more likely to be living in a worse
disease environment when the nearest PBS station is further away. The quality of
local institutions may simultaneously affect both the system loss from the grid and
the nutritional status of children. Further, these points may affect different types of
households differently. Neither fixed-effects regressions nor IV regressions are able
to fully address this issue. Therefore, we consider below whether a plausible level
of selection on unobservables may overturn our baseline result that the household’s
access to electricity positively affects the nutritional status of children.
Robustness to selection on household-level unobservables
We adopt the method developed by Oster (2016) to check the effect of plausible levels
of selection on unobservable variables. This method is built on Altonji et al. (2005),
who came up with the plausible bounds on the effect of attending a Catholic school
on educational attainment and test scores. The key assumption of this method is
the proportional selection relationship assumption, where the ratio of covariance
between the potential selection variable and the observable component relevant to
selection to the variance of the latter is proportionate to a similar ratio for the
unobservable component relevant to selection.
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To apply the method by Oster (2016) to our context, we denote the mapping
from each child to the household the child belongs to by h(i). We then assume that
the selection occurs at the household level and not at the individual level. This
would be a reasonable assumption because electricity is adopted at the household
level and not at the individual level. To incorporate this idea, it is useful to write
the error term i in eq. (1) as i = φh(i) + ηh(i) + ξi, where φh(i) is the composite
effect of household-level unobservable variables that may be correlated with Ei. The
second term ηh(i) is the household-level unobservable error uncorrelated with Ei and
third term ξi is the individual-level idiosyncratic error also uncorrelated with Ei.
Following Oster (2016), we calculate the threshold value of the coefficient of
proportionality at which the treatment impact is equal to zero, where the coefficient
of proportionality is defined as follows:
δ =
cov(φh(i), Ei)var(γ
TXi)
cov(γTXi, Ei)var(φh(i))
.
Roughly speaking, if this quantity is equal to one, it means that the amount of
selection on observables is equal to the amount of selection on unobservables. This
quantity cannot be calculated directly because we never observe φh(i). However, the
threshold value at which the treatment effect becomes zero can be calculated from
observable quantities.
One of the important inputs for calculating the threshold value of δ is the max-
imum value of R2-statistic (R2max) that would be obtained when a regression of
HAZi is hypothetically run on Ei, Xi,and φh(i). Using the notations introduced
above, R2max would (asymptotically) satisfy the following equality:
R2max = 1−
cov(HAZi, ηh(i) + ξi)
var(HAZi)
.
In a general setting, we do not know what the value of R2max should be except
that R2max is no greater than unity. As noted by Oster (2016), it seems likely that
the outcome variable of interest cannot be fully explained in many empirical settings
even when the full control set were included. Therefore, R2max is likely to be strictly
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less than unity and the inferences based on R2max = 1 may be too conservative.
Fortunately, we can obtain a reasonable conservative estimate of R2max with the
estimated values of ξi in the regression of HAZ on household-level fixed-effects terms
and some individual-level controls in the basic covariates:22
R2max ≤ 1−
cov(HAZi, ξi)
var(HAZi)
(≡ R2f )(< 1).
In our application, the values of R2f are 0.426, 0.452, 0.365, and 0.406 for the
years 2004, 2007, 2011, and 2014, respectively, when we use the same covariates
as column (4) of Table 3. Setting R2max = R
2
f , our (conservative) estimates of the
threshold value of δ are 1.134, 0.951, 0.571, and 0.528 for these years.23 Roughly
speaking, this means that the household-level selection on unobservables needs to
be almost as strong as the selection on observables to have a zero treatment effect in
2004 and 2007. In 2011 and 2014, the household-level selection on unobservables can
be substantially weaker than selection on observables to have a zero treatment effect.
This is not surprising given that the estimated impact on electrification is much
smaller for these years. Nevertheless, given that many of the important household
characteristics are presumably included in the regression, the actual selection on
unobservables appears unlikely to be strong enough to overturn our main finding.
Reality checks
To further bolster our main finding, we also conduct some reality checks. First, we
use the weight-for-age Z-score (WAZ) as an alternative dependent variable. This
measure arguably has an advantage that its measurement is more accurate than
22We exclude the households with only one child under five from the calculation of R2f because the
regression residual is zero for these households and make a finite-sample correction when estimating
ξi.
23We use the STATA code psacalc to make these calculations. We include the child-level
dummy variables for “the child is a boy”, “vaccination card for the child seen”, “the child ever
had a vaccination”, “ANC visit to a doctor”, “ANC visit to other health professionals”, “four or
more ANC visits”, “ANC visit status missing”, “born in medical facility”, “the child has an elder
sibling”, and “preceding birth interval” as additional controls, or controls unrelated to selection
to be included in all regressions, for the calculation of δ (Oster, 2016). This is because we assume
that selection occurs at the household level. Note that these covariates and household-level fixed
effects are included for the calculation of R2max as well.
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HAZ particularly for very young children, even though WAZ may be noisy as one
can gain or lose weight in a relatively short period of time. Consistent with Table 3,
we find that the access to electricity positively affects WAZ as expected (See Table 45
in Appendix).
Second, we conduct a falsification test to see whether the heights of those moth-
ers who have finished their linear growth are affected by the households’ access to
electricity. We find that the heights of these mothers are not affected by rural electri-
fication but those of their children are positive affected (Details are reported in the
Appendix). While the falsification test requires some assumption on which mothers
have completed their linear growth, these findings are consistent with the presence
of positive impact of rural electrification on the nutritional status of children.
Finally, we take into account the quality of electricity because the impact of
access to electricity may depend on the quality of electricity that households enjoy.
We address the quality of electricity in two ways. First, we merge the information
on the PBS-level outage frequency in 2005 into BDHS 2004 and use it as a regressor.
As panel A of Table 7 shows, the impact of outage is negative and significant as
expected. This result appear to indicate that the quality of electricity matters.
Second, we distinguish between grid and solar electricity for the year 2014 (this is
not possible for earlier rounds). As panel B of Table 7 shows, the estimated impact
of grid electricity on the children’s nutrition status is always positive and significant
but this is not true for the solar electricity. Further, the point estimate for solar
electricity is always smaller than that for grid electricity, even though the difference
is insignificant. Because we do not address the potential endogeneity of the adoption
of different types of electricity, we are unable to draw strong conclusions. However,
the results presented here also suggest that the quality of electricity matters, because
solar electricity from a typical SHS is generally less reliable and powerful than the
grid electricity.
As discussed in Section 1.3, there has been a rise in the use of solar electricity
over time. Further, the aggregate figures presented in Table 1 suggest that the
quality of grid electricity may have deteriorated over time during our study period.
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Table 7: Alternative regression specifications taking the quality of elec-
tricity into account.
Dep var: HAZ (1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A (2004)
Electrified household 0.490*** 0.240*** 0.188*** 0.204***
(0.067) (0.059) (0.061) (0.061)
Outage frequency in 2005 -0.018 -0.031** -0.033** -0.042***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012)
Observations 2,689 2,689 2,689 2,643
R-squared 0.028 0.251 0.256 0.263
Panel B (2014)
Grid electricity 0.402*** 0.134*** 0.106** 0.105**
(0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048)
Solar electricity 0.299*** 0.125** 0.099 0.096
(0.066) (0.061) (0.061) (0.062)
Observations 4,324 4,324 4,324 4,183
R-squared 0.020 0.240 0.242 0.246
Controls
Basic No Yes Yes Yes
Asset Index No No Yes Yes
Community No No No Yes
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively. standard errors clustered at the community
level are reported in parentheses. See the table notes of Tables 2 and 3
for the definitions of basic and community covariates.
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These points may explain why the estimated impact of rural electrification on the
nutritional status of children appear to be smaller for recent years.
1.7 Exploring the Channels of Causality
The balance of evidence in the previous section shows that electrification has a
positive impact on the nutritional status of children, particularly for earlier rounds
of BDHS, and this finding passes reality checks and is fairly robust—robust with
respect to the assumed error structure, choice of subsample used for the analysis,
plausible levels of selection on unobservables, and whether to apply the sample
weights.
We now explore the channels through which the household’s access to electricity
positively affects the nutritional status of children. Because of the data limitations,
our analysis is admittedly speculative. However, we investigate wealth, fertility, TV,
and local health facility as potential channels of causality through which electrifica-
tion positively affects children’s nutritional status.
Wealth
The access to electricity may improve income opportunities available to households
and help them become richer, because electricity is a vital input for various eco-
nomic activities. As shown by Khandker et al. (2009), this possibility is relevant
in Bangladesh. The increase in the household wealth may in turn allow parents
to afford, for example, more and better food and medical care for their children,
leading to an improvement in the nutritional status of their children. Because we do
not have a direct measure of income, we used asset index in our regression analysis.
As can be verified from the comparison between columns (2) and (3) of Table 3,
the inclusion of the asset index, which reflects the wealth of the household, reduces
the estimated coefficient of β between 0.03 and 0.04 after controlling for the basic
covariates. This magnitude is modest and not very large relative to the standard
errors. Furthermore, the estimated coefficient on the electrified household dummy
variable remains positive and significant even after controlling for the asset index.
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This observation indicates that our main results may be driven in part by wealth
effects but it is not the only causal channel.
In Figure 1, we present the result of nonparametric (local mean-smoothing) re-
gressions of HAZ on the asset index with the Epanechnikov kernel run separately
for each round and each of electrified and nonelectrified households. The graphs are
generally upward-sloping for each round and each of electrified and nonelectrified
households. The upward slopes in Figure 1 indicate that wealth is likely to be an
important determinant of the nutritional status of children even after controlling for
the electrification status. Figure 1 also shows that the line for electrified households
always lie above that for nonelectrified household regardless of the value of the asset
index or the survey round. Consistent with this observation, we find that the point
estimates of β are almost all positive when regressions similar to column (2) of Ta-
ble 3 are run separately by the asset index quintiles (available on request). Because
the sample sizes are generally small, these estimates are not always significant. How-
ever, our results and existing studies such as Khandker et al. (2009) overall suggest
that wealth may be an important channel of causality, but it is surely not the only
channel.
Fertility
Fertility is another possible channel through which electrification may affect the chil-
dren’s nutritional outcome. This possibility is in part motivated by the empirical
findings of Fujii and Shonchoy (2015), which show with a panel dataset that the
expansion of rural electrification leads to a reduction in fertility, possibly because
of the change in the time-use behavior. Because the BDHS dataset is a repeated
cross-section dataset, we are unable to replicate the findings of Fujii and Shonchoy
(2015). However, when we run cross-sectional regressions using the number of chil-
dren as a dependent variable, we find that the coefficient on the household’s access
to electricity is negative and significant (Table 46 in the Appendix).
If there are fewer children in electrified households than nonelectrified household-
s, more resources can be potentially allocated to each child in the former. This in
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Figure 1: Local mean-smoothing regression of HAZ on the asset index by survey
round and household’s electrification status. The top and bottom 2.5 percent are
trimmed.
turn means that each child may be able to enjoy more food and better care. There-
fore, electrification may improve the nutritional status of children through reduced
fertility in the household. Our regression results are consistent with this possibility.
The estimated coefficient on the dummy variable for having an elder sibling is mostly
significantly negative and large in absolute value (0.105 or higher in absolute value)
in our regressions. Further, the coefficient on the number of surviving children is
also mostly negative and significant. While this analysis is na¨ıve, it is consistent
with the presence of the fertility channel (See Table 36 in the Appendix).
It would be ideal if the presence of the causal channel through fertility could be
tested rigorously by exploiting the exogenous variations in the number of siblings
using, for example, twining or heterogeneity in the enforcement family planning pol-
icy as was done in the empirical literature on quantity-quality trade-off of children.
However, because we do not have clear exogenous variations to exploit, we take an
alternative indirect approach.
Based on the findings of Fujii and Shonchoy (2015), we hypothesize that the
fertility-reducing effect of rural electrification is less pronounced for households with
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Table 8: OLS regression of height-for-age Z-score for a sub-
sample of children without siblings.
Dep var: HAZ 2000 2004 2007 2011 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Electrified household 0.149 0.277** 0.151 -0.021 0.031
(0.111) (0.119) (0.101) (0.081) (0.083)
Observations 662 722 683 1,138 1,197
R-squared 0.328 0.302 0.355 0.307 0.264
Note: ***, **, and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10
percent levels, respectively. Clustered standard errors at the community
level are reported in parentheses. Basic and asset index are included in
each regression. Community covariates are also included in each regression
except for the year 2000. See the table notes in Tables 2 and 3 for the
definitions of the basic and community covariates.
no or only one child than those with more children. This is because the former would
still wish to have more children on average regardless of whether the household has
an access to electricity. On the other hand, this is not the case for households with
two or more children. Furthermore, if the child has no siblings, there is no direct
competition among siblings, even though the levels of competition that children
face with expectant children may be different between electrified and nonelectrified
households. Thus, we restrict our sample to the set of children without siblings to
weaken, if not shut off, the fertility channel of causality.
Table 8 reports the results of the same OLS regressions as Table 3 (column (3)
for 2000 and column (4) for all other years) except that the subsample of households
with only one child is used. As the comparison between these two tables indicate,
the point estimates became noticeably smaller except for the year 2004 and mostly
insignificant. Therefore, our results are consistent with the presence of fertility
channel and quantity-quality trade-off. Nevertheless, because the standard errors
for the point estimates reported in Table 8 are large and our discussion rests on
rather strong assumptions, we refrain from drawing strong conclusions.
Television
The influence of TV in developing countries has been documented in the recent
economics literature (e.g., Ferrara et al. (2012); Jensen and Oster (2009)). It is
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Table 9: OLS regressions of child’s height-for-age Z-score on the house-
hold’s access to electricity and possession of TV.
Dep var: HAZ 2000 2004 2007 2011 2014
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Electrified household 0.179*** 0.155*** 0.154*** 0.057 0.062
(0.067) (0.055) (0.059) (0.047) (0.048)
TV possession 0.006 0.222*** 0.070 0.100** 0.131***
(0.093) (0.065) (0.068) (0.047) (0.050)
Observations 3,566 3,649 3,002 4,735 4,183
R-squared 0.241 0.249 0.258 0.222 0.248
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the community level are re-
ported in parentheses. Basic covariates and asset index are included in each
regression. Community covariates are also included in each regression except
for 2000. See the table notes in Tables 2 and 3 for the definitions of basic and
community covariates.
plausible that watching TV also has consequences for children’s nutritional status.
For example, people receive health-related information from TV (see also Endnote 3)
and this may lead to changes in health-related behaviors and improve children’s
health outcomes (World Bank, 2008).
Table 9 reports the results for the regressions with the same specification as
Table 3 (column (3) for 2000 and column (4) for all other years) except that a
dummy variable for the possession of a TV is included as an additional regressor.24
The point estimate for the household electrification dummy lowers slightly for all
years. The coefficient on the household electrification dummy becomes insignificant
in 2011 and 2014 and the coefficient on TV possession is positive and significant in
2004, 2011, and 2014. These observations indicate that TV possession dummy may
have an impact on the nutritional status of children. It should be noted, however,
that the OLS specification suffers from the potential endogeneity problem. For
example, those households which are keen to obtain information from TV may be
the type of households that would be able to take care of children better. So the
results reported in Table 9 should be interpreted with caution.25
24For all BDHS rounds except for 2000, we also know whether the mother watches TV at least
once a week, less than once a week, or not at all. We also ran regressions with this variable instead
of the TV possession. Qualitative implications are similar.
25We also instrumented the possession of TV with (i) the dummy variable for the district of
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Local health facility
It may be argued that the conditions of local health facilities improve with access
to electricity because the construction, operation, and management of local health
facilities become easier. Further, more talented health workers may be attracted with
an access to electricity (Essendi et al., 2015). However, as reported in column (4) of
Table 3, the coefficient on the household’s access to electricity does not alter much
even after controlling for a rich set of community-level characteristics related to the
local health facility. Therefore, even if this impact channel exists, other channels
are likely to be more important. Further, the results of the community-level fixed
effects indicate that unobservable community-level characteristics are not important
for years prior to 2007.
However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the importance of local health
facility channel has increased over time for two reasons. First, as shown in Table 3,
the community-level variables are jointly significant for the years 2011 and 2014,
even though the significance is only marginal. Further, for these years, the household
electrification dummy is no longer significant when the community-level fixed-effects
terms are included as shown in Table 5.
Second, the usage of local health facilities has increased over time. To highlight
this point, let us look at fever and diarrhea, two of the most common conditions
for children. While the prevalence of diarrhea [fever] did not change much between
2004 and 2014,26 only 12.3 [14.7] percent of children among the children who had
diarrhea [fever] received a treatment from a health provider or health facility in
2004. However, this share increased to 30.4 [54.2] percent in 2014.
Whether and to what extent this increase in the usage of local health facilities is
due to the household’s access to electricity is unclear. It should be noted that we are
residence sharing borders with India on the west and its interaction terms with basic variables and
(ii) distance to the nearest center or subcenter of the Bangladesh Television (BTV), because these
measures reflect the variety and receptability of regular terrestrial broadcasting channels. While
these IVs are weak, the possession of TV is never statistically significant and the point estimates
tend to be smaller than the OLS estimates in these regressions, indicating the possibility of upward
bias in the estimates of the impact of TV in Table 9.
26The prevalence of diarrhea [fever] over the last two weeks for the children under five in rural
Bangladesh in this period stayed between 4.9 and 9.7 percent [37.8 and 39.9 percent].
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limited by the fact that no direct observation of local health facilities is available in
our data. However, our results indicate that the impact of electrification is unlikely
to have occurred through the channel of local health facility for earlier years. Even
for later years, this impact channel is likely to be only marginally relevant at best.
In the Appendix, we report the results of path analysis to verify the relative
importance of different channels discussed above. We find that the direct effect and
the indirect effects through wealth and TV are significant in all or most years. In
particular, the direct effect and indirect effect through wealth always account for
the majority of the total impact of household’s access to electricity. On the other
hand, fertility and local health facility are significant only in one of the four BDHS
rounds. Furthermore, the point estimate of the indirect impact through the local
health facility was smaller in absolute value than both direct effect and other indirect
effects in most years. Overall, the results of the path analysis are consistent with
the discussion above.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper, we demonstrated that households’ access to electricity has a statis-
tically and economically significant and positive impact on the nutritional status
of children in rural Bangladesh. This study is among the first to identify such a
positive effect. Most point estimates provided in this study are statistically indis-
tinguishable from our baseline OLS estimate of around 0.2 for the years 2000, 2004,
and 2007 and 0.1 for the years 2011 and 2014. Our analysis also provides suggestive
evidence that the size of the impact may depend on the quality of electricity.
We have also investigated the mechanisms through which electrification positive-
ly affects the nutritional status of children. While this analysis is speculative due
to the data limitation and inherent difficulty in identifying the causal channels, we
find some support for the presence of the wealth channel. Fertility and TV chan-
nels also appear to have played some role. However, we find little evidence that
the positive impact of electrification on children’s nutritional outcome is driven by
improved local health facilities.
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The four channels considered in the previous section are not the only possible
channels through which electrification may affect children’s nutritional status. For
example, the use of refrigerators may lead to better preparation and preservation of
food. This in turn may reduce the prevalence of diarrhea and malnutrition. However,
in rural Bangladesh, the impact of refrigerators is unlikely to be big in our study
period. First, only 12.3 percent of rural households had a refrigerator even in 2014
(NIPORT, Mitra and Associations, and ICF International, 2016) and this share was
much smaller in earlier rounds. Further, the prevalence of diarrhea did not change
much as noted in Endnote 26.
Similarly, electricity can potentially replace the use of traditional fuel for cooking,
which may lead to an improvement of the health environment in the household.
However, the use of electricity for cooking remains rare in Bangladesh. Therefore,
this is also unlikely to be an important channel, although it is worth noting that
electrification is associated with the switching from traditional to modern fuels in
urban areas (Barnes et al., 2005, p.32).
There are at least two other possible channels of causality that may be poten-
tially important. First, as Fujii and Shonchoy (2015) show, time use may be altered
as a result of electrification. It is plausible that the use of electric lighting allows
households to take a better care of children with more flexible time use. The im-
proved lighting may also help them keep their house tidy and improve the indoor
air quality by switching away from candles and kerosene lamps.
Second, the reduction in the burden of fuel collection due to the electrification
of the household may also be relevant. As Batliwala (1982) discusses in the case
of India, this reduced burden may in turn reduce caloric consumption and lessen
the burden on the mother’s body, leading to a better nutritional status for the
children. Our empirical results are consistent with this possibility, because the
mother’s anthropometric indicators are positive and significant in most specifications
(See also Tables 36 in the Appendix). However, direct observation of fuel collection
would be needed to establish this causal channel. Thus, while we were unable to test
empirically these two channels of causality, they may explain the positive impact
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of electrification on children’s nutritional status repeatedly found in this study even
after controlling for a variety of covariates.
One important policy implication of this study is that it is critically important to
evaluate infrastructure programs such as rural electrification from a broad perspec-
tive. This is because the impact may go well beyond the narrowly-defined economic
benefits in a typical cost-benefit analysis. Further, once the additional social benefits
of electrification—such as improved nutritional status of children—are well recog-
nized, governments around the developing world may be encouraged to invest more
in basic infrastructure, which is still severely lacking in Bangladesh and many other
countries in the rest of South Asia and sub-Saharan Africa.
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2 Intrahousehold Gender Gap in Education Ex-
penditure in Bangladesh
2.1 Introduction
Bangladesh has made a remarkable progress in gender equality in education over the
past two decades. Intensive education investment and interventions, particularly in
girls, helped narrow the gender gap in the school enrollment, highest grade attained,
and some other educational indicators (Ahmed et al., 2007). According to BANBEIS
(2006), only 34 percent of students enrolled in secondary schools were girls in 1990,
but this figure exceeded half by 1998. This success in closing the gender gap in
secondary school enrollment has indeed attracted much attention from researchers.
Various studies (Asadullah and Chaudhury, 2009; Behrman, 2015; Khandker et al.,
2003; Mahmud, 2003) indicate that the success in closing the gender gap in secondary
school enrollment owe at least partly to the stipend and tuition fee waiver targeted at
girls through various programs by the Government of Bangladesh (GOB) and donor
agencies, which we collectively refer to as the Female Stipend Programs (FSPs).
Begum et al. (2017) further show that the FSPs also benefit the siblings of the
affected children, creating indirect, long-term gains for the society.
Despite this improvement, girls lagged behind boys in the education outcomes
at the secondary level. Girls consistently underperformed boys both in terms of the
passing rate of the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) examination and the share
of top students who achieved the highest grade point average (GPA 5) in the SSC
exam as Figure 2 shows. Girls are also found to have higher rates of dropout and
grade repetition (Schurmann, 2009).
These observations appear to suggest that the investment in the quality of ed-
ucation may have been lower for girls than for boys, leading to the girls’ relative
underperformance in education. We, therefore, study the gender gap in the allo-
cation of educational expenditure to investigate the possibility that the quality of
education for girls may have been poorer than that for boys conditional on enroll-
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Figure 2: The solid lines represent the proportion of boys (blue) and girls (red) who
have passed the Secondary School Certificate (SSC) examination among those who
took the exam and the dashed lines represent the share of top students who achieved
the highest grade point average (GPA 5). Source: BANBEIS-Education Database
(http://data.banbeis.gov.bd/) accessed on Oct 29, 2017.
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ment. These observations appear to suggest that the investment in the quality of
education may have been lower for girls than for boys, leading to the girls’ relative
underperformance in education.
To this end, we develop a three-part model consisting of the following three
related decisions on the education of children in a household: 1) enrollment,27 2)
amount of education expenditure conditional on enrollment, and 3) share of edu-
cation expenditure allocated to the core component, which directly relates to the
quality of education as elaborated subsequently. Our model can be viewed as an
extension of the hurdle model adopted by Kingdon (2005), which only includes the
first two decisions, to incorporate a separate decision making for the investment in
the quality of education. Therefore, unlike Kingdon (2005), we are able to detect
the gender difference in the share of education expenditure allocated to the core
component, even if the total education expenditure is the same between boys and
girls.
Our three-part model has three noteworthy features. First, as with Kingdon
(2005), our model separates the parental decision on the investment in education
into the extensive and intensive margins—whether the child is enrolled in secondary
school and how much is spent on education conditional on enrollment. This sep-
aration is important particularly when analyzing the gender gap, because school
enrollment only reflects the quantity of education but not quality. Put differently,
the education investment in girls conditional on enrollment may be lower than that
in boys, even when the girls has a higher enrollment rate than boys.
Second, unlike Kingdon (2005), our model allows us to account for the gender
difference in how the education expenditure is used, a point that is mostly neglected
in the literature. To see the relevance of this point, consider a household with a boy
and a girl in which an equal amount is spent on the education of each child. Suppose
further that the education expenditure for the boy is mostly used to pay for home
27We define enrollment to be one if the education expenditure is positive and the child is enrolled
in secondary school, and zero otherwise. Around 0.39% of observations reporting to have enrolled
in secondary school with zero education expenditure are dropped. Thus, enrollment here refers
to secondary school enrollment with positive educational expenditure for the secondary-school age
group.
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tutoring whereas that for the girl is mostly used to buy better or more uniforms.
This gender difference in the pattern of education expenditure would reflect the
gender difference in the quality of education that they receive.
Third, our three-part model takes into account the correlations of the three
decisions conditional on observable characteristics. This is important because there
may be some unobservable characteristics, such as innate ability, which may affect
all three decisions simultaneously. For example, a smart child is more likely to be
enrolled in school due to the higher expected returns from education. However, the
child may require less education expenditure from the household than a less smart
counterpart, because of a lower need for home tutoring or higher chance of receiving
merit-based scholarships, for example. On the other hand, households may be more
encouraged to invest in children with a higher ability to learn.
We apply the three-part model to the observations of school-age children from
a total of four rounds of household surveys. Our analysis indicates that there is a
pro-female bias in the enrollment decision, but the decisions on the total education
expenditure and core share conditional on enrollment are biased against female in
recent rounds. While this gap exists both at the primary and secondary levels, it is
much more pronounced at the secondary level.
Our analysis also shows that the pro-female bias in enrollment became stronger
between 1995 and 2010. On the other hand, the strong pro-male bias in conditional
expenditure did not change much at the secondary level. Further, the decision on
the core share allocation has become more pro-male. This finding is interesting
because such inconsistency in the direction of gender bias is unique to Bangladesh
to the best of our knowledge. In particular, existing studies in other South Asian
countries such as India and Pakistan tend to find pro-male bias as elaborated in the
next section.
Therefore, a natural question that arises here is why the parents in Bangladesh
behave differently from other south Asian countries that share the historical root-
s and have broadly similar cultural, political, and economic backgrounds. Clearly,
gender discrimination alone fails to explain what is observed in Bangladesh, because
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it would also lead to pro-male bias in enrollment. We, therefore, explore the rele-
vance of the stipend program, because a comparable nationwide program does not
exist in India or Pakistan. We indeed find some evidence that the FSPs help explain
the inconsistency in the direction of bias. Therefore, while a program like FSPs may
help improve or even reverse the gender gap in the quantity of education, it does
not necessarily fill the gap in the quality of education. Hence, even though policies
to narrow the gender gap in the quantity of education are desirable, policy-makers
should be also wary of the potential implications for the quality of education.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews related stud-
ies and discusses our paper’s relevance and contributions to the existing studies.
Section 2.3 introduces the three-part model. Section 2.4 describes the data and re-
ports key summary statistics. Main empirical findings are presented in Section 2.5.
Section 2.6 investigates the relevance of FSPs to observed pattern of gender bias
pattern. We then provide a diagrammatical analysis in Section 2.7 to explain our
findings, followed by the conclusion in Section 2.8.
2.2 Relevance to Existing Studies and our Contributions
Classical household theory suggests that decisions on intrahousehold resource allo-
cation depend on preferences, investment returns, and time and income constraints
(Behrman et al., 1982). Preferences may change over time with changing social
norms. For example, Blunch and Das (2015) reports that younger cohorts have a
more positive attitude towards gender equality than older cohorts in Bangladesh.
Invest returns also matter. As Asadullah (2006) argues, if the labor market returns
to education for girls is higher than that for boys, parents would be more motivated
to invest in the former. On the other hand, if education of girls is deemed to bring
about no returns to their parents or to lower the prospect of marriage, parents may
be discouraged to invest in girls. This argument is true even when parents have no
inherent gender bias. Indeed, this possibility is consistent with the experiment by
Begum et al. (2016), who find that no systematic inherent gender bias by parents.
Therefore, as noted by Lehmann et al. (2012), human capital investment in children
47
in the same household may vary by a number of factors such as cognitive endow-
ments, gender, and age and income of parents at the time of birth even though
children possess similar genetic endowments. The current study relates to these
studies by not only examining how much is spend on each child’s education but also
by dissecting the way the education resources are spent.
Many studies have found that parents tend to invest systematically more in sons
than in daughters in developing countries (e.g., Deaton (1989) and Li and Tsang
(2003)). This study relates to this literature and is built in particular on King-
don (2005), who first incorporated the Working-Leser specification of Engel Curve
approach into the hurdle model to study the gender bias in education expenditure
in rural India. This model allows for the following two separate channels through
which gender bias may exhibit: (1) enrollment and (2) conditional education expen-
diture. She found a pro-male bias in the enrollment decision but found no evidence
of gender bias in educational expenditure among enrolled children. Azam and K-
ingdon (2013) revisit this study with more comprehensive data from India and find
that the pro-male bias persists. This finding is also supported by Majumder et al.
(2016) using Heckman’s two-step model in West Bengal and Saha (2013) using the
Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition approach.
Besides India, the hurdle models have been applied to other countries, including
Kenayathulla (2016) in Malaysia, Aslam and Kingdon (2008) in Pakistan, Masterson
(2012) in Paraguay, and Himaz (2010) in Sri Lanka as summarized in Table 2.2. This
table shows that pro-male bias is not ubiquitous; pro-female bias was detected in Sri
Lanka and no gender bias was found in Malaysia. Wongmonta and Glewwe (2017)
also find a bias in favor of females in Thailand, though they do not use a hurdle
model.
Table 2.2 also shows that the directions of the biases for enrollment and condi-
tional education expenditure are always consistent (i.e., if one of them is positive
and significant, then the other is never negative and significant). Furthermore, the
direction of the bias was pro-male both in India (Azam and Kingdon, 2013; Kingdon,
2005) and Pakistan (Aslam and Kingdon, 2008), which share historical, socioeco-
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Table 10: Existing Studies Using Hurdle Model
Paper Data & Year Sample Age d Cond y
Kingdon (2005) 16 states in Rural India, 1994 5 to 14 − ≈
Aslam and Kingdon (2008) Pakistan, 2001-2002 5 to 9 − ≈
10 to 14 − −
Himaz (2010) Sri Lanka, 1990-91, 1995-96, 2000-01 5 to 9 ≈ +
10 to 13 ≈ ≈
14 to 16 ≈ +
Masterson (2012) Paraguay, 2000-2001 5 to 14 (Rural) − −
5 to 14 (Urban) + +
Azam and Kingdon (2013) India, 2004-05 5 to 9 ≈ −
10 to 14 − −
Kenayathulla (2016) Malaysia, 2004-05 5 to 14 ≈ ≈
Note: −, + and ≈ mean pro-male bias, pro-female bias and no bias, respectively.
nomic, and cultural (India) or religious (Pakistan) backgrounds with Bangladesh. In
contrast, we find an inconsistency in the direction of gender bias with a pro-female
bias in enrollment and pro-male bias in total educational expenditure as elaborated
subsequently.
This study makes contributions to the following three broad areas. First, the
inconsistency in the direction of biases found in this study is new. It is also inter-
esting because no such inconsistency was found in other countries including India
and Pakistan as we have seen above.
Second, we make a modest but relevant contribution to the body of literature on
limited dependent variable models. Our model is related to the double hurdle model
originally proposed by Cragg (1971), which has been further extended and applied
to study, among others, the consumption of food away from home (Yen, 1993),
tobacco consumption (Aristei and Pieroni, 2008), and beef consumption (Jones and
Yen, 2000) besides the studies on education expenditure mentioned above. Both the
double-hurdle model and ours deal with a situation where the consumption amount
is observed only when certain conditions are satisfied. However, ours is different
because it has a third equation to model the core share in the total education
expenditure. Furthermore, we allow for possible correlations in the unobservable
error terms across different decisions. By taking advantage of this correlational
structure, we are potentially able to obtain more accurate coefficient estimates than
equation-by-equation regressions. The flexibility of our model enables us to detect
the inconsistency in the direction of gender bias.
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Finally, we provide a simple theoretical model somewhat similar to Dang and
Rogers (2015) to explain why the policies like the FSPs may translate into the
narrowing the gender gap in enrollment but not in the quality of education. Our
theoretical model also provides a plausible explanation on why girls have underper-
formed boys in the SSC exam and other education outcomes. It also provides a
cautionary lesson to researchers and policymakers that just increasing the enroll-
ment of female students does not automatically lead to a greater gender equality in
the quality of education children receive.28
2.3 The Three-Part Model
We extend the standard hurdle model, which consists of decisions on the school
enrollment of the child and the amount of education expenditure conditional on
enrollment, in two ways. First, we allow for correlations in the unobservable error
terms across all the equations. Second, we incorporate the share of education ex-
penditure on the core component in our model as the third part, which allows us
to analyze the way education expenditure is spent. The education expenditure not
spent on the core component is spent on the peripheral component, which do not
directly relate to the quality of education. The definitions of the core and peripheral
components are given in the next section.
Our three-part model formally has the following structure:
• Enrollment decision (d)
d = 1(x′dβd + d > 0), (2)
where xd, βd, and d are covariates, their coefficient vector, and idiosyncrat-
ic error term for the enrollment equation, respectively, where the covariates
include a dummy variable for girl to identify the gender effect. We use the
28 A related point was made in Shonchoy and Rabbani (2015). However, we provide more
complete explanations of this phenomenon with a theoretical model and more rounds of data. We
also investigate the gender differences in educational performance.
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subscript d to denote the decision on d. We also use the subscripts y and s
below in a similar manner.
• Education expenditure decision (y)
log(y) = x′yβy + y (3)
• Core component share decision (s)
s =

0 s∗ ≤ 0
s∗ 0 < s∗ < 1
1 s∗ ≥ 1
(4)
where s∗ = x′sβs + s is the latent variable for s.
Note that education expenditure (y) and core component share (s) are observed
only when the child is enrolled in school (i.e., d = 1).
To allow for the dependency across the three equations, we assume that the error
terms d, y, and s have the following trivariate normal distribution: dy
s
 ∼ N
0,
 1 ρdyσy ρdsσsρdyσy σ2y ρysσyσs
ρdsσs ρysσyσs σ
2
s

 , (5)
where the variance of d can be assumed to be unity without loss of generality.
There are four cases to consider in this setup: 1) the child is not enrolled in school
(d = 0), 2) the child is enrolled in school with all education expenditure going to
the peripheral component (d = 1 and s = 0), 3) the child is enrolled in school with
education expenditure going to both the core and peripheral components (d = 1
and 0 < s < 1), and 4) the child is enrolled in school with all education expenditure
going to the core component (d = 1 and s = 1).29
Given the model structure described by eqs. (2)-(5), the log-likelihood li for
child i given the parameter vector θ ≡ (βd, βy, βs, σy, σs, ρdy, ρds, ρys)T can be written
29Cases 2) and 4) are relatively rare in our data, accounting for 0.27% and 0.22% of all observa-
tions across years, respectively.
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as follows:30
li(θ) = 1[di = 0] · l1i + 1[di = 1, yi = y, si = 0] · l2i
+1[di = 1, yi = y, 0 < si < 1] · l3i + 1[di = 1, yi = y, si = 1] · l4i ,
where the log-likelihood lji for case j ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4} is given by the following with
ey ≡ log(y)−x
′
yβy
σy
and es ≡ s−x′sβsσs :
l1i = log
[
Φ(−x′diβd)
]
l2i = log(φ(eyi))− log(yi)− log(σy)
+ log
[
Ψ
(
x′diβd+ρdyeyi√
1−ρ2dy
, −x
′
si
βs+ρysσseyi
σs
√
1−ρ2ys
,
ρdyρys−ρds√
(1−ρ2dy)(1−ρ2ys)
)]
l3i = log
(
φ
(
eyi√
1−ρ2ys
))
+ log
(
φ
(
esi√
1−ρ2ys
))
+
(
ρys
eyiesi
1−ρ2ys
)
− log(yi)− log(σy)− log(σs)− log(
√
1− ρ2ys))
+ log
[
Φ
(
x′diβd(1−ρ
2
ys)+(ρdy−ρdsρys)eyi+(ρds−ρdyρys)esi√
(1−ρ2ys−ρ2dy−ρ2ds+2ρdyρdsρys)(1−ρ2ys)
)]
l4i = log(φ(eyi))− log(yi)− log(σy)
+ log
[
Ψ
(
x′diβd+ρdyeyi√
1−ρ2dy
,
x′siβs−1+ρysσseyi
σs
√
1−ρ2ys
,
ρds−ρdyρys√
(1−ρ2dy)(1−ρ2ys)
)]
.
The sample log-likelihood function is just the summation of individual log like-
lihood function. Therefore, the maximum-likelihood (ML) estimator θˆML for the
three-part model can be obtained as follows:
θˆML = arg max
θ
N∑
i=1
li(θ).
The primary coefficients of interest are those on the girl dummy in βd, βy, and βs.
If the signs on these coefficients are positive, they indicate a pro-female bias but the
opposite is true if the sign is negative. It should be noted here that the size of the
coefficient does not necessarily equate with the size of the effect, because the model
is nonlinear. Therefore, using the ML estimates, we calculate the marginal effects of
being a girl on the probability of enrollment as well as conditional and unconditional
30The detailed derivation of the likelihood function for each cases is provided in Appendix B.1.
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levels of the total education expenditure and core expenditure. Because we cannot
obtain a simple closed-form solution for the marginal effect due to the correlation
across error terms, we need to use numerical integration to calculate marginal effects.
The effects of girl on these quantities are computed as the change in the expected
value of the outcome of interest when the value of the girl dummy variable changes
from zero to one, where we use the following expressions for the conditional and
unconditional expectations:
E(d) = P (d = 1) = Φ (x′dβ1) (Expected enrollment)
E(y|d = 1) =
∫ ∞
0
yf(y|d = 1)dy (Conditional expected education expenditure)
E(y) = P (d = 1)E(y|d = 1) (Unconditional expected education expenditure)
E(ys) =
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
ysf(y, s)dyds (Unconditional expected core expenditure)
E(ys|d = 1) = E(ys)
P (d = 1)
=
E(ys)
Φ (x′dβ1)
(Conditional expected core expenditure)
where f(y, s) is the joint probability density function for y and s and the subscript i
is omitted for simplicity. We use simulations to compute the standard errors for the
equations above and evaluate only at the sample means to reduce the computational
burden of numerical integrations. The details of the mathematical expressions used
for numerical integrations and procedures for calculating the point estimates and
standard errors of the marginal effects are described in Appendix B.2.
2.4 Data
We primarily use the Household Expenditure Survey (HES) for the year 1995 and
Household Income Expenditure Survey (HIES) for the years 2000, 2005, and 2010,
all of which are conducted by the Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics.31 These datasets
provide detailed information on individual educational expenditure as well as socioe-
conomic and demographic characteristics of the households. We separately analyze
each round of survey for pre-SSC secondary-school age group—which are officially
31Top 1% observations with the highest total educational expenditure are dropped to exclude
outliers.
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ages 11 to 15.32 In addition, HES for the year 1991 is also used for the analysis of
timely graduation from secondary school but HES 1991 is not used for other analysis
because it does not contain individual-level education expenditure.
There are two reasons why we primarily study on secondary education. First,
as shown in Figure 3, there is a significant increment in education expenditure in
grade 6 and onwards in comparison with the primary level (grades 1-5). Second,
the government interventions are different for the primary and secondary levels. For
example, the FSPs targeted only at girls in secondary schools, whereas the Food for
Education program started in 1993 and its successor, the Primary Education Stipend
program started in 2002, were open to both primary-school boys and girls. While
the secondary education in Bangladesh can be divided into junior secondary (grades
6-8 or ages 11-13), secondary (grades 9-10 or ages 14-15), and higher secondary
(grades 11-12 or ages 16-17), we focus on the pre-SSC level or grades 6-10 because
passing the SSC examination is a major milestone in the educational attainment in
Bangladesh.
The analysis of older age groups, including the higher secondary and tertiary
levels, are beyond the scope of this paper, because the analysis gets more compli-
cated for several reasons. First, early marriage and pregnancy can result in grade
repetition and dropout for girls, but we have only limited information about each
child beyond gender and age. As a result, our three-part model cannot address these
issues and our estimates are likely to be confounded with early marriage and preg-
nancy. Second, the passing rate of the SSC examination was historically low, below
60% for most years before 2007 as Figure 2 shows. Since we do not have information
about whether the child has passed or failed the SSC examination, our estimate of
the gender effect is likely to be confounded with the results of SSC examination.
Finally, the proportion of girls in higher education was very small in earlier years,
making it difficult to attain reliable estimates.
We include the following set of covariates in all of our regressions for all three
equations (i.e., eqs. (2)-(4)): demographic characteristics of the household such as
32Official primary-school age group is ages 6 to 10 in Bangladesh.
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Figure 3: Nominal education expenditure in taka by year, gender, and grade
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the age and gender of the child, the age and gender of the household head, loga-
rithmic household size, logarithmic expenditure per capita, the number of children,
head’s working status and religion, and parental education in years. In addition, we
include urban dummy to capture the geographical heterogeneity in parental invest-
ment on children’s education in each equation. The choice of these covariates are
consistent with the existing studies such as Kingdon (2005), Aslam and Kingdon
(2008), Masterson (2012), and Azam and Kingdon (2013).
We also include some variables that affect some but not all equations. Our model
allows this flexibility of adopting different sets of covariates for each of eqs. (2)-(4).
School accessibility may heavily affect the enrollment decision particularly in de-
veloping countries such as Bangladesh where the infrastructure and institutions are
underdeveloped. Meanwhile, it is unlikely to heavily affect education expenditure.
Thus, in eq. (2), we additionally include the numbers of secondary schools and
madrasas per thousand people in the area of residence, which is a district for the
years 1995, 2005, and 2010 and a subdivision for the year 2000, as measures of school
accessibility. For the years 1995, 2005, and 2010, we obtain the numbers of secondary
schools and madrasas at the district level from BANBEIS (1995), BANBEIS (2006)
and BANBEIS (2010). For the year 2000, we obtain these numbers at the subdivi-
sion level from Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (2002). We then divide the number
of schools by the population figures taken from the Population and Housing Census
for the year 2001. For eq. (3), school type variables 33 are added as different school
types may affect tuition, uniform, and other education fees. The logarithmic edu-
cation expenditure is separately added to control the education expenditure in the
33We use three school types: government, private and all other schools. Other schools include
NGO schools, madrasas and other types of schools. While the choice of school type is potentially
important, we choose not to model it for three reasons. First, government schools are very rare in
Bangladesh, which accounts for less than five percent of all secondary schools based on BANBEIS
(1995), BANBEIS (2006) and BANBEIS (2010). Second, there is a significant mismatch in the
distribution of school types between the HIES data and other sources. The proportion of children
in government schools in our data is around 20 percent, which is much higher than five percent
or less reported by BANBEIS or Education Watch. This discrepancy may in part stem from the
public nature of private schools in Bangladesh, where private school teachers are often paid by
the government. Lastly, the tuition fee reflects the quality of education as discussed below and
Appendix B.3. It should also be noted that our results remain qualitatively similar even when the
school-type variables are dropped from the regression.
56
Table 11: Summary statistics of basic covariates by gender for 1995 and 2010
(secondary-school age group)
1995 2010
Boy (B) Girl (G) Diff (G-B) All Boy (B) Girl (G) Diff (G-B) All
Variables (1) (2) (2)-(1) (4) (5) (6) (6)-(5) (8)
All children aged 11-15
Enrolled in secondary school 0.349 0.370 0.021 0.359 0.465 0.560 0.095 0.511
(0.477) (0.483) (0.480) (0.499) (0.496) *** (0.500)
Child’s age (yrs) 13.022 12.903 -0.119 12.966 12.980 12.896 -0.084 12.940
(1.369) (1.351) *** (1.362) (1.389) (1.372) ** (1.382)
HH per capita expenditure 10.222 11.512 1.29 10.832 28.434 28.659 0.225 28.543
(8.062) (11.161) *** (9.673) (19.044) (21.466) (20.248)
Household size 6.634 6.807 0.173 6.716 5.518 5.605 0.087 5.560
(2.507) (2.518) ** (2.513) (2.005) (1.868) * (1.940)
Father’s education (yrs) 3.691 3.951 0.26 3.814 2.780 2.832 0.052 2.805
(4.426) (4.578) ** (4.500) (4.150) (4.172) (4.160)
Mother’s education (yrs) 1.960 2.262 0.302 2.103 2.484 2.579 0.095 2.530
(3.085) (3.347) *** (3.215) (3.595) (3.674) (3.633)
Number of children 3.658 3.794 0.136 3.722 2.932 3.036 0.104 2.982
(1.862) (1.913) ** (1.888) (1.438) (1.444) *** (1.442)
Urban 0.314 0.365 0.051 0.338 0.342 0.335 -0.007 0.339
(0.464) (0.482) *** (0.473) (0.474) (0.472) (0.473)
Female head 0.084 0.089 0.005 0.086 0.131 0.139 0.008 0.135
(0.277) (0.285) (0.281) (0.337) (0.346) (0.342)
Head is a wage worker 0.354 0.365 0.011 0.359 0.407 0.404 -0.003 0.405
(0.478) (0.482) (0.480) (0.491) (0.491) (0.491)
Head’s age (yrs) 46.466 46.556 0.09 46.508 47.142 46.827 -0.315 46.990
(11.188) (11.115) (11.152) (10.597) (10.554) (10.577)
Muslim 0.898 0.890 -0.008 0.894 0.898 0.887 -0.011 0.892
(0.303) (0.313) (0.308) (0.303) (0.317) (0.310)
Hindu 0.094 0.101 0.007 0.097 0.093 0.103 0.010 0.098
(0.292) (0.301) (0.296) (0.290) (0.305) (0.297)
Obs 2,641 2,370 5,011 3,209 2,996 6,205
Enrolled in secondary school children aged 11-15
Govt school 0.16 0.18 0.02 0.17 0.23 0.20 -0.03 0.22
(0.37) (0.39) (0.38) (0.42) (0.40) * (0.41)
Private school 0.79 0.81 0.02 0.80 0.70 0.69 -0.01 0.70
(0.41) (0.40) (0.40) (0.46) (0.46) (0.46)
Other school 0.05 0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.03 0.09
(0.21) (0.11) *** (0.17) (0.26) (0.30) *** (0.28)
Obs 921 877 1,798 1,493 1,679 3,172
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the mean. ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote that the means of girl and boy are different at 1, 5,
10 percent significance levels, respectively. The unit for household per capita expenditure is thousand taka. Other school includes all types
of schools other than government and private schools, including religious schools (like madrasas) and NGO schools.
core share equation (i.e., eq. (4)).
Table 11 reports descriptive summary statistics for the secondary school enroll-
ment, and basic covariates (as discussed above) disaggregated by year and gender
of the child in the secondary-school age group, regardless of the enrollment status
of the child for the years 1995 and 2010.34
The first row in Table 11 shows that girls are on average more likely to be
enrolled in school. The gender difference in enrollment was small and not statistically
significantly different from zero by a t-test of equality of means in 1995, but it has
become larger and statistically significant since the year 2000. This fits well with the
common observation of the reversal of the gender gap from pro-male to pro-female
in school enrollment in Bangladesh in recent years (e.g., Asadullah and Chaudhury
(2009)).
34The summary statistics for the years 2000 and 2005 corresponding to Table 11 are reported in
Table 47 in Appendix B.5.
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Table 11 also shows that girls tend to be younger and live in a larger household
than boys. Over the years, there is an increase in the enrollment rate for both genders
and an impressive rise in the nominal household per capita expenditure, where it
has almost tripled in 2010 compared with that in 1995. There are improvements
shown by other indicators such as an increase in mother’s education.
Next, we analyze the pattern of education expenditure using the subsample of
children who were enrolled in secondary school at the time of survey. Table 12
reports summary statistics of each education expenditure item in nominal terms for
the years 1995 and 2010.35 The table shows that the average education expenditure
has rapidly increased.36
Figure 3 further demonstrates the trend in gender disparity of average education
expenditure based on the grade of child enrolled in school at the time of survey for
each year. There are three points to note from this figure. First, boys are getting a
larger share of educational investment than girls conditional on enrollment. Second,
the gap is widening for higher grades except 1995, especially at the secondary level
(grade 6 onwards). Finally, the education expenditure has a positive correlation
with grade and increased over years for both genders.
As mentioned earlier, we categorize the items of education expenditure into core
and peripheral components. The core component includes tuition, home tutoring,
and materials, where materials refer to expenses on textbooks, exercise books, and
stationary. The peripheral component includes the other recorded items: admis-
sion, examination, uniform, meals, transportation, and others, which are typically
perceived to have only a marginal relevance at best to the quality of education.
It is reasonable to include the tuition fee in the core component because it appears
to reflect, at least to some extent, the quality of education provided by the schools
in Bangladesh. If schools face some degree of competition, those schools which
35The same summary statistics for the years 2000 and 2005 are reported in Table 48 in Ap-
pendix B.5.
36The rate of increase for education expenditure has been faster than the inflation rate. For
example, between 2005 and 2010, the average annual inflation rate in consumer prices was 8.6
percent based on World Bank statistics, and the annual rate of increase in secondary education
expenditure was around 17 percent in the same period.
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consistently provide only low-quality education at a high tuition will exit the market
such that a positive correlation between the quality of education and tuition would
emerge. As elaborated in Appendix B.3, an analysis of separate dataset provides
suggestive evidence that a higher tuition reflects higher quality of education based
on the relationship between the average tuition fee and test score at the primary
level.
We also include home tutoring in the core expenditure. It is widely documented
that home tutoring can be an important educational input and this is also the case
in Bangladesh. It is not uncommon in Bangladesh for public school teachers to serve
as private tutors for their students. In some cases, the teachers deliberately teach
less in the regular classes to gain more incomes from private tutoring. Given such a
possibility, home tutoring must be included into the core component.
Nevertheless, a concern about the interpretation of the spending on home tutor-
ing may arise here. On one hand, home tutoring would raise the overall education
quality that the child receives. On the other hand, if home tutoring is given only
to weaker students and boys are generally weaker than girls, the pro-male bias in
the core share we show subsequently may be driven by the relatively weak academic
performance of boys. However, we argue that this is highly unlikely given that girls
have underperformed boys in the passing rate and share of top students in the SSC
exam over years as shown in Figure 2 earlier.
Finally, it is also reasonable to include materials in the core component, because
reading more textbooks and doing more exercises also directly contribute to the
academic performance. However, one could argue that more expensive books are
not necessarily of higher quality. Thus, the inclusion of materials in the core com-
ponent is admittedly disputable. Therefore, we repeated our analysis excluding the
materials from the core component (unreported) but the results are qualitatively
similar. In sum, our choice of the definition of the core component is reasonable, if
not undisputable, and consistent with available empirical and anecdotal evidence.
Table 12 presents the descriptive statistics for each education expenditure item
for the years 1995 and 2010. From the table we see that the core component accounts
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Table 12: Summary statistics of education expenditure by items for secondary-school
enrollees in 1995 and 2010
1995 2010
Boy (B) Girl (G) Diff (G-B) % Zeros Boy (B) Girl (G) Diff (G-B) % Zeros
Taka (1) (2) (2)-(1) (4) (5) (6) (6)-(5) (8)
Core 1,672.7 1,582.1 -90.6 1% 5,239.4 4,284.8 -954.6 0%
(1,616.3) (1,539.7) (5,081.9) (4,362.9) ***
Tuition 275.0 193.7 -81.3 32% 548.7 296.2 -252.5 46%
(312.7) (304.9) *** (963.1) (606.0) ***
Home Tutor 802.8 788.8 -14 45% 3,273.2 2,626.5 -646.7 26%
(1,298.1) (1,225.6) (4,334.5) (3,745.4) ***
Material 594.9 599.5 4.6 1% 1,417.5 1,362.1 -55.4 1%
(429.2) (414.8) (950.1) (929.4) *
Peripheral 717.2 747.3 30.1 1% 2,109.8 2,066.8 -43 0%
(877.9) (791.3) (2,223.5) (2,076.6)
Admission 126.4 138.4 12 24% 371.2 336.6 -34.6 21%
(211.3) (196.8) (657.3) (561.2)
Exam 115.2 123.7 8.5 5% 301.3 295.1 -6.2 5%
(145.8) (138.9) (287.9) (270.3)
Uniform 215.2 249.3 34.1 45% 618.8 629.5 10.7 19%
(289.6) (278.4) ** (534.4) (657.7)
Meal 40.3 4.9 -35.4 99% 423.9 377.3 -46.6 58%
(463.6) (57.7) ** (805.8) (744.1) *
Transportation 87.0 109.2 22.2 81% 204.7 311.4 106.7 85%
(332.7) (393.8) (817.7) (1,079.6) ***
Others 133.0 121.7 -11.3 44% 190.0 116.9 -73.1 75%
(281.3) (343.9) (1,272.9) (775.7) *
Total 2,389.9 2,329.4 -60.5 7,349.2 6,351.6 -997.6
(2,111.5) (2,030.0) (6,150.7) (5,524.3) ***
Core Share 0.68 0.65 -0.03 0.67 0.63 -0.04
(0.19) (0.20) *** (0.18) (0.19) ***
Obs 921 877 1,493 1,679
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the mean. ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote that the means of girl and boy are different
at 1, 5, 10 percent significant levels, respectively. The summary statistics is for subsample of children who were enrolled in
school at the time of survey. Core share stands for the ratio of core components over total education expenditure. The annual
session and registration fees are also included in admission because they are not separately reported in HES 1995.
roughly two-thirds of the total education expenditure and boys have a significantly
higher share than girls. Within the core component, home tutoring fee is the major
cost item but a considerable share of children have no spending on home tutor in both
years. There is an obvious trend in the popularity of home tutoring over the years,
particularly among higher grades. In 1995, 45% of secondary students reported to
have no private tutors, but this ratio dropped to 26% in 2010, showing increasing
dependency on home tutors. This may also indicate that parents are willing to invest
more in children’s education for better quality of education beyond the typical costs
like schooling fees.37 Table 12 also shows that girls on average have lower spending
on tuition and a significant share of children have zero spending on tuition fee (32%
in 1995 and 46% in 2010), which can be explained by the tuition waiver provided
by various programs including the FSPs discussed in detail in Section 2.6.
37Of course, alternative interpretations are possible. For example, the increasing popularity of
home tutoring may reflect the deteriorating quality in school education because of overcrowding
of classrooms or teacher absenteeism (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006).
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2.5 Main Results
In this section, we present our main results. We first show the ML estimates of the
three-part model. We then perform similar regressions under alternative specifica-
tions to show the robustness of our results. Finally, we compute the marginal effects
of being a girl with the method discussed at the end of Section 2.3 to provide results
with direct quantitative interpretations.
Estimation of coefficients
Table 13 presents the ML estimates of the coefficient on the girl dummy in the
three-part model for each year and for each of primary- and secondary-school age
groups.38 It is shown that the gender gap for the primary age group is smaller than
that for the secondary-school age group, and thus we hereafter focus on the analysis
of the secondary-school age group.
Columns (4) to (6) of Table 13 show the presence of clear and strong pro-female
bias in enrollment decision from the year 2000 onwards after controlling for the
observables discussed in Section 2.4. That is, other things being equal, parents are
more likely to send girls to school than boys. In contrast, conditional on enrollment,
the core component for girls tends to account for a lower share of the total education
expenditure than that for boys. Column (5) reveals that, conditional on enrollment,
households are spending significantly less on girls’ education than boys’ for all the
four years. The gender gap in 1995 somewhat differs from the three more recent
rounds. While we still see pro-male bias in conditional education expenditure, the
coefficient on the girl dummy is substantially smaller in absolute value and the
coefficients for enrollment and core share equations are insignificant. We will revisit
this issue in Section 2.7.
While the girl dummy is the main covariate of interest, other covariates included
in our regressions are also of interest. Therefore, we briefly summarize our findings
here. The details of the regressions presented in Table 13 are reported in Table 49 in
38Equation by equation regressions (i.e., under the assumption of uncorrelated errors where
all the ρ’s are zero) yield similar results and are presented in Table 50 in Appendix B.5. The
importance of introducing the dependent error structure is also discussed in Appendix B.5.
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Table 13: ML estimation of the three-part model by years and age groups
Primary-school age (6-10) Secondary-school age (11-15)
d Cond y Cond s d Cond y Cond s
Coef. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1995
Girl -0.031 -0.013 -0.016 -0.001 -0.085*** 0.001
(0.036) (0.033) (0.012) (0.042) (0.032) (0.032)
Obs. 6485 5011
2000
Girl 0.061* -0.114*** 0.009 0.339*** -0.174*** -0.082***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.010) (0.039) (0.049) (0.014)
Obs. 5600 4878
2005
Girl 0.048 -0.076** -0.023** 0.291*** -0.154*** -0.071***
(0.035) (0.033) (0.009) (0.034) (0.027) (0.012)
Obs. 6481 5638
2010
Girl 0.134*** -0.066** -0.019* 0.289*** -0.131*** -0.067***
(0.032) (0.029) (0.010) (0.033) (0.025) (0.009)
Obs. 7272 6205
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels.
Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in paren-
theses. The estimations are obtained using three-part model construct-
ed in Section 2.3. In all regressions, the following covariates are also
included: logarithmic per capita expenditure, logarithmic household
size, father’s and mother’s education in years, number of children, fe-
male head, wage-worker head, head’s age, and religion (muslim/hindu),
and urban area. In addition, secondary school and madrasa school ac-
cessibility variables, school types (government/private school) and log-
arithmic education expenditure are also controlled in d, Cond y and
Cond s, respectively. Detailed results for secondary-school age group
are presented in Table 49 in Appendix E.
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Appendix B.5. In general, children in richer households are more likely to be enrolled
and receive a higher expenditure on education but a lower core share. Parental
education, especially mother’s education, has a similar effect qualitatively in all
three decisions. The more educated parents are, the more likely children will enroll
in school and get more education expenditure, despite a lower core share, indicating
the presence of positive intergenerational transmission in education. Somewhat
surprisingly, the number of children has no effect as most of its coefficients are not
significant. The difference between urban and rural areas exhibits an interesting
pattern. Children in rural areas are more likely to enroll in school, but have lower
education expenditure conditional on enrollment. These differences may be caused
by various aid programs targeted to rural areas. If the head is a wage worker, child
has a lower probability of attending school. Other covariates, such as the logarithm
of household size, head’s sex, age, and religion, are not statistically significant. The
coefficients on school-type variables show that children going to private schools spend
more on education than those going to government schools. As to the core share
decision, the estimated coefficients on the logarithmic education expenditure are all
positive but insignificant. Finally, the importance of school accessibility in affecting
enrollment decision is worth highlighting. When the number of secondary schools
per thousand people in the area of residence is higher, children are more likely to
enroll, while the accessibility for madrasas does not seem to have much impact.
Because of the grade repetition and delayed entry into school, some secondary-
school age children may be still in primary school and some post-secondary-school-
age children may be still in secondary school. To see if the presence of these children
affects our results, we re-estimate the same model with an alternative definition of
age groups where primary- and secondary-school age groups are defined as 6-11 and
12-17, respectively. The results are quantitatively and qualitatively similar.39
To understand the time trend of the gender bias in education expenditure, we
estimated the three-part model for all years simultaneously with time fixed effect and
its interaction term with the girl dummy. As the regression results with the pooled
39Results are available upon request.
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sample in Table 14 show, the gender bias pattern detected are consistent with the
year-by-year results. That is, a pro-female bias is found in enrollment decision but
a pro-male bias is found in conditional expenditure and core share decisions. The
coefficients on the interaction terms between the year and girl dummy show that
enrollment decision has become more pro-female. On the contrary, the core share
has become more pro-male. The conditional expenditure did not change much over
time.
Table 14: Results of the pooled regression with the three-part model
d Cond y Cond s
Coef. (1) (2) (3)
Girl 0.029 -0.097*** -0.032***
(0.040) (0.033) (0.010)
Y00 -0.036 0.224*** -0.017
(0.039) (0.035) (0.011)
Y05 -0.042 0.400*** -0.037***
(0.040) (0.032) (0.013)
Y10 -0.161*** 0.541*** -0.054***
(0.045) (0.035) (0.016)
Girl ×Y00 0.317*** -0.059 -0.050***
(0.055) (0.047) (0.015)
Girl ×Y05 0.259*** -0.072* -0.034**
(0.053) (0.042) (0.014)
Girl ×Y10 0.260*** -0.038 -0.032**
(0.052) (0.041) (0.013)
Obs 21,732
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at
1, 5, 10 percent levels. Standard errors clustered
at the household level are reported in parenthe-
ses. Additional controls include the set of co-
variates discussed in Table 13 except that the
school accessibility variables are constructed at
subdivision level for all years to make this vari-
able comparable across years. Year 1995 is the
base year for comparison in these regressions.
Therefore, Table 14 indicates that the apparent inconsistency in the direction
of gender bias did not change and, if any thing, strengthened by the fact that the
pro-female bias in enrollment became stronger while the pro-male bias stayed the
same in conditional expenditure and were strengthened in core share decision.
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Robustness of Estimation
There are some endogeneity concerns, which may bias our estimation, in the results
presented above. Therefore, we perform similar regressions under alternative speci-
fications that would mitigate these concerns to show that our estimates are robust
to these endogeneity concerns. We also conduct the analysis separately for urban
and rural areas to show that our main findings hold in both areas.
To understand the endogeneity concern, recall that Table 11 shows that girls on
average live in a household with significantly more children and household members
than boys. This may be explained by the fertility stopping rule with unobserved
parental preference towards boys (Jensen, 2002). That is, if parents have a preference
for a boy, they may continue to try to have more children until they have a boy,
leading to a bigger family size for girls on average. Hence, the unobserved parental
preference may simultaneously affect both the household’s demographic composition
as well as the education expenditure on children such that the unobserved error terms
may be correlated with the covariates.
To partially address this concern, we include the household size and number of
children in the set of covariates to control for the differences in the household struc-
ture in our regressions. However, these controls would not fully address the poten-
tial endogeneity concerns relating to the family structure. Therefore, we run linear
regressions with household fixed effects to control for all household-level observ-
able and unobservable characteristics in addition to the individual-level observable
characteristics. The signs of the coefficient on the girl dummy variable from these
estimations are broadly consistent as can be seen from Table 15, though the level
of significance drop for the conditional expenditure decision. This may be partly
because of the smaller sample size as we use subsample of children from households
with at least two children in secondary-school age group.
Another concern regarding this family structure issue is that girls are likely
to face a stiffer competition with siblings than boys because the former have more
siblings than the latter on average. Therefore, our main results may be driven by the
differential competitions for boys and girls. To mitigate this issue, we also analyze
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Table 15: Results of linear regressions with household-level fixed effects
Coef. d Cond y Cond s
(1) (2) (3)
1995
Girl -0.006 -0.139* -0.014
(0.028) (0.076) (0.027)
Obs 2,834 1,076 1,076
2000
Girl 0.076*** -0.063 -0.043*
(0.028) (0.090) (0.025)
Obs 2,695 1,015 1,015
2005
Girl 0.098*** -0.032 -0.018
(0.028) (0.068) (0.015)
Obs 2,587 1,084 1,084
2010
Girl 0.095*** -0.078 -0.050***
(0.031) (0.061) (0.019)
Obs 2,551 1,220 1,220
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical signifi-
cance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. Standard
errors are reported in parentheses. Each
point estimate corresponds to one linear
regression. Household-level fixed-effects
terms as well as the age fixed effects are
included in all regressions. In addition,
school type dummies for government and
private school are controlled in column
(2) and logarithmic education expendi-
ture is added in column (3). All other co-
variates are absorbed in the household-
level fixed effects.
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a subsample of households in which there is only one child. This arguably mitigates
the gender difference in the level of competition within the household. Because of the
small sample size used for this analysis, it is difficult to draw definitive conclusions,
but the results reported in Columns (1) to (3) of Table 16 indicate that the biases
remain but become weaker. Similar results are obtained when we restrict the sample
to be children living in households with one boy and one girl in secondary-school
age group. Therefore, the competition within the household appears to be a part of
the source of bias, though the explanatory power is limited.
Because of the differences between urban and rural in economic environment,
labor market development, and social attitudes towards female education among
others, one may argue that rural and urban areas should be separately analyzed.
Moreover, as shown in Section 2.6, the FSPs only covered non-metropolitan areas.
Thus, we re-estimate the analysis of the three-part model separately for the urban
and rural areas. As the results in Table 17 show, the directions of the gender gap
in three equations are essentially the same except that they are less pronounced in
1995. The comparison of the two areas also shows that the gender gap in rural areas
is clearer than that in urban area.
Marginal Effects
Because the regression coefficients do not translate into a readily interpretable quan-
tity, we evaluate the marginal effect of being a girl at the sample mean using the
formulae presented at the end of Section 2.3. The estimated marginal effects are
presented in Table 18. Column (1) shows the difference between girls and boys
in probability of enrollment. There is a significant pro-female bias except in 1995.
In 2010, girls are 11.6 percentage points more likely to enroll in secondary schools
than boys at the sample mean. The effects on conditional expectations are shown
in columns (3) and (5) and male students apparently have an advantage over fe-
male students in having more education expenditure and higher amount spent on
the core components. For example, the differences in the total education expendi-
ture between boys and girls in 2005 was 416.6 taka at the mean of the subsample
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Table 16: Linear regressions by subsamples with different family structure
Only Child One-boy-one-girl
d Cond y Cond s d Cond y Cond s
Coef. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1995
Girl 0.023 0.097 -0.056* 0.010 -0.139 0.001
(0.052) (0.151) (0.032) (0.033) (0.096) (0.041)
Obs 314 113 113 1,076 423 423
2000
Girl 0.064 -0.130 -0.013 0.069** -0.135 -0.044
(0.052) (0.142) (0.038) (0.032) (0.091) (0.029)
Obs 286 108 108 1,146 447 447
2005
Girl 0.025 -0.129 -0.042 0.099*** -0.037 -0.022
(0.048) (0.095) (0.028) (0.032) (0.077) (0.017)
Obs 382 169 169 1,190 526 526
2010
Girl 0.040 -0.089 -0.046** 0.093*** -0.068 -0.054**
(0.038) (0.076) (0.018) (0.035) (0.070) (0.022)
Obs 580 305 305 1,086 510 510
Basic covariates Y Y Y Y∗ Y∗ Y∗
HH fixed effects N N N Y Y Y
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. Standard
errors clustered at household levels are reported in parentheses. The estima-
tions are obtained by equation-by-equation OLS estimations for each dependent
variable. Only child subsample contains child from the household with only one
child. One-boy-one-girl subsample contains children from the households with
exactly two children, one secondary-school age boy and one secondary-school age
girl.
∗: The girl dummy and age fixed effects are included in columns (4)-(6). In
addition, the school type dummies and logarithmic education expenditure are
included, respectively, in columns (5) and (6). All other covariates are absorbed
in the household-level fixed effects.
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Table 17: Estimation of the three-part model by the urban and rural subsamples
Urban Rural
Coef. d Cond y Cond s d Cond y Cond s
1995
Girl 0.094 0.008 -0.030* -0.047 -0.131*** 0.010
(0.072) (0.047) (0.016) (0.053) (0.043) (0.047)
Obs 1,695 3,316
2000
Girl 0.310*** -0.024 -0.047** 0.365*** -0.277*** -0.116***
(0.073) (0.053) (0.021) (0.047) (0.059) (0.019)
Obs 1,598 3,280
2005
Girl 0.264*** -0.102** -0.054*** 0.318*** -0.177*** -0.081***
(0.060) (0.046) (0.016) (0.042) (0.034) (0.016)
Obs 1,921 3,717
2010
Girl 0.376*** -0.095** -0.069*** 0.255*** -0.151*** -0.069***
(0.057) (0.043) (0.015) (0.041) (0.032) (0.011)
Obs 2,102 4,103
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. The
same set of covariates is used as in Table 13 except that the urban dummy
is dropped.
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Table 18: Marginal effects of the girl dummy at the sample mean
Marginal effects on E(d) E(y) E(y|d = 1) E(ys) E(ys|d = 1)
Year (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1995 -0.001 -40.5 -181.9*** -7.8 -110.5
( 0.016) ( 26.3) ( 67.7) ( 16.3) ( 92.7)
Obs. 5011 5011 1798 5011 1798
2000 0.126*** 152.5*** -224.7*** 11.5 -312.7***
( 0.014) ( 29.8) ( 76.3) ( 24.6) ( 62.5)
Obs. 4878 4878 1885 4878 1885
2005 0.114*** 145.6*** -416.6*** -0.4 -367.3***
( 0.014) ( 47.6) ( 80.8) ( 40.3) ( 56.6)
Obs. 5638 5638 2579 5638 2579
2010 0.116*** 313.0*** -616.8*** 3.2 -604.9***
( 0.014) ( 80.6) (146.7) ( 51.7) ( 98.7)
Obs. 6205 6205 3172 6205 3172
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. Standard
errors obtained by simulation with 100 replications are reported in parentheses.
E(·) stands for the expectation of the variable in the brackets. Estimates in
column (1) are the marginal effect of the girl dummy on the expected enrollment
in secondary school for the children in the secondary-school age group. The
marginal effects presented in Columns (2) to (5) are in taka in nominal terms.
Unconditional [Conditional] expectations are evaluated at the mean of the full
sample [subsample of secondary-school enrollees].
of secondary-school enrollees. Similarly, there exists a significant pro-male bias in
the core component expenditure from 2000 onwards. However, as shown in column
(2), when we combine the probability of enrollment and conditional expenditure
effect together, girls have a higher unconditional education expenditure than boys
on average except 1995. Further, the gender gap in the unconditional core edu-
cation expenditure became negligible as shown in column (4). This highlights the
importance of decomposing the education expenditure decision into different parts.
The results above consistently show that girls received less expenditure in the
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core component than boys conditional on enrollment across years, and this gender
gap grew over time. However, because the core component consists of multiple items,
including tuition, private tutoring, and materials, we further investigate this gender
gap by item-by-item Tobit regressions. We report the marginal effect of being a girl
at the sample mean for the secondary-school enrollees in Table 19. We find that
girls receive significantly less investment in tuition than boys for all the survey years.
Girls also receive less in home tutoring, though not all the differences are significant.
On the other hand, the only item for which girls somewhat consistently receive a
higher amount is uniform but this difference does not make up for the disadvantages
in other expenditure items. Therefore, girls have overall lower education expenditure
and lower core expenditure conditional on enrollment and this female disadvantage
mainly comes from tuition and home tutoring.
2.6 Analyzing the Role of FSPs
Given the apparent inconsistency in the direction of gender bias we found in the
previous section, a natural question that arises here is what explains this inconsis-
tency. Because a nationwide female-targeted stipend program was implemented in
Bangladesh during our study period and because clear pro-male bias was observed
in India and Pakistan, where no such program was implemented, we conjecture that
the FSPs may have played some role and explore this possibility in this section.
First, we provide a brief background of the FSPs. We then study the impact
of FSPs in four aspects. First, we incorporate the FSPs information in the three-
part model constructed in Section 2.3 by exploiting the individual status of the
receipt of FSPs and the regional variations in the FSP intensity. We show that
the FSP recipients receive more educational investment conditional on enrollment
than nonrecepients, but have a smaller share in the core component. By further
including the girl recipient ratio (GRR), or the number of FSPs recipients over the
total number of girls at the same age and in the same division of residence, and
its interaction with the girl dummy, we show that girls are more likely to enroll
in areas with a higher FSP intensity but receive lower educational investment in
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Table 19: Tobit marginal effect of the girl dummy on education expenditure by
expenditure item among secondary-school enrollees
Expenditure in Taka 1995 2000 2005 2010
Core -178.7*** -284.1*** -259.8*** -649.9***
(62.7) (70.9) (77.4) (137.6)
Tuition -228.9*** -488.0*** -694.6*** -669.0***
(26.6) (38.4) (60.8) (63.5)
Home Tutor -142.7 -199.1* -100.1 -578.8***
(87.4) (101.9) (108.2) (153.6)
Material 1.7 -5.4 -23.1 -14.9
(19.3) (21.1) (20.5) (31.1)
Peripheral 6.4 31.0 -45.0 59.8
(35.1) (37.5) (45.5) (69.6)
Admission 8.8 -20.5 -15.0 -26.9
(11.5) (13.0) (15.5) (24.8)
Exam 6.9 -2.3 9.6 -1.0
(6.4) (6.7) (6.2) (10.2)
Uniform 70.0*** 86.5*** 25.3 49.1*
(22.7) (22.5) (23.8) (25.9)
Meal -310.6 44.9 -52.4 -59.5
(840.1) (37.4) (40.7) (57.7)
Transport 9.2 -7.8 57.7 723.8***
(65.8) (95.3) (109.7) (187.7)
Obs 1,798 1,885 2,579 3,172
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels.
Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in paren-
theses. Marginal effects using Tobit regressions of education expendi-
ture items evaluated at the mean of the subsample of secondary-school
enrollees are reported. The covariates are the same to those used in
columns (2) and (5) of Table 13. The annual session and registration
fees are also included in admission because they are not separately
reported in HES 1995.
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the core component than boys. Second, by exploiting the fact that the FSPs was
rolled out nationwide only in 1994 and only covers for girls’ secondary education,
we use a triple difference strategy to identify the impact of the FSPs on school
enrollment. Third, we hypothetically mute the effect of tuition waiver for girls,
which is one of the major instruments of the FSPs and show that tuition waiver is
an important policy instrument by which the parents are incentivized to send their
girls to secondary schools. All these analyses indicate the relevance of the FSPs
in explaining the gender bias we have detected in education expenditure. Finally,
we explore the impact of FSPs on gender gap in education using timely graduation
from secondary school as an indicator of educational outcome. The results suggest
that the FSPs did not fill the gender gap in this outcome among the primary-school
graduates.
Background of FSPs
The FSPs rolled out nationwide in 1994 consist of four projects, including the Fe-
male Secondary School Assistance Project funded by International Development
Association and GOB, Female Secondary Stipend Project funded by GOB, Sec-
ondary Education Development Project funded by Asian Development Bank and
GOB, and Female Secondary Education Project funded by Norwegian Agency for
Development Cooperation (NORAD).
With the goal of encouraging female education, all FSPs provide financial assis-
tance to eligible female students in grades 6 to 10. They only cover unmarried girls
studying in secondary schools which have signed a Cooperation Agreement with the
GOB, and metropolitan areas are excluded. At the entry points (grades 6 and 9),
all female students from eligible institutions are eligible to benefit from the FSPs
regardless of her past attendance or performance. However, three conditions must
be met for the continuation of the program; the recipients are required to i) attend
at least 75 percent of the school days, ii) secure a minimum of 45 percent marks in
the annual school exam, and iii) remain unmarried until the SSC examination.
The FSPs disburse the financial assistance through commercial banks in two par-
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allel installments per academic year.40 Based on Bangladesh Ministry of Education
(1996), the stipend money, together with the book allowance if the recipient is in
grade 9 and the examination fee if she is in grade 10, is disbursed to the recipients’
personal bank account. When the money is withdrawn from the bank, the girls
have to go personally to the assigned venue on a fixed date. The FSP recipients
are also entitled to enjoy free tuition and schools are directly paid by the FSPs.
However, around 15 percent of the FSP recipients pay some tuition fee in our data,
even though the amount paid by them is lower than nonrecepients.
It should also be highlighted that students in grade 8 were not covered in the
FSPs in 1995, because the FSPs were not rolled out at the time when they are at
the entry points. Further, the FSP coverage in 1994 was substantially lower. As a
result, the coverage of students in other grades also appear to be lower than later
years. According to BANBEIS (2006), the number of FSP recipients was only 70
thousand in 1994. The number jumped to 1.4 million in 1995 and more than doubled
in the following two years. It continued to increase rapidly until reaching its peak
of 4.2 million in 2002 after which it dropped to 2.3 million in 2005. These numbers
are significant both in absolute terms and relative to the size of cohort (17.3 million
in 2005) and enrollment (7.4 million in 2005) for the secondary-school age group.
With the intention of improving the quality of education and reaching out to the
poor regardless of gender, the FSPs were subsequently replaced by the Secondary E-
ducation Quality and Access Enhancement Program (SEQAEP) in December, 2007.
Thus, FSPs are relevant only to the first three rounds of our data, namely 1995,
2000, and 2005, whereas the SEQAEP was in place in 2010. As with the FSPs, the
policy on the paper for the SEQAEP does not appear to have been strictly adhered
to. For example, the quota for female recipients in the SEQAEP was supposed to
be 60 percent but girls account for 80 percent of the recipients in our data.
40The monthly stipend amount increases with grade progression, which starts from 25 taka for
grade 6 and reaches 60 taka for grade 10. It roughly covered less than half of expenditure for
secondary education. The tuition rate also increases with grade, from 10 taka to 15 taka for
government schools grade 6 to 10, respectively. The tuition rate is 5 taka per month more for
private schools. By design, it was supposed to cover tuition cost for recipients. The detailed
stipend and tuition rates are displayed in Table 2 of Bangladesh Ministry of Education (1996).
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Because of the lack of clarity in the way the resources for the FSPs and SEQAEP
are allocated and because of the lack of information on the individual eligibility of
these programs in our dataset, our analysis is necessarily based on the actual receipt
of the program. Furthermore, clean identification of the impacts of FSPs (and
SEQAEP) is difficult for two reasons. First, the assignment of FSPs is nonrandom
as there are some eligibility criteria. Second, we have limited data for the pre-
FSPs period. In particular, individual-level information on education expenditure
is only available from the year 1995 when the FSPs already started. Nevertheless,
we provide some suggestive evidence that FSPs are indeed a factor contributing to
the inconsistency in the direction of gender bias in Bangladesh.
Incorporating FSPs information
To try to understand the impact of FSP at the individual level, we use the HIES
data for the years 2000 and 2005 as they contain information on the individual status
of the receipt of FSPs.41
The educational expenditure on the FSPs recipients are affected because they
enjoy tuition waiver as well as receiving a certain amount of stipend provided by
FSPs. Thus, we include the dummy variable for FSP recipients, who are all girls,
in the conditional expenditure and core share equations. The regression results are
reported in first three columns of Table 20. The coefficients on the girl dummy
for the conditional expenditure and core share equations become more negative.
The point estimates on the FSP dummy are positive in the conditional expenditure
equation while they are significantly negative in the core share equation for both
years.
To understand where this impact occurs, we report in Table 52 in Appendix B.5
the marginal effects using item-by-item Tobit regressions, which are similar to those
41HES 1995 does not contain the information on the FSP status. HIES 2010 data was also not
used because FSPs was already terminated. It should also be noted that the HIES 2000 data
appears to underrepresent the FSP recipients. Based on BANBEIS (2006), the ratio of the number
of FSPs recipients to the number of female enrolled secondary school students is 86%, while the
figure directly derived from the HIES 2000 data is 59%. Therefore, the interpretation of the results
for the year 2000 requires some caution. This issue does not exist for the year 2005.
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Table 20: Three-part model estimation with the FSP status
Year Coef. d Cond y Cond s d Cond y Cond s
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Girl 0.339*** -0.245*** -0.062*** 0.228** -0.236*** -0.018
(0.039) (0.054) (0.019) (0.091) (0.085) (0.028)
FSP 0.123** -0.034** 0.149*** -0.037**
2000 (0.049) (0.015) (0.051) (0.017)
GRR 0.769** -1.299*** 0.247**
(0.346) (0.297) (0.121)
Girl × GRR 0.378 -0.100 -0.138*
(0.286) (0.260) (0.078)
Obs. 4878 4878
Girl 0.289*** -0.178*** -0.058*** 0.110 -0.107 -0.007
(0.034) (0.034) (0.014) (0.093) (0.072) (0.025)
FSP 0.046 -0.026*** 0.075** -0.025***
2005 (0.036) (0.009) (0.036) (0.010)
GRR 0.470 -1.004*** 0.020
(0.306) (0.227) (0.093)
Girl × GRR 0.656** -0.308 -0.184**
(0.315) (0.233) (0.081)
Obs. 5638 5638
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. Standard errors clus-
tered at the household level are reported in parentheses. GRR stands for the ratio of girl
recipients to all girls at the division-age level. Additional controls include the covariates dis-
cussed in Table 13.
reported in Table 19, but they are calculated for both girl and FSP dummies this
time. This analysis shows that the FSPs recipients spend less on tuition as expected
because the tuition is waived for FSP recipients. For home tutoring and materials,
the FSP recipients are getting more than nonrecepients, though this does not offset
the amount of shortfall in the tuition expenditure. Thus, the FSP recipients still
get less in the core component. For the items in the peripheral component, the FSP
recipients get a higher expenditure in most items, especially in uniform, meal, and
transportation. Because there may be systematic difference between FSPs recipients
and nonrecepients, we cannot make a causal inference, but our results suggest that
FSP did not increase the core expenditure conditional on enrollment.
Next, we study the spillover effect of FSPs exploiting the variations in the in-
tensity of FSPs across regions and ages. The FSPs intensity variable, GRR, is
constructed by the ratio of recipients among girls at division-age level. We also
include its interaction term with the girl dummy in all the regressions and report
the estimation results in Columns (4) to (6) of Table 20. The results show that girls
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living in more FSP-intensive divisions (for their age) are more likely to be enrolled
in school. This indicates that FSPs may have a positive spillover effect on families
living in the same area such that parents are more likely to enroll their children,
particularly daughters, in school. However, there is no evidence that FSPs facilitate
parental investment in the quality of education for girls. The coefficient on the inter-
action terms in the conditional education expenditure is negative for both 2000 and
2005, and the same coefficient in the conditional core share equation is significantly
negative in both years.
Impact on School Enrollment
The analysis so far has been based on a sample of children in their secondary-school
age group at the time of survey. It is also possible to estimate the impact of FSPs
by looking at the education from a larger sample, including adults at the time
of survey with retrospective panel data. However, because of the lack of data on
past education expenditure, we necessarily need to restrict our attention only to
the enrollment. It is nevertheless still useful to verify whether the FSPs positively
affected the enrollment from a different perspective.
To be specific, we use an empirical strategy similar to Heath and Mobarak (2015),
where the enrollment status of individuals are retrospectively constructed for each
year between 1960 and 2005 (for HIES 2005) or 2007 (for HIES 2010) from the
highest completed grade and birth year. Then, we restrict the sample to the set
of people who are aged between 6 to 15 in each year to match our school age
definition.42 Using these data, the impact of FSPs is identified by a triple difference
estimator, where the differences are taken i) between boys and girls, ii) between the
periods before and after 1994, the year in which the FSPs were rolled out nationwide,
and iii) between those who have and those who have not completed primary schooling
in a given year. The primary completion status essentially serves as the potential
FSP-eligibility, and this is where our approach diverges from Heath and Mobarak
42We also conduct similar analysis for those aged between 5 and 18 to match the definition of
school-age children used in Heath and Mobarak (2015). The results are qualitatively the same.
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(2015) and explains why our results qualitatively differ from theirs. We elaborate
this point in Appendix B.4 and argue that our specification is better suited to
capture the impact of FSPs.
To be more specific, we estimate for girl i in household h in year t:
Enrolliht = α1Girlih + α2Post1994t + α3Primary Gradiht
+ α4Post1994t × Primary Gradiht + α5Girlih × Post1994t
+ α6Primary Gradiht ×Girlih
+ α7Post1994t × Primary Gradiht ×Girlih
+ λ0t + λ
1
t ×Girlih +
a=15∑
a=6
β0a × 1(Age = a)
+
a=15∑
a=6
β1a × 1(Age = a)×Girlih + θh + iht, (6)
where βs, λs, and θh represent, respectively, age-gender-, time-gender-, and household-
specific fixed effects.
The estimated coefficients of α1-α7 are presented in Table 21, where α7 is of our
main interest. The table shows that the triple-difference estimates of the impact
of FSPs on enrollment are all positive and significant. This is true whether or not
we include the household fixed effects and whether we use the HIES data for the
year 2005 or 2010. Therefore, based on our preferred specification of fixed effects
model, the FSPs have increased the enrollment by 8.3-11.7 percentage points, which
is broadly consistent with the marginal effects found in Table 18.43 Therefore,
while Table 21 has nothing to say about the effect of the FSPs on the educational
expenditure or core share, it strengthens our finding that the FSPs had a positive
impact on the secondary-school enrollment for girls and contributed to the observed
reversal of the gender gap in the secondary enrollment.
43This comparison is not meant to be strict. Recall that Table 18 reports the marginal effect at
the sample mean and not average marginal effect. In addition, the dependent variable for column
(1) in Table 18 is probability of enrolled in secondary school, while we study the probability of
remaining in school (regardless of the grade) in Table 21.
78
Table 21: Triple-difference estimation of the impact of the FSPs on school enrollment
with retrospective panel data
2005 HIES 2010 HIES 2005 HIES 2010 HIES
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Girl -0.205*** -0.215*** -0.211*** -0.184***
(0.018) (0.013) (0.021) (0.014)
Post 1994 -0.378*** 0.323*** -0.439*** 0.202***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.012)
Primary Grad 0.164*** 0.225*** 0.625*** 0.714***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Post 1994 × Primary Grad -0.003 -0.106*** -0.051*** -0.205***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Post 1994 × Girl 0.230*** 0.279*** 0.220*** 0.245***
(0.021) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016)
Primary Grad × Girl -0.144*** -0.176*** -0.125*** -0.157***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Post 1994 × Primary Grad × Girl 0.117*** 0.083*** 0.074*** 0.042***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.013) (0.013)
HH fixed effects Y Y N N
Obs 236,258 348,516 236,258 348,516
R2 0.334 0.339 0.335 0.339
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. The estimation is
based on the OLS estimation of eq. (6). Standard errors clustered at the household level
are reported in parentheses. Primary grad dummy is defined to have value 1 if the person
has completed at least grade 5. The age group used in the analysis is 6 to 15.
Muting the FSPs Tuition Waiver
As mentioned above, the tuition waiver is an important instrument of the FSPs.
The tuition waiver encourages enrollment but also tends to reduce the conditional
expenditure and core share among the school enrollees. However, the latter negative
effects may be spurious. This may be perhaps simply because the FSPs are crowding
out the household’s tuition expenditure for girls through tuition waiver; FSPs might
not have any impact on the conditional expenditure and core share without the
tuition waiver.
To see if this is a possible explanation, we attempt to mute the impact of the
tuition waiver by conducting two alternative empirical exercises: exclusion and im-
putation. In the exclusion exercise, we remove the tuition fee from the calculations
of both the total education expenditure and core expenditure. In the imputation
exercise, we impute the tuition fee for the FSP recipients using the prediction model
based on the survey year, gender, grade, school type, enrollment, stipend recipient
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Table 22: Three-part model estimation with the impact of the tuition waiver muted
Year Model d Cond y Cond s
Exclusion 0.322*** -0.081* -0.062***
(0.039) (0.045) (0.013)
2000 Imputation 0.324*** -0.072 -0.055***
(0.039) (0.047) (0.011)
Baseline 0.339*** -0.174*** -0.082***
(0.039) (0.049) (0.014)
Exclusion 0.274*** -0.079*** -0.058***
(0.035) (0.028) (0.011)
2005 Imputation 0.279*** -0.106*** -0.050***
(0.035) (0.028) (0.010)
Baseline 0.291*** -0.154*** -0.071***
(0.034) (0.027) (0.012)
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10
percent levels. Standard errors clustered at the house-
hold level are reported in parentheses. Additional con-
trols include the covariates discussed in Table 13. In the
exclusion exercise, tuition fee is excluded from both to-
tal education expenditure and core expenditure. In the
imputation exercise, we impute the tuition fee for FSP
recipients using the predicted value from a linear model
with survey year, female, grade, school type, enrollment,
stipend recipient dummy, and district of residence. The
baseline results are those presented in Table 13.
dummy, and district information. The imputed tuition fee would reflect the tuition
fee parents would have to spend had their daughter not received a tuition waiv-
er. The results of these two exercises are presented in Table 22 together with the
baseline model estimations for the ease of comparison.
Compared with the baseline results, the absolute value of the coefficient on the
girl dummy gets smaller for all three equations after turning off the impact of tuition
waiver either by exclusion or imputation. This finding indicates that a part of
our finding is indeed driven by the spurious effect coming from the tuition waiver.
However, as Table 22 shows, the signs and statistical significance of the coefficient on
the girl dummy remain the same. Therefore, the earlier finding of the inconsistency
in the direction of bias still remains valid even after muting the effects of tuition
waiver.
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Impact on Timely Graduation from Secondary School
The FSPs appear to have improved the quantity of education in terms of enrollment.
However, the FSPs have also been criticized for the lack of attention on education
quality (Mahmud, 2003; Raynor and Wesson, 2006). Our analysis presented so far
indeed aligns with this argument. If the quality of education for girls lags behind
that for boys, the educational outcome is likely to suffer. In fact, we argue that the
educational outcome should be the ultimate concern for researchers and policymak-
ers.
Unfortunately, our data do not contain standard outcome measures of education
such as test scores. Therefore, we use the completion of secondary school (rough-
ly) on time as an indicator of education outcome. This is a reasonable outcome
indicator because it is not trivial to pass the SSC exam.44 Based on our age group
classification, a child is regarded to have completed secondary school (roughly) on
time if he/she has already passed at least grade 10 (SSC or equivalent) when he/she
is in age 16-20. Because the HES for the year 1991 also contains information to
construct the indicator for completion on time (but not individual-level information
on education expenditure), we use five rounds of survey data for this analysis.
The year-by-year estimated effects of being a girl on the completion on time by
OLS regressions are reported in columns (1)-(5) of Panel A, Table 23. It has became
less pro-male and the beginning of the narrowing of the gap roughly corresponds
to the onset of the FSPs, which seems to indicate that FSPs helped in closing the
gender gap in timely completion of secondary education.
However, if we restrict the sample to those who have already completed primary
education, the picture looks different as Panel B of Table 23 first five columns show.
The gender gap in the timely completion of secondary education conditional on the
completion of primary education is larger than in the unconditional sample except
for the year 1991, which is before the start of the FSPs. This result indicate that
44To complete secondary education, the child has to pass the SSC exam. As shown in Figure 2,
the passing rate varies and may be as low as 40 percent depending on the year. Thus, without a
certain level of mastery of secondary-level curriculum, the child will not be able to complete the
secondary school.
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the narrowing gender gap observed in Panel A may be due to the improvement in
girls’ secondary enrollment. If more girls are enrolled, they have higher probability
of completion. In addition, it is also consistent with our previous finding that the
quality of education for girls conditional on enrollment consistently lagged behind
that for boys.
Next, we conduct analysis with the FSP intensity (GRR; the ratio of recipients
to all girls at the division-age level) and its interaction term with the girl dummy.
Because the timely graduation from secondary school analysis reflects the accumula-
tive impact of FSPs in the past 5 years, we use lagged GRR in the regression. That
is, we use the GRR for the year 2000 [2005] in the analysis of timely graduation in
the year 2005 [2010]. The results are presented in the last two columns of Table 23.
For all children aged between 16 and 20, girls living in more program-intensive areas
are less likely to graduate on time because the point estimates for the interaction
term are negative. When we look only at the subsample of those who have complet-
ed primary education, the pro-male gender gap is significant in more FSPs intensive
areas. Thus, we find no evidence that the FSPs improved girls’ education quality.
2.7 Diagrammatical Analysis
While the enrollment rate for girls at the secondary level has substantially increased
relative to that for boys over the last two decades in Bangladesh, the findings in
the previous sections demonstrate that the quality and performance for girls lagged
behind those for boys conditional on enrollment. Therefore, even though the FSPs
appeared to have helped eliminate the gender gap in enrollment, it did not reduce
or remove the gap in the investment in quality.
A simple demand-supply diagram for the market of education quality for the
secondary-school children is helpful for the understanding of this result. In Figure 4,
we show the demand and supply curves for the market of education quality. While
we abstract away from the details of the market of education quality, it can be
considered as home tutoring for the ease of understanding. The black solid line in
the figure represents the supply for the education quality. Its demand curves for
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Table 23: OLS regressions of completing Secondary education on time by year
Sec complete on time 1991 1995 2000 2005 2010 2005 2010
Coef. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Panel A: All individuals aged 16-20
Girl -0.043*** -0.053*** -0.043*** -0.014 -0.005 0.004 0.065**
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.011) (0.020) (0.027)
Lagged GRR 0.242*** 0.699***
(0.091) (0.091)
Girl×Lagged GRR -0.064 -0.261***
(0.070) (0.094)
Obs 3,043 3,752 3,988 5,055 5,316 5,055 5,316
Panel B: All primary graduates aged 16-20
Girl -0.019 -0.081*** -0.063*** -0.022* -0.024* 0.032 0.088***
(0.027) (0.019) (0.017) (0.013) (0.014) (0.027) (0.033)
Lagged GRR 0.345*** 0.835***
(0.122) (0.115)
Girl×Lagged GRR -0.201** -0.425***
(0.094) (0.116)
Obs 1,223 2,113 2,621 3,716 4,089 3,716 4,089
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. Standard errors clustered at
household level are reported in parentheses. The dependent variable is a dummy variable for the com-
pletion of secondary school on time, which takes one if an individual aged between 16 and 20 at the time
of survey had already completed grade 10 or higher. Lagged GRR is the GRR at division-age level five
years before the survey. In 2005 [2010], we use GRR for the year 2000 [2005]. In all regressions , the
following covariates are also included : logarithmic expenditure per capita, logarithmic household size,
the dummy variables for the household heads’ education level (primary, secondary and higher), female
head, wage-worker head, head’s age and religion (muslim/hindu), and urban area. Panel A uses a sample
of all individuals aged between 16 and 20 and Panel B uses a subsample of primary graduates among
them.
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Figure 4: Demand and supply for the investment in the education quality.
girls and boys are shown in solid red and blue lines, respectively. In this figure, the
demand for girls is always lower than that for boys, representing pro-male bias in the
market for education quality. The aggregate demand is the kinked line in purple.
In this case, the equilibrium price is given by (the length of) OA and equilibrium
demand for the boys and girls are AB and BC, respectively. The FSPs would reduce
the cost of sending children to school, which may in turn increase the demand for
the education quality, shifting the demand curve for the girls to the dashed red line.
Then, the lower part of the aggregate demand curve will also shift to the dashed
purple line. In this case, the new demand for girls will increase to DE whereas that
for boys will decrease to EF. The demand for the education quality for boys decrease
because of the higher equilibrium price resulting from higher completing demands
from girls. In this picture, the aggregate investment in the education quality for
girls would increase relative to that for boys as a result of the FSPs, and this is
arguably the natural outcome that may be expected from the FSPs.
However, this is clearly inconsistent with our earlier empirical findings. Figure 4
also allows us to explain why the expected outcome may not occur. First, the
demand for the quality of education may remain unchanged if the equilibrium price
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is above the choke price for girls. To demonstrate this point, suppose now that
the supply curve is the black dashed line, such that the equilibrium price is GH
regardless of the presence of FSP. In this case, the equilibrium demand for boys is
GH and that for girls is zero, whether or not an FSP is in place. Second, it is also
possible that the households who send girls to a secondary school because of the
FSP may be unwilling to invest in the education quality. In this case, the demand
curve for girls would be still the red solid line such that FSPs bring about no changes
in the market for education quality.
These possibilities are also consistent with our finding that the pattern of gender
bias is different in 1995 as shown in Table 13. Because the FSP coverage was
substantially lower in 1995 than in 2000 and 2005, it is not surprising that the gender
gap in enrollment was found insignificant in 1995. Furthermore, because many of
the compliers—the girls who would go to school if they receive FPS but wouldn’t
go otherwise—are probably not covered in 1995, the effect on the core component is
also small; if they were in school, they would receive very little investment in quality
from their parents such that the estimated coefficient on the girl dummy for the core
share would be small. While this discussion is somewhat speculative, it is consistent
with both the empirical results and diagrammatic analysis presented above.
Incidentally, the diagram we use here is somewhat similar to Dang and Rogers
(2015), who include private tutoring into the analysis of education in Vietnam.
However, our model is distinct in two important aspects. First, the decision to
enroll is not a particularly important decision in Vietnam as most children go to
school and thus enrollment decision is not separately considered.45 On the other
hand, whether or not a child is sent to a secondary school remains an important
household decision in Bangladesh. Second, we also explicitly distinguish between
boys and girls and use the diagram to analyze the impact of a policy.
45Dang and Rogers (2015) report that 87 percent of children aged between 6 and 18 were enrolled
in a school in the past 12 months in 2006.
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2.8 Conclusion
The allocation of educational resources is a key determinant of the human capital
accumulation for children and their employment in later life. With affirmative action
policies such as the FSPs in place, Bangladesh has achieved a significant improve-
ment in the quantity measures of education such as school enrollment and years of
schooling for girls.
Nevertheless, the quantity of education alone does not allow us to fully under-
stand the gender gap in education. As we saw in Figure 2, girls underperformed boys
in measures such as the passing rate and share of top students in the SSC exam.
We hypothesized that this may be because the monetary investment in education,
and the quality of education in particular, for girls may have been lower than that
for boys. To test this hypothesis, we developed and estimated a three-part model to
check the presence of gender-based gap in enrollment, total education expenditure,
and expenditure share on the core component using four rounds of household survey
data with detailed individual-level education expenditure data.
Our results demonstrate that there is a pro-female bias in enrollment but there is
a pro-male bias in total education expenditure and core share decisions conditional
on enrollment. This pattern is more pronounced at the secondary level than the
primary level. We also find that the gender bias has been persistent and signifi-
cant over the last one and half decades. While this pattern may be in part driven
by the presence of the unobserved parental preference simultaneously affecting the
family structure and intrahousehold allocation of education, this conclusion remains
unchanged even if we alternatively estimate a linear model for each outcome with
household fixed effects, which controls for all household-level observable and unob-
servable characteristics including the parental preference.
We also performed item-by-item Tobit regressions. This analysis suggests that
boys tend to receive more educational resources in the form of higher spending on
tuition and home tutoring. While girls receive more resources for uniforms, this
does not make up for the gap in other expenditure items such as tuition and home
tutoring. Further, higher spending on uniforms is unlikely to lead to higher quality
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of education. Taken together, despite the parents’ willingness to send girls to school,
they appear to invest less in the quality of education for girls than for boys.
At a first glance, this pattern may appear puzzling because the direction of gender
bias is inconsistent between the decision on enrollment and decision on educational
expenditure and core share conditional on enrollment. This pattern is also puzzling
because the neighboring countries such as India and Pakistan appear to have a
clearer pro-male bias.
However, we have provided some evidence that this apparent inconsistency is
at least in part driven by the FSPs. On one hand, the FSPs encourage more girls
to attend secondary schools through stipend and tuition waivers. This finding that
FSP had a positive impact on enrollment is robust. It holds across years and both in
urban and rural areas. The conclusion remains unchanged when the triple-difference
estimation is used with retrospective panel data instead of the three-part model. On
the other hand, the FSPs do not incentivize parents to invest more in the quality
of girls’ education. While our finding appears to be partly driven by the presence
of the tuition waiver in the FSPs, the significant pro-male bias in the educational
expenditure and core share remains even after muting the effects of tuition waiver.
We further investigated the impact of the FSPs on timely graduation from sec-
ondary school as an outcome measure of education. This analysis indicates that the
educational outcome for girls lags behind that for boys conditional on the comple-
tion of primary schooling. This is a result consistent with the aggregate measures
presented in Figure 2 and also with the presence of pro-male bias in the education
expenditure and core share. Therefore, putting these pieces of evidence together,
we conclude that the FSPs were successful in bringing girls to classrooms but not
in raising the quality of education they receive.
The current study highlights both the positive and (somewhat) negative aspects
of FSPs. The positive news is that the FSPs did achieve what they intended to
achieve. The FSPs certainly contributed to the promotion of gender equality in the
secondary enrollment. However, the FSPs did not fully achieve gender equality in
education because they did not raise the quality of education for girls relative to that
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for boys. There is no evidence that the FSPs attracted complementary investment
from the households in the quality of education. Indeed, the exact opposite is true, if
anything. Therefore, this study serves as a cautionary tale for policymakers in that
the quantity of education does not necessarily tell the whole story about the gender
gap in education. To truly achieve gender equality in Bangladesh, eliminating the
gender gap in the investment of households would be needed.
Clearly, doing so is a challenge and requires us to know why there is a pro-male
bias in the investment in quality of education, a question the current study is unable
to answer. Still, it is possible to consider at least two rational reasons, besides the
intrinsic gender bias of parents, why the pro-male bias may be observed. First, the
returns from the investment in the quality of education may be different. If parents
expect that girls will not be able to get a high-paying job even with high quality
education, it would be rational for them not to invest in the quality of education.
Note that they may still choose to send girls to school to receive the benefits of the
FSPs. Second, similar to the first point, the parents may believe that they receive
no returns in any case as girls will get married and bring about no economic returns
to them. On the other hand, they may believe that boys are the important source of
their retirement income. While exploring these possibilities is beyond the scope of
this paper, we view this as an academically interesting question that has important
policy implications to be explored in future research.
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3 Can a Vocational Training Program Empower
Women? Experimental Evidence from North-
ern Bangladesh
3.1 Introduction
Empowerment of women is an integral part of sustainable development. It is impor-
tant on its own and has been found to be positively correlated with human capital
accumulation of the next generation and subsequent economic growth. However, as
many parts of the developing world continue to endorse the patriarchal social val-
ue, many women still face a number of constraints that men do not face and enjoy
only less than equal rights to make their own choices. Such gender inequality is
particularly trounced in South Asia, Middle East, and North Africa. For example,
Bangladesh, the country of focus in this paper, ranks 139 out of 188 in the Gen-
der Inequality Index in 2015 by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP).
Bangladesh is not alone in this poor ranking in South Asia. India and Pakistan rank
131 and 147, respectively. Therefore, the empowerment of women clearly remains
an important challenge for these countries to tackle.
A widely held belief among the researchers and practitioners in international
development is that economic autonomy is an important channel to empower women
(World Bank (2011)). This may be so because women do not necessarily need to
depend on men to make a living. For example, an intrahousehold bargaining model
of a couple consisting of a husband and wife proposed by Lundberg and Pollak
(1993) indicates that the cooperative equilibrium of intrahousehold allocation would
be determined by, among others, the threat points of the couple, which reflect the
noncooperative outcomes for each member. Since the threat points depends on the
wife’s earning capacity, interventions to promote female labor market participation
and earning capacity have the potential to increase the women’s bargaining power
within the household and help achieve gender equality.
Therefore, Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) programs,
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if made available to women, may serve the purpose of increasing the skills of female
participants as well as the purpose of empowering women through the participation
in the labor market. Indeed, TVET programs have been promoted as a critical
instrument to promote female labor force participation in recent years (Chen and
Chindarkar, 2017). Nevertheless, there is at best mixed evidence on the effectiveness
of TVET programs in increasing the employability of participants (Card et al., 2015;
Fox and Kaul, 2017; Kluve et al., 2016; McKenzie, 2017). Furthermore, there is a
dearth of rigorous impact evaluations of TVET programs on female empowerment.
The objective of this paper is to investigate the relevance to female empow-
erment of a vocational training program targeted at the vulnerable poor in rural
northern Bangladesh through a randomized field experiment implemented in part-
nership with Gana Unnayan Kendra (GUK), a local non-governmental organization
(NGO). People in our study area are vulnerable to seasonal flooding and riverbank
erosion, leaving them far behind the rest of the country. The study area is a tra-
ditional society, where cultural norms, known as purdah, suppress the autonomy of
women and exclude women from public spaces.
The GUK’s training program is designed to help the vulnerable poor, both males
and females, in the study area to acquire skills relevant to and to tap into the em-
ployment opportunities in the Ready-Made Garment (RMG) sector, a sector that
has been rapidly expanding since early 1980s and is expected to continue to grow
in the foreseeable future. This program is unique because it is designed to tackle
the issues that many other programs adequately address. That is, GUK’s training
program consists not only of a skills training but also of a stipend to address the
credit constraint and an internship to provide the opportunities with the partici-
pants to get a first-hand experience in the RMG sector. Because the employment
opportunities in the RMG sector are predominantly in the outskirt of Dhaka, the
program also covers the travel expenses to encourage migration.
Because the GUK’s training program consists of multiple components, we at-
tempt to disaggregate its impacts to different components by having multiple treat-
ment arms in the experiment, where more components are progressively added on.
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In addition to the pure control group (C); our field experiment contains four treat-
ment arms. The information treatment group (T1) is given information about the
RMG sector. The training treatment group (T2) is given a free one-month skills
training in addition to the information. The stipend treatment group (T3) receives
a stipend on top of what T2 group receives. The internship treatment group (T4)
receives a one-month internship in a factory located in Dhaka after the skills training
in addition to everything T3 group receives.
We collected various indicators related to female empowerment, including so-
cial status, perception of female empowerment, freedom of movement, and decision
power, in the baseline survey and 12-month panel survey and supplementary in-
formation was collected in the short interviews over the phone during the 6- and
18-month follow-up surveys. We follow an approach similar to Kling et al. (2007)
and construct a normalized z-score index over a family of indices. Our approach is
slightly different in the sense that the control group at baseline is used as the refer-
ence group for constructing the indices such that we can also account for the changes
in the secular time trend in the control group in the difference-in-differences analysis
(DID). Because most of the questions that are used in this study are subjective in
nature and the heterogeneity in the way the respondents react to these questions
may well be different, the DID analysis potentially help us to obtain more accurate
estimates than the intention-to-treat analysis based on the pure-experimental design
because the DID analysis controls for the individual-level fixed effects.
Our empirical findings on the impact of the training program on female empow-
erment are mixed. We find that the training program on average increased both
male and female participants’ social status, and the increments are larger for wom-
en, narrowing the gender gap in the social status. This positive impact of treatments
appears to be durable even up to 18 months. Somewhat surprisingly, only the skills
training component appears to matter and the stipend and internship components
do not contribute significantly to the improvement of female participants’ social sta-
tus. In contrast, the internship component affects the male subsample heavily. The
training program also leads to freer movement of women after 12 months. The result-
91
s on the perception of female empowerment suggest that there is a non-monotonic
transition process. That is, women in the treatment groups exhibit less positive atti-
tude towards female empowerment than the control group after 6 months. However,
this different tends to disappear 18 months after the intervention. This may denote
an example that the change of social norms may take time and the transition process
may be uneven. We also find that men in the treatment groups show higher levels
of acceptance towards female empowerment than those in the control group after
the treatment. This indicates that the training program improves the acceptance
of female empowerment. On the other hand, the decision power of women in the
treatment groups becomes weaker than those in the control group.
Our study contributes to the existing literature in two aspects. First, there is
a significant gap in the literature on the impact of vocational training program on
rural poor in terms of female empowerment in developing countries. The established
results of impact of vocational trainings focus on the more direct outcomes, such as
employment and wage. Card et al. (2011) find a modest impact on wages and little
impact on employment using an experimental dataset from the Dominican Repub-
lic. Attanasio et al. (2011) introduce soft-skills along with vocational training to the
disadvantaged youth in Columbia and find positive impact for girls in labor market
outcomes. Similar finding is established by Acevedo et al. (2017) in Dominican Re-
public. However, these are evidence for middle-income countries. As to developing
countries, Bandiera et al. (2014) in Uganda and Cho et al. (2013) in Malawi focus
on self-employment and entrepreneurship and the impact is shown to be limited.
Even in studies where female empowerment status is mentioned, such as Chen and
Chindarkar (2017) which show that participating in a training program increases
the socioeconomic status of rural women in India, female empowerment is not the
focus of the study. Further, our study contributes to the understanding of which
components are important and which are not, especially when migration is involved
in making labor participation decisions.
Second, this study adds to the growing body of literature on the expansion of
RMG sector in Bangladesh. The RMG sector has been indeed an important driving
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force for the economic growth in Bangladesh (Ahmed, 2009). However, there are
also challenges, for example, in promoting a program training line supervisors and
narrowing the gender gap in the productivity and representation at the manage-
ment level (Macchiavello et al., 2015). This study contributes to this literature by
providing microevidence on the impact of job training on female empowerment with
a unique experimental dataset.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides background
information of the study context. Section 3.3 describes the experimental design and
estimation strategy. We then present data description and baseline comparisons in
Section 3.4, followed by our main results in Section 3.5. We conclude in Section 3.6.
3.2 Background
3.2.1 Women Empowerment
Bangladesh has made an impressive progress in promoting gender equality since
its independence in 1971. For examples, girls’ secondary school enrollment rate
has surpassed that of boys since 1998 (BANBEIS (2006)) and the gender gap in
infant mortality has narrowed. Realizing that empowerment of women is essential
for the achievement of sustainable development, the government of Bangladesh has
formulated the Women’s Development Policy in 1997 to empower women at all
stages.
Despite all these improvements and efforts, the patriarchal social norms persist
and women are still heavily constraint in taking part in social, political, and eco-
nomic activities in the country. Its status of women empowerment is reflected in
the country ranking on various global indices. As noted earlier, Bangladesh ranks
poorly in the Gender Inequality Index. Bangladesh is also among the bottom half of
the countries in the 2014 Global Gender Gap Index by the World Economic Forum.
Despite the massive economic transformation Bangladesh experienced over the
last three decades, Bangladeshi women today still face the traditional custom, known
as purdah, which secludes them from the outside world. Basically, women are not
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allowed to move freely outside the home, and this is particularly true in rural areas.
According to NIPORT, Mitra and Associations, and ICF International (2016), 41
percent of currently married women aged 15-19 are not allowed to go to a health
center or a hospital alone or accompanied by their children. Only eight percent of
the currently married women of reproductive age report that they are the main de-
cision maker for major household purchases. The prevalence of domestic violence in
Bangladesh has also drawn attention. The percentage of married women who have
ever experienced any kind of violence by husband is as high as 87 percentage report-
ed in Report on Violence Against Women Survey 2011. It is found that women’s
employment and access to wealth are strongly and negatively associated with experi-
encing domestic violence (NIPORT, Mitra and Associations, and ICF International,
2016). In general, the autonomy of women in economic activities strengthens their
bargaining power in intrahousehold allocation and improves women’s social status.
Thus, vocational training which enables women to get access to labor market could
be an important channel to empower women.
3.2.2 Ready-Made Garment Sector
The Ready-Made Garment (RMG) sector in Bangladesh has expanded rapidly over
the past decades and has become a top global exporter. Its main attractiveness
comes from competitive price and huge capacity. This high demand from the global
market boosts its export value. Based on Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and
Exporters Association (BGMEA) statistics, RMG generates over 80 percent of the
country’s total export earnings since 2013 and contributes more than 10 percent to
national GDP since 2005. With an average annual growth rate of 12 percent, RMG
sector is a key driving force behind the steady economic growth of Bangladesh.
Besides its contribution in economic activities, the RMG sector is also instru-
mental to the radical transformation of socio-economic conditions of the country.
Among the 4.4 million people currently employed in RMG, 80 percent are women,
and the majority of them are disadvantaged and poverty stricken. With these mass
employment opportunities, the awareness of women about various issues such as
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economic autonomy, women empowerment, human capital investment, health and
safety, population control, and disaster management may have increased.
However, the sector still faces various challenges (Berg et al., 2011). Among
them is the shortage of skilled workers. Without an adequate pool of labor force,
the competitive advantage of “Made in Bangladesh” in the RMG sector would be
impossible to sustain. It is predicted that the RMG sector will require up to six
million workers by 2020 after taking increasing productivity into consideration. This
in turn means that the sector will need an additional 1.5 million skilled workers
(Rahman and Hossain, 2017).
Currently, the RMG factories are concentrated in Dhaka and Chittagong. Never-
theless, the availability of workforce in these areas is limited. Therefore, to effectively
utilize the country’s excess labor supply elsewhere, either migrating trained workers
or diversifying the geographic locations of factories to more remote areas would be
needed. The former approach is likely to be more promising than the latter at least
in the short run, because transportation and electrification infrastructure is poor in
the rural areas. Thus, interventions to improve the skills of the rural people and
promote them to migrate may help not both the training participants themselves
and a sustained growth of the RMG sector.
3.2.3 The situation in northern Bangladesh
The northern areas of Bangladesh lag far behind the rest of the country. This
has resulted in an uneven distribution of gains from economic growth and human
development across regions. According to the BBS (2011), the poverty rate using
the Upper Poverty Line in Rangpur region was 46.2 percentage in 2010, well more
than 10 percentage points higher than the national average of 31.5 percent.
These northern areas are disaster-prone and people there are vulnerable to sea-
sonal flooding and riverbank erosion. They suffer from a famine-like condition known
as monga, which occur during the lean agricultural season of the main rice crop, nor-
mally from September to November and from March to April. Most people depend
on agriculture to make a living and employment drops significantly during the mon-
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ga period, leading to a dramatic reduction in the food intake and chronic extreme
poverty, which in turn negatively affect their productivity and keep them trapped in
poverty. This situation is particularly relevant to women, who suffer social exclusion.
The labor demand generated by the continued expansion of the RMG sector
provides people, especially women, in northern Bangladesh with an opportunity to
take up formal employment and achieve economic empowerment. The jobs available
in the RMG sector are potentially attractive to those poor who struggle to get out
of the poverty trap due to monga. Nevertheless, the poor in northern Bangladesh
are neither exploiting these opportunities nor benefitting from the RMG sector ex-
pansion. Even though 85 percent of the RMG workers are migrants (World Bank,
2008), only approximately five percent of the RMG employees are from the north-
ern Bangladesh. The analysis using Bangladesh Household Income and Expenditure
Survey 2010 data shows that the migration rate of the Rangpur division is only four
percent, which is far below the national level of 12 percent. Furthermore, the mi-
grants are predominantly male. In contrast, nearly 40 percent of our program par-
ticipants are female, which allow us to explore whether the opportunities presented
in the RMG sector can benefit both females and males equally.
3.3 Experimental Design and Estimation
3.3.1 Experimental Design
We study the impact of vocational training ”plus” program using a Randomized
Control Trial (RCT) experiment in the Gaibandha district of the Rangpur division,
a typical monga-prone area in northern Bangladesh. The participating households
were drawn from all the subdistricts of Gaibandha except for Gaibandha Sadar.46 A
total of 2,215 households that are “ultra-poor” and “moderately poor” households
with a household member aged between 18 and 30 were selected. In cases where
there are multiple members eligible for the training, one participant was chosen by
46The experiment was inspired by GUK’s training program named “Reducing Extreme Poor
by Skills Development on Garments” in Gaibandha Sadar. It made an impressive success but its
program design made it hard to assess its impact. To avoid contamination and minimize spillovers
from past GUK-garments program, Gaibandha Sadar was excluded from our sampling.
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lottery such that each sample household exactly has one potential participant in the
training.47 The households were then randomly allocated to one of the following
five groups:
(i) Information group (T1, 506 participants): A day-long job-related information
session was conducted at the union level in the implementation area. Informa-
tion provided include RMG factories in Dhaka, factory environment, working
conditions, hours of work, wage rate, overtime payments, and living environ-
ment in Dhaka. The participants also learn about the hiring procedure and
the required skills for securing such a job.
(ii) Training only group (T2, 506 participants): A one-month long (22 working
days) residential vocational training intervention was provided by GUK after
the same information session as T1. The training was delivered by experienced
trainers in the GUK’s training center with lodging facilities. The training was
designed to equip participants with skills to operate overlock sewing machines
and basic knowledge of the production process in the RMG sector. Each par-
ticipant received a training certificate from GUK upon successful completion
of the residential training program.48
(iii) Stipend group (T3, 506 participants): Participants in this group received the
same treatment as the T2 group. In addition, they received stipend to com-
pensate the forgone income during the training. A total of 3,500 BDT (about
45 USD) was given to each participant in two installments, one at the begin-
ning of the training and the other at the end to encourage them to complete
the treatment. The stipend amount was calibrated to be approximately equal
to the prevailing daily wage rate of 160 BDT (about 2 USD) multiplied by the
training period of 22 days.
(iv) Internship (T4, 506 participants): The same as T3, plus an intern in a factory
located in Dhaka. There are 14 RMG factories in Dhaka signed the Memo-
47See Shonchoy and Fujii (2017) for further details of the sampling.
48Because the recruitment process in the RMG sector is typically a ”walk-in-test” (Rahman and
Hossain, 2017), such a certificate does not carry much importance during the recruitment process.
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randum of Understanding (MoU) with GUK for the placement of OJT partic-
ipants. GUK internship placement office also facilitated the accommodation
arrangement for the participants in Dhaka. The migration cost, which covered
the transportation and initial moving cost, was borne by the participants using
the stipend allowance.
(v) Control group (C, 191 participants): No intervention was introduced.
Due to the limited training capacity of the GUK’s training center, a phase-in design
was adopted for the treatment groups. A total of 12 batches of training sessions
were conducted between November 2013 and November 2014. A baseline survey
was conducted before the randomization to collect detailed information about the
participants and their household. A panel survey was conducted 12 months after the
intervention. In addition, two short participant follow-up surveys were conducted
6 and 18 months after the intervention, respectively. To track the participants for
the purpose of the survey, each participant was given a SIM card and airtime credit
was topped up subsequently as an incentive for participating in these surveys. This
design helped us to limit the attrition at very low levels. Both the 6-month follow-
up and 12-month panel surveys have an attrition rate of below three percent. The
18-month follow survey has an attrition rate of about six percent.
3.3.2 Estimation
We first estimate the intent-to-treat (ITT) impact of the training program through
the following regression:
Yihj = β0+β1Infoihj+β2Trainihj+β3Stipendihj+β4Internihj+αXihj+µj+ihj (7)
where Yihj is the women empower indicator we are interested in of individual i in
household h originating from village j. βk(k = 1, 2, 3, 4) captures the ITT effect of
treatment k, i.e., the effect of being assigned to treatment k. µj and ihj are village-
and individual-specific error terms. All the reported standard errors are clustered
at the village level. To improve the precision of the estimates and to control for the
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differences between groups in the distribution in the baseline characteristics, we also
include a vector of individual- and household-level characteristics, Xihj.
Following Dupas and Robinson (2013), we further study the impact of each
component of the program, which essentially assume the additive separability of the
components. Based on the assumption, the estimated coefficients in the equation
above can be expressed as sum of the impacts of Information (INF), Skills Training
(SKT), Stipend (STP) and Internship (INT). The estimates of impacts on different
components can be summarized as follows:
β1 = INF (8)
β2 = INF + SKT (9)
β3 = INF + SKT + STP (10)
β4 = INF + SKT + STP + INT. (11)
Therefore, the impacts of INF, SKT, STP, and INT can be estimated by the esti-
mates of β1, β2 − β1, β3 − β2, and β4 − β3, respectively.
3.4 Data Description and Baseline Comparisons
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics of Empowerment Status
The dataset contains a rich set of information about the empowerment status of the
participants. We classify the variables into the following four categories: (i) social
status, (ii) perception of female empowerment, (iii) freedom of movement, and (iv)
decision power. For each category, we construct a summary index using a variant
of the method by Kling et al. (2007) as noted in the introduction. That is, we first
calculate the z-scores for each component variable in a category by subtracting the
control group mean and dividing by the control group standard deviation at the
baseline to make our indices comparable across time.49 Then, the summary index
is calculated as a simple average of these z-scores. All variables are normalized such
49Bandiera et al. (2014) also use baseline control group as reference group.
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that higher index values would indicate a better empowerment status. Because the
six- and eighteen-month follow-up surveys were conducted through phone calls, some
questions were omitted to keep the survey sufficiently short. As a result, except for
the social status and perception of female empowerment, the variables are available
only in the 12-month panel survey.
The social status index is the aggregation of six component variables: (i) self-
reported social status of individual; (ii) that of household; (iii) (dummy variable for)
whether the family gets invited to attend village meetings regularly; (iv) whether the
family gets invited to attend village level wedding regularly;50 (v) whether the par-
ticipant feels comfortable to attend this type of wedding; and (vi) whether they think
they have some decision power in the village. Perception of female empowerment
index summarizes responses to the following nine statements: (i) it is important
for women to work outside; (ii) women and men should be paid equally in gender
equivalent jobs; (iii) child rearing should be the responsibility for both father and
mother; (iv) housework is the responsibility of all members; (v) female family mem-
ber can be seen by male doctors if female doctor is not available; (vi) marriage is
the most important thing in women’s life; (vii) instead of working outside, women
should take care of the family; (viii) a man should be the sole decision maker and
a woman should obey; and (ix) son is more desirable than daughter as successor or
for future security. To ensure that higher index values indicate better empowerment
status, they are defined to be agreeing with the first five statements and disagree
with the last four.51
Another important empowerment status index is the freedom of movement,
which summarizes the dummy variables for whether the participants could go alone
to the following five common places: (i) doctor, (ii) friends/relatives, (iii) market,
(iv) Jatra/Mela/Cinema, and (v) village level judiciary operated by local elite. Fi-
50Over 90 percent participants report they are invited, so it is a common phenomenon in the
study area.
51The participants were asked to answer based on a scale 1-5 from strongly disagree to agree.
We define agree dummies to include both strongly agree and agree. However, there is an inconsis-
tency in the design of the questionnaire between baseline and follow-up surveys, the scale changed
direction. This may create confusion and thus lead to measurement error.
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nally, we created two dummy variables for the decision power of study participants—
one for being the primary decision maker in the household and the other for being
among the top three important decision makers—for each of the following decision-
s: food expenditure, routine household purchase, children’s education, whether the
participant can work, whether the spouse can work, the participant’s time for so-
cializing, that for the spouse, intergenerational transfer to parents (in law), savings,
sister’s marriage, own marriage, loan, and practicing hijab for the female members.
Then, for each of the primary and top three decision-maker dummy variables, the z-
score was created by taking the average of normalized scores across all the decisions
given here.
Table 24 presents the descriptive statistics of the empowerment indices for each
round of survey without distinguishing treatment and control groups. To further
present the status of female empowerment, we also report the descriptive statistics
for the female subsample in even number columns. The social status index exhibits
non-monotonic pattern across time. It increases till the twelve-month survey and
then drops in the 18-month follow-up survey. When the baseline results are com-
pared against the 18-month follow-up survey, an improvement in participants’ social
status, especially among female participants, was observed. As to the female em-
power perception index, the mean for female subsample is always higher than that of
the full sample, indicating that women hold more positive attitude towards female
empowerment and gender equality than men, a commonly observed phenomenon
in developing countries. The table also shows a consistent declining pattern in the
perception of female empowerment, which is true even true for the female subsample.
Freedom of movement has always been seen as an issue in Bangladesh due to the
cultural seclusion of female. Here, we see that the participants, especially female,
became more freely mobile after 12 months of the training program. In contrast,
Table 24 shows that the participants’ status of being the primary decision maker
became weaker after 12 months, though they seemed to gain power in participating
in the decision making process, i.e., being among the top 3 household members being
mentioned in making decisions for various issues. The pattern is more obvious for
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female participants.
Table 24: Descriptive Statistics of Empowerment Indices
Baseline Six-month Twelve-month Eighteen-month
All Female All Female All Female All Female
Index for (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Social Status -0.064 -0.138 0.027 -0.041 0.209 0.124 0.109 0.081
(0.574) (0.581) (0.520) (0.490) (0.555) (0.499) (0.423) (0.373)
Women Empower Perception -0.011 0.001 -0.151 -0.135 -0.194 -0.164 -0.474 -0.369
(0.466) (0.451) (0.536) (0.499) (0.549) (0.499) (0.913) (0.813)
Freedom of movement -0.127 -0.181 0.396 0.151
(0.671) (0.593) (1.022) (0.838)
Decision Power (Primary) -0.159 -0.343 -0.178 -0.421
(0.785) (0.586) (0.880) (0.625)
Decision Power (Top 3) -0.180 0.054 -0.179 0.098
(0.931) (0.856) (1.007) (0.900)
Observations 2,215 854 2,142 816 2,164 827 2,154 826
Notes : The table reports means and standard deviations of the women empowerment indices for each round of
survey combining treatment and control groups.
3.4.2 Baseline Characteristics
As noted earlier, the training was conducted with the phase-in design due to the
limited training capacity. Therefore, the characteristics of the participants may
vary across phases and all regressions reported in this paper control for the phase-
specific fixed effects for this reason. However, within each phase, the participants
are randomly allocated to different arms. As a result, the baseline characteristics of
those in the control and treatment groups are expected to be similarly distributed
because of the randomization.
Table 25 presents the baseline averages of various individual- and household-level
characteristics, which will be referred to as basic covariates in the later analysis,52
and tests whether the averages vary by treatment status. Column 1 reports the
sample mean and standard deviation. The results for balance check are presented in
Columns (2)-(5), which are the coefficient estimates of the difference between mean
in each of the treatment groups and the mean in the control group. The standard
errors are adjusted for clustering at union level. Column (6) presents the p-value for
the joint test of the equality of means across all five treatment arms.
Column (1) shows that slightly less than 40 percent of the participants are fe-
male. Our sample is relatively young with the average age of 22 and have low levels
52Basic covariates also include age square and head’s age square variables.
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Table 25: Balance on Predetermined Basic Characteristics
Coefficient (SE) on treatment dummies
Sample Information Training Stipend Internship Equality
mean group group group group of means
SD T1 T2 T3 T4 p-value
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female 0.386 0.103* 0.101* 0.097* 0.127** 0.323
(0.487) (0.056) (0.054) (0.057) (0.062)
Age 22.417 0.338 0.212 0.200 0.437 0.702
(4.331) (0.372) (0.437) (0.424) (0.481)
Edu: primary 0.140 0.044 0.018 0.060* 0.064* 0.150
(0.347) (0.026) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033)
Edu: secondary 0.395 -0.099* -0.081 -0.103* -0.105 0.330
(0.489) (0.050) (0.055) (0.054) (0.063)
Edu: higher 0.006 0.008* 0.004 0.010** 0.004 0.064*
(0.076) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Married 0.370 0.088* 0.066* 0.072* 0.066 0.412
(0.483) (0.044) (0.038) (0.041) (0.044)
No. of children 0.519 0.142** 0.144** 0.118** 0.140** 0.241
(0.844) (0.065) (0.065) (0.059) (0.070)
Participant is HH head 0.163 -0.046 -0.040 -0.066* -0.048 0.510
(0.369) (0.035) (0.034) (0.038) (0.033)
HH size 4.190 0.196 0.215* 0.247** 0.271** 0.242
(1.388) (0.128) (0.126) (0.119) (0.118)
Food-shortage in Monga 0.307 -0.025 -0.006 -0.033 -0.021 0.780
(0.461) (0.046) (0.041) (0.045) (0.041)
Landholdings size (decimals) 2.134 -0.189** -0.255*** -0.150 -0.232** 0.020**
(1.192) (0.092) (0.093) (0.100) (0.105)
Muslim 0.938 -0.001 -0.005 0.013 0.019 0.538
(0.242) (0.029) (0.025) (0.028) (0.030)
Landless 0.072 0.039 0.042* 0.035 0.019 0.388
(0.259) (0.025) (0.025) (0.021) (0.019)
Ultra-poor HH 0.573 0.015 0.031 0.007 0.019 0.916
(0.495) (0.049) (0.048) (0.050) (0.051)
HH migrated during past year 0.123 -0.015 0.004 -0.035 0.002 0.259
(0.328) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037)
Head age 42.042 0.121 -0.848 0.447 0.012 0.305
(12.657) (1.127) (1.030) (1.050) (1.213)
Head edu: primary 0.050 0.013 0.011 0.015 0.011 0.965
(0.218) 0.013 (0.019) (0.020) (0.021)
Head edu: secondary 0.129 (0.036) -0.037 -0.053 -0.053 0.592
(0.335) -0.045 (0.034) (0.034) (0.037)
Head edu: higher 0.012 (0.010) 0.004 -0.006 -0.004 0.189
(0.110) -0.010 (0.012) (0.011) (0.010)
Head is married 0.887 (0.034) 0.020 0.022 0.040 0.757
(0.317) 0.040 (0.035) (0.035) (0.036)
Head occup: wage labor 0.481 -0.002 0.010 -0.012 -0.004 0.931
(0.500) (0.055) (0.046) (0.046) (0.049)
Head occup: self-employed 0.180 0.056* 0.068** 0.074** 0.072** 0.068*
(0.384) (0.033) (0.027) (0.029) (0.031)
Head occup: agriculture 0.102 -0.012 -0.024 -0.022 -0.032 0.772
(0.302) (0.029) (0.027) (0.029) (0.030)
Head occup: small business 0.102 -0.032 -0.028 -0.024 -0.020 0.885
(0.302) (0.033) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030)
Head is unemployed 0.083 -0.018 -0.022 -0.006 -0.022 0.863
(0.276) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.031)
Notes : ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered
at the union level are reported in parentheses. The number of observation is 2,215. Phase fixed effects are
controlled in all regressions. The basic set of covariates also include age square and head’s age square variables.
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of education with only 40 percent received secondary education or higher. Nearly
a third of our sample households reported to have food shortage during the monga
period. The landholding is on average only 0.02 acres and 7 percent are landless.
Almost half of the household head work as wage labor and eight percent are unem-
ployed. All these indicate that our sample households are generally poor and indeed
57 percent are classified as ultra-poor.
Columns (2)-(5) show the difference between the treatment and control group
means. The treatment arms appear to be balanced overall. Among the 25 variables
we consider, only 6 variables have coefficients with significance level less or equal to
5 percent. This is further supported by joint test for equality of means presented in
Column (6), only 3 variables has p-value less than 10 percent.
3.5 Main Estimation Results
In this section, we present the estimated impacts of (the various components of)
the training ”plus” program on female empowerment using various indices discussed
in Section 3.4. We first present the impact on gender gap of empowerment, which
reflected the relative status of female empowerment and then turn to impacts on
empowerment of the female subsample, which reflected the absolute status of female
empowerment. For ease of comparison, the analysis using male subsample is also
presented. Following method proposed in Dupas and Robinson (2013) as discussed
in Section 3.3, we further report the impact of each component of the treatments.
At last, making use of the multiple rounds of follow-up surveys we have, the results
of time trend of treatment impact with individual fixed effects are presented.
3.5.1 Social Status
Table 26 focuses on the average impact of treatment on self-reported social status.
First three columns present the results for the relative status of female empowerment.
Women reported lower social status compared with men for all three rounds, and
the training program improved the participants’ social status for all four treatment
groups. The gender gap, shown by the coefficients of interaction terms of female and
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treatment groups, tended to narrow for 6- and 18-month follow-up, though neither
the coefficients nor the joint F -test is significant.
The results for the female subsample, as presented in Columns (4)-(6), show
that the training program significantly improved female participants’ social status
after 6 and 18 months. In addition, Information (INF) and Skills Training (SKT)
play an important role in imposing the impact, while Stipend (STP) and Internship
(INT) do not. For example, women in the Internship group (T4) were 0.2 standard
deviation above those in the control group in social status index after 6 months,
and the leading gap became 0.26 standard deviation after 18 months. Despite these
significant impact of T4 treatment, the INT component only contribute 0.009 and
0.074 standard deviation, which is less than 4% and 28% of the overall impact, for 6
months and 18 months analysis, respectively. For comparison, the intervention also
improved male participants’ social status significantly, and INT contributed heavily.
To sum up, the training program improved both female and male participants’ social
status, though the gender gap was not closed. What’s more, different components
of the treatments matters. While INF and SKT affect women’s social status, INT
matters for men.
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3.5.2 Female Empowerment
The perception of female empowerment index reflects the acceptance of female em-
powerment and attitude towards gender equality. The estimates presented in Ta-
ble 27 exhibit a clear path of changing social norms through time. According to
Columns (1) to (3), women were more accepting female empowerment than men
in all rounds of follow-up surveys, which would come as no surprise. The gender
gap narrowed significantly after 6 month, and continued to narrow significantly,
though only marginally, after 12 months. Unlike the social status, the STP compo-
nent contributes significantly, indicating that training program, especially the STP
component, helps to improve the relative female empowerment status.
The female subsample results in Columns (4)-(6) provide us further insights.
Women in the treatment groups exhibit lower levels of acceptance of female empow-
erment than the control group, which indicates that the training program worsened
attitudes towards female empowerment among the female participants. However,
the treatment participants became more assured of female empowerment after 18
months, though not significantly different from the control group. This shows that
changing of social norms takes time, and external interventions may result in nega-
tive impact in the short run. It is encouraging to see that men’s attitude towards
female empowerment also significantly improved by the training program after 18
months as shown in the last three columns. Another point needs highlighting is
the continuously decreasing acceptance of female empowerment in the control group
through time, for which we have no clear explanation.
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3.5.3 Freedom of Movement
Table 28 presents the estimates of average treatment impact on participants’ free-
dom of movement. We present the pure experimental results where only treatment
dummies and phase fixed effects are controlled in odd number columns, and results
with additional controls of the basic covariates shown in Table 24 are reported in
even number columns.
The first two columns show that women’s mobility index was between 0.69 and
0.90 standard deviation lower than that of men, which is statistically significant at
a one percent level, indicating the restrictions women face in freedom of movement.
The training program significantly narrowed the gender gap in mobility after 12
months as shown in Column (2), though this was mainly due to the decline in
the mobility of male participants in the treated groups as displayed in Column (6)
and not because of the improvement in female treatment participants as shown in
Column (4). Column (3) shows that the treatments provided by the vocational
training program significantly improve female freedom of movement, thus, leading
to positive impact beyond labour market outcomes.
3.5.4 Decision Power
The evidence presented in Table 29 and Table 30 suggests a different picture from
the standard description of the role played by a TVET program in women’s decision-
making capacity. It is expected to increase women’s bargaining power in household
decision-making process due to the increased economic autonomy. However, our
results show otherwise. After 12 months, the gender gap in decision power was not
significantly affected by the training program based on the results from first two
columns of both tables. In terms of the changes in the absolute status of women’s
decision power as presented in Columns (3) and (4), participating in the program
weakens women’s decision power in the treatment groups. The last two columns of
both tables show that men’s decision-making capacity, either as a primary or top
three decision maker, was not affected. As we only have one round of follow-up
survey with the decision power information being available, we could not check the
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Table 28: Average Impact of Treatment on Freedom of Movement after 12 Months
Full sample Female subsample Male subsample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Participant -0.685*** -0.897***
(0.190) (0.237)
Information (T1) -0.015 -0.154 0.279*** 0.193 -0.003 -0.226*
(0.146) (0.137) (0.104) (0.132) (0.143) (0.135)
Skills Training (T2) -0.007 -0.170 0.247*** 0.108 0.001 -0.241*
(0.134) (0.131) (0.091) (0.134) (0.133) (0.130)
Stipend (T3) 0.019 -0.135 0.278** 0.185 0.032 -0.212*
(0.131) (0.120) (0.122) (0.135) (0.128) (0.125)
Internship (T4) -0.065 -0.183 0.297** 0.191 -0.054 -0.271**
(0.158) (0.136) (0.123) (0.148) (0.155) (0.132)
Female × T1 0.313 0.523**
(0.195) (0.222)
Female × T2 0.277 0.423**
(0.178) (0.209)
Female × T3 0.272 0.449**
(0.195) (0.224)
Female × T4 0.378* 0.519**
(0.219) (0.236)
Observations 2,164 2,164 827 827 1,337 1,337
R-squared 0.041 0.219 0.014 0.281 0.007 0.265
Mean of Control grp 0.357 0.357 -0.118 -0.118 0.551 0.551
Joint T1=T2=T3=T4=0 [0.787] [0.722] [0.086] [0.505] [0.757] [0.345]
Joint test for interaction [0.530] [0.224]
INF=T1-C=0 -0.015 -0.154 0.279 0.193 -0.003 -0.226
[0.704] [0.564] [0.009] [0.282] [0.613] [0.098]
SKT=T2-T1=0 0.008 -0.015 -0.031 -0.085 0.005 -0.015
[0.912] [0.816] [0.783] [0.372] [0.210] [0.831]
STP=T3-T2=0 0.026 0.034 0.030 0.077 0.031 0.029
[0.217] [0.485] [0.723] [0.149] [0.947] [0.633]
INT=T4-T3=0 -0.085 -0.048 0.019 0.005 -0.086 -0.058
[0.257] [0.263] [0.680] [0.949] [0.981] [0.373]
INF × Female=0 0.313 0.523
[0.963] [0.817]
SKT × Female=0 -0.036 -0.100
[0.667] [0.246]
STP × Female=0 -0.005 0.026
[0.112] [0.021]
INT × Female=0 0.107 0.070
[0.919] [0.461]
Covariates
Basic covariates N Y N Y N Y
Notes : ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard
errors clustered at the union level are reported in parentheses. P-value for F/t-test are reported
in square brackets. Phase fixed effects, and geographical fixed effects at union level are controlled
in all regressions.
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time trend in the change. So this 12-month survey may be during the transition
period and as mentioned previously, external interventions may bring about negative
impacts and introduce conflicts within the household in the short-run.
3.5.5 Time Trend Analysis
Even though both observable and unobservable characteristics have the same distri-
bution across different treatment arms because of the randomization in expectation,
the realized differences across different treatment arms may be substantial. The de-
sign of our study enables us to overcome this potential imbalance on unobservable
because we can still control for the individual-level heterogeneity by controlling for
the fixed effects The results for the time-varying effects of treatments are displayed
in Table 31, where the baseline data are included as the base group for comparison.
As the assignment of treatment groups did not change over time, the level effects of
treatment assignments are absorbed by the individual-level fixed effects. Subsamples
of female and male participants are analyzed separately for ease of comparison.53
After controlling for the individual fixed effects, most of the coefficients are no
longer significant. But the signs of the coefficients are broadly consistent with our
previous analysis and this provides supportive evidence that our results are robust.
The training program on average increased women’s social status, lower women’s
acceptance of female empowerment but improved men’s attitude towards gender
equality, weakens women’s decision power while increases their mobility.
53Analysis of triple-difference, female × surveyround × treatmentgroup, using full sample is
also conducted and none of the coefficients is significant. Results are available upon request.
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Table 29: Average Impact of Treatment on Decision Power (Primary) after 12
Months
Index for Full sample Female subsample Male subsample
primary decision maker (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Participant -0.212 -0.081
(0.172) (0.112)
Information (T1) -0.006 -0.040 -0.249* -0.157 0.017 -0.010
(0.115) (0.065) (0.138) (0.106) (0.113) (0.070)
Skills Training (T2) -0.014 -0.060 -0.220 -0.148 0.010 -0.041
(0.109) (0.060) (0.132) (0.101) (0.110) (0.064)
Stipend (T3) -0.087 -0.074 -0.283* -0.155 -0.063 -0.060
(0.123) (0.056) (0.154) (0.123) (0.120) (0.060)
Internship (T4) -0.030 -0.074 -0.272* -0.194 -0.008 -0.063
(0.121) (0.065) (0.152) (0.124) (0.121) (0.069)
Female × T1 -0.239 -0.065
(0.165) (0.109)
Female × T2 -0.205 -0.028
(0.156) (0.102)
Female × T3 -0.194 -0.042
(0.185) (0.117)
Female × T4 -0.234 -0.057
(0.200) (0.135)
Observations 2,164 2,164 827 827 1,337 1,337
R-squared 0.069 0.769 0.017 0.634 0.036 0.817
Mean of Control grp -0.016 -0.016 -0.173 -0.173 0.048 0.048
T1=T2=T3=T4=0 [0.726] [0.390] [0.481] [0.402] [0.722] [0.265]
Joint test for interaction [0.665] [0.971]
INF=T1-C=0 -0.006 -0.040 -0.249 -0.157 0.017 -0.010
[0.957] [0.544] [0.075] [0.143] [0.879] [0.932]
SKT=T2-T1=0 -0.008 -0.021 0.030 0.009 -0.007 -0.031
[0.894] [0.800] [0.635] [0.877] [0.910] [0.560]
STP=T3-T2=0 -0.073 -0.014 -0.064 -0.007 -0.073 -0.019
[0.253] [0.588] [0.407] [0.849] [0.258] [0.370]
INT=T4-T3=0 0.058 0.000 0.012 -0.039 0.055 -0.003
[0.453] [0.672] [0.847] [0.287] [0.479] [0.885]
INF × Female=0 -0.239 -0.065
[0.152] [0.999]
SKT × Female=0 0.034 0.037
[0.692] [0.568]
STP × Female=0 0.010 -0.013
[0.921] [0.790]
INT × Female=0 -0.039 -0.016
[0.721] [0.556]
Covariates
Basic covariates N Y N Y N Y
Notes : ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the union level are reported in parentheses. P-value for F/t-test
are reported in square brackets. Phase fixed effects, and geographical fixed effects at union
level are controlled in all regressions.
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Table 30: Average Impact of Treatment on Decision Power (Top 3) after 12 Months
Index for Full sample Female subsample Male subsample
Some decision power (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female Participant 0.553*** 0.059
(0.161) (0.116)
Information (T1) 0.075 0.073 -0.077 -0.049 0.085 0.100
(0.100) (0.066) (0.141) (0.126) (0.096) (0.069)
Skills Training (T2) -0.012 -0.010 -0.097 -0.045 -0.001 0.026
(0.111) (0.069) (0.114) (0.121) (0.107) (0.067)
Stipend (T3) -0.050 -0.001 -0.098 -0.086 -0.039 0.040
(0.115) (0.076) (0.124) (0.114) (0.112) (0.076)
Internship (T4) 0.011 -0.006 -0.264** -0.142 0.020 0.021
(0.122) (0.092) (0.115) (0.110) (0.117) (0.101)
Female × T1 -0.151 -0.199
(0.162) (0.132)
Female × T2 -0.085 -0.136
(0.165) (0.138)
Female × T3 -0.048 -0.172
(0.188) (0.151)
Female × T4 -0.272 -0.228
(0.176) (0.142)
Observations 2,164 2,164 827 827 1,337 1,337
R-squared 0.066 0.544 0.018 0.591 0.024 0.545
Mean of Control grp -0.150 -0.150 0.241 0.241 -0.310 -0.310
T1=T2=T3=T4=0 [0.563] [0.510] [0.033] [0.333] [0.547] [0.478]
Joint test for interaction [0.144] [0.493]
INF=T1-C=0 0.075 0.073 -0.077 -0.049 0.085 0.100
[0.619] [0.135] [0.584] [0.952] [0.430] [0.155]
SKT=T2-T1=0 -0.087 -0.083 -0.019 0.004 -0.086 -0.074
[0.417] [0.111] [0.989] [0.696] [0.221] [0.151]
STP=T3-T2=0 -0.037 0.009 -0.001 -0.041 -0.038 0.014
[0.457] [0.629] [0.848] [0.314] [0.381] [0.822]
INT=T4-T3=0 0.060 -0.005 -0.166 -0.056 0.059 -0.019
[0.025] [0.875] [0.013] [0.491] [0.648] [0.808]
INF × Female=0 -0.151 -0.199
[0.788] [0.491]
SKT × Female=0 0.066 0.063
[0.220] [0.274]
STP × Female=0 0.037 -0.036
[0.651] [0.480]
INT × Female=0 -0.224 -0.055
[0.354] [0.939]
Covariates
Basic covariates N Y N Y N Y
Notes : ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels, respectively. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the union level are reported in parentheses. P-value for F/t-test are
reported in square brackets. Phase fixed effects, and geographical fixed effects at union level
are controlled in all regressions.
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3.6 Conclusion
Many women in northern Bangladesh live in a “dis-empowerment trap.” Women
are secluded from participating in the labor market by the male-dominated social
norms, which in turn results in the dependence of women on men for living and
keep women dis-empowered. To break this vicious circle, interventions to bring
about vocational training and employment opportunities may appear attractive. In
this study, we examined the impact of a vocational training on female empowerment
among the poor through a randomized experiment in northern Bangladesh, where
the levels of employment and female empowerment are both low.
Our empirical results are mixed. We find that the training program on aver-
age increased both male and female participants’ social status, and the increments
are larger for women such that the training program narrowed the gender gap in
social status. This positive impact of treatments appears to be persist as it hold-
s as evidenced by both the surveys conducted six and eighteen months after the
intervention. However, the Stipend (STP) and Internship (INT) components in
the training program do not seem to contribute significantly to the improvement of
female participants’ social status, though the INT substantially affects the males.
The vocational training program also leads to a freer movement of women after
12 months, indicating a positive impact on female empowerment. The results on
perception of female empowerment statements indicate that the transition process
is not monotonic, because the women in the treatment groups exhibit less positive
attitudes towards female empowerment than the control group 6 months after the
intervention, but this pattern weakens, if not reversed, afterwards. This illustrates
that the change of social norms takes time and the process may be uneven in some
cases. Further, men in the treatment groups show higher levels of acceptance to-
wards female empowerment compared with those in control group in the follow-up
surveys, indicating that the training program may improve the perception of female
empowerment. On the other hand, the decision power of women in the treatment
groups becomes lower than those in the control group, whether measured as be-
ing a primary decision maker or among the top-three decision makers. This result
115
appears somewhat puzzling, but it may reflect the real loss in decision power, a
higher awareness among women about the importance of being a decision maker, or
combination of both.
There are two potential limitations to the current study. First, the results p-
resented above do not take attrition into consideration. In general, this can be an
important concern because the participants who dropped out from the training pro-
gram may be systematically different from those who complete and the attrition
may be systematically different across treatment groups. However, our sample has
very low attrition rates such that this is not a major concern. Second, as with all
other field experiments, our results are valid under a specific context in northern
Bangladesh. Therefore, our findings may not be externally valid, particularly in
other contexts where economic and cultural backgrounds are very different. Clearly,
more studies are needed to understand the impacts of vocational training programs
on female empowerment. Despite these limitations, this study offers a unique piece
of experimental evidence on the impact of a vocational training on female empow-
erment.
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A Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Construction of Asset Index
We choose to use the possession of nonelectric assets holding and dwelling charac-
teristics to produce the asset index used in this study. To ensure the comparability
of the asset index across different rounds, we only use those variables which are
available in all five rounds of the BDHS dataset. The exact set of variables used in
the principal component analysis and their scoring coefficients for the first principal
component are reported in Table 32. The asset index used in Figure 1 is calculat-
ed with these coefficients and ranges between -3.05 and 3.41. As Table 32 shows,
the coefficients have a positive [negative] sign for indicators associated with better
[worse] standards of living. The eigenvalue of the first principal component is 1.807,
which is considerably larger than the second (1.184) and higher-order principal com-
ponents. Table 33 provides summary statistics for our asset index. The table clearly
shows the increasing trend of asset index over time, reflecting the economic growth
Bangladesh has experienced during our study period.
Table 32: Scoring coefficients.
Variables Scoring coefficients
Radio 0.135
Bike 0.261
Scooter 0.244
Homestead 0.220
Own land 0.309
Basic wall -0.304
Basic roof -0.290
Basic floor -0.296
Note: Five rounds of BDHS data
are pooled to obtain the scoring co-
efficient. Basic wall, roof, and floor
mean that they are made of basic ma-
terials such as earth, bamboo, thatch,
palm leaf, and sand.
It should be noted that the BDHS dataset also includes a wealth index for
each household derived from a principal component analysis, details of which are
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Table 33: Summary statistics of asset in-
dex by survey year.
Survey year Obs Mean Std. Dev.
2000 3,566 -0.649 1.184
2004 3,727 -0.288 1.006
2007 3,088 0.001 0.944
2011 4,735 0.136 0.932
2014 4,324 0.245 0.924
Unweighted sample statistics.
discussed in Rutstein and Johnsons (2004). However, we chose not to use it for the
following reasons. First, as noted in NIPORT et al. (2009), the wealth index is a
single asset index developed for the entire sample with no distinction between urban
and rural households (See also, Rutstein (2008)). Therefore, the scoring matrix
may not be the most appropriate one for a rural-focused analysis like the current
study. Second, the wealth index is calculated separately year by year, which makes it
impossible to compare over time. Third, the set of variables used for the wealth index
includes dummy variables for living conditions representing intermediate quality.
This makes the interpretation of the wealth index difficult. Finally, the wealth
index in the BDHS dataset uses household’s electrification status. This would make
the comparison between electrified and nonelectrified households in Figure 1 difficult
to interpret, because electrified households would have a higher wealth score than
nonelectrified households even if everything else is the same.
A.2 Details on falsification test
Ideally, we would like to control for mothers’ access to electricity when they were
growing up to cleanly conduct a falsification test. However, because the BDHS data
do not permit us to identify whether the mother grew up in a household with access
to electricity, we will have to make the following assumption: the mother’s linear
growth had ended by the time electricity became available if mother’s age exceeds
the age of the nearest PBS by at least 20. Put differently, we assume that the
mother’s linear growth has already finished by the time PBS is established because
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they are already at least twenty years of age by then. We call a subsample of
households with elderly mothers satisfying this condition “falsification sample.”
On the left side of Table 34, we report the regression results with a subsample of
children born out of the mothers in the falsification sample. The table shows that
the coefficients are positive for all rounds. Further, the coefficients are significant for
in 2000, 2004, and 2007. On the right side of Table 34, we report similar regressions
for mothers. Here, none of the estimated coefficients is significant.
A.3 Details on path analysis
We conducted a path analysis for each BDHS round between 2004 and 2014. Path
analysis is a type of structural equation model and allows us to test the direct and
indirect effects of household’s access to electricity under a postulated model. Path
analysis allows us to find the relative importance of different channels discussed in
Section 1.7 and the effect not explained by these channels.
To make the interpretation straightforward, we assume that the electrification of
status affects the HAZ of the child directly and indirectly through wealth, fertility,
TV, and local health facility, where the wealth, fertility, and TV are measured by
the asset index, the number of children, and possession of TV, respectively. For
the local health facility, we use a principal component score of the community-level
covariates used in this study. We assume that fertility may be affected by local
health facility, wealth, and TV. TV is assumed to be affected by wealth. Based on
this model, we present path diagrams in Figure 5.
While the model we use here is plausible, path analysis is based on strong as-
sumptions about the underlying causal structure and the potential endogeneity of
the household’s access to electricity is ignored. Therefore, the results only serve as a
guidance for the plausible relative importance of different causal channels discussed
in Section 1.7.
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2004 
Household 
electrification 
Local health 
facility  
Fertility  
Wealth TV 
Child HAZ 
Direct effect:         0.191  
Indirect effect:      0.289 
---health facility:  -0.008 
---wealth:           0.186 
---fertility:           0.021 
---TV:           0.091 
Total effect:           0.480 
-0.109 0.272 
0.864 
-0.332 
-0.057 
-0.082 
-0.348 
0.108 
0.311 
0.174 
0.074 
-0.063 
0.191 
2007 
Household 
electrification 
Local health 
facility  
Fertility  
Wealth TV 
Child HAZ 
-0.417 
0.323 
0.925 
-0.075 
0.130 
-0.156 
-0.321 
0.125 
0.089 
0.137 
-0.035 
-0.074 
0.190 
Direct effect:         0.190  
Indirect effect:      0.211 
---health facility:  0.019 
---wealth:          0.150 
---fertility:             0.006 
---TV:          0.036 
Total effect:           0.401 
2011 
Household 
electrification 
Local health 
facility  
Fertility  
Wealth TV 
Child HAZ 
-0.319 0.412 
0.802 
-0.071 
0.007 
-0.147 -0.336 
0.131 
0.132 0.213 
0.007 
-0.063 
0.100 
Direct effect:         0.100  
Indirect effect:      0.260 
---health facility:  -0.002 
---wealth:               0.195 
---fertility:              0.004 
---TV:                       0.063 
Total effect:           0.361 
2014 
Household 
electrification 
Local health 
facility  
Fertility  
Wealth TV 
Child HAZ 
-0.102 0.313 
0.820 
-0.083 
-0.016 
-0.160 -0.221 
0.160 
0.158 0.209 
0.042 
-0.073 
0.107 
Direct effect:         0.107  
Indirect effect:      0.260 
---health facility:  -0.004 
---wealth:               0.204 
---fertility:              0.006 
---TV:                       0.055 
Total effect:           0.368 
Figure 5: Path analysis for BDHS 2004, 2007, 2011, and 2014. The numbers shown
in bold face represent statistical significance at a 5 percent level.
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A.4 Additional Tables
Tables 36 and 37 show the detailed regression results for column (4) in Tables 3
and 4, respectively. Tables 38, 39, 40, 41, and 42 report the subsample regressions
by the age of the child, sex of the child, mother’s education level, food sufficiency,
and division of the household, respectively. Tables 43 and 44 provide the detailed
first- and second-stage regression results for Table 6. Table 45 gives the WAZ re-
gression results. Table 46 provides the results for the cross-sectional analogue of
the regressions reported in Fujii and Shonchoy (2015), which were mentioned in
Section 1.7.
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Table 36: Detailed OLS regression results for column (4) in Table 3.
Dep var: HAZ 2004 2007 2011 2014
Electrified household 0.215*** 0.176*** 0.097** 0.102**
(0.053) (0.058) (0.041) (0.045)
Child is a boy -0.066 0.079* 0.010 0.022
(0.042) (0.044) (0.037) (0.035)
Vaccination card for the child seen 0.245* -0.090 -0.041 0.252***
(0.129) (0.187) (0.128) (0.096)
Child ever had a vaccination 0.351*** 0.126 0.061 0.369***
(0.130) (0.193) (0.133) (0.103)
ANC visit to a doctor 0.116* 0.121* 0.116** 0.143**
(0.063) (0.063) (0.047) (0.056)
ANC visit to other health professionals -0.012 -0.022 -0.062 0.066
(0.058) (0.059) (0.048) (0.059)
Four or more ANC visits 0.069 0.072 -0.124** 0.008
(0.078) (0.079) (0.056) (0.062)
ANC visit status missing -0.248** -0.084 0.056 0.007
(0.099) (0.102) (0.082) (0.145)
Born in medial facility 0.309*** 0.113 0.092* 0.021
(0.085) (0.092) (0.053) (0.059)
Has elder sibling -0.258*** -0.105 -0.187** -0.165**
(0.082) (0.093) (0.075) (0.073)
Preceding birth interval (mth) 0.006*** 0.003** 0.002* 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother height 0.054*** 0.064*** 0.056*** 0.048***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Mother’s education (yrs) 0.014* 0.002 0.013* 0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007)
Father’s education (yrs) 0.010 0.013** 0.017*** 0.020***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
% HH with open deification in community -0.226 -0.382 -0.308 -0.053
(0.163) (0.242) (0.227) (0.193)
Water source from pipe -0.050 -0.174 0.329** -0.121
(0.337) (0.369) (0.130) (0.177)
No. of surviving children -0.032 0.007 -0.059** -0.044*
(0.030) (0.029) (0.028) (0.026)
Dependency ratio 0.006 -0.025 -0.016 0.034
(0.040) (0.039) (0.037) (0.033)
Asset index 0.106*** 0.066* 0.081*** 0.081***
(0.025) (0.036) (0.025) (0.025)
Time to district headquarter 0.000 -0.000 -0.004 0.011
(0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.015)
Ratio of certified doctors 0.016 0.071 0.067 0.172**
(0.110) (0.085) (0.085) (0.073)
Distance to nearest health facility -0.012 0.002 0.047** 0.050
(0.025) (0.005) (0.022) (0.034)
Has pharmacy in the village -0.031 0.106** -0.152*** 0.032
(0.062) (0.053) (0.052) (0.061)
Distance to pharmacy 0.015 0.009 -0.037** 0.034
(0.028) (0.014) (0.015) (0.026)
Observations 3,650 3,002 4,735 4,183
R-squared 0.247 0.258 0.222 0.246
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported in parenthesis. Mother’s age
in years, child’s age in months, and division fixed-effects are also included in all regressions.
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Table 37: Detailed OLS regression results for column (4) in Table 4.
Dep var: HAZ 2004 2007 2011 2014
Electrified household 0.233*** 0.152** 0.095** 0.098*
(0.065) (0.068) (0.048) (0.057)
Child is a boy -0.048 0.117* 0.030 0.065*
(0.054) (0.060) (0.041) (0.039)
Vaccination card for the child seen 0.344** -0.149 -0.024 0.315**
(0.159) (0.345) (0.153) (0.122)
Child ever had a vaccination 0.449*** 0.101 0.049 0.418***
(0.160) (0.350) (0.163) (0.131)
ANC visit to a doctor 0.146* 0.133* 0.171*** 0.192***
(0.079) (0.077) (0.053) (0.072)
ANC visit to other health professionals -0.014 -0.049 -0.054 0.021
(0.075) (0.078) (0.055) (0.071)
Four or more ANC visits 0.126 0.037 -0.143** 0.038
(0.100) (0.104) (0.062) (0.071)
ANC visit status missing -0.285** -0.005 0.094 0.055
(0.127) (0.134) (0.096) (0.212)
Born in medial facility 0.338*** 0.139 0.127** 0.029
(0.103) (0.104) (0.060) (0.066)
Has elder sibling -0.381*** -0.023 -0.193** -0.167*
(0.105) (0.118) (0.089) (0.087)
Preceding birth interval (mth) 0.007*** 0.003* 0.002* 0.003***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother height 0.053*** 0.066*** 0.058*** 0.050***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Mother’s education (yrs) 0.007 -0.004 0.008 0.010
(0.011) (0.010) (0.008) (0.009)
Father’s education (yrs) 0.006 0.010 0.019*** 0.018***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007)
% HH with open deification in community -0.327 -0.936*** -0.161 -0.097
(0.227) (0.306) (0.305) (0.251)
Water source from pipe -0.837* -0.841 0.327** -0.149
(0.425) (0.532) (0.132) (0.177)
No. of surviving children -0.006 -0.030 -0.045 -0.066*
(0.031) (0.036) (0.034) (0.035)
Dependency ratio -0.036 0.011 -0.019 0.049
(0.043) (0.051) (0.042) (0.040)
Asset index 0.123*** 0.060 0.081*** 0.102***
(0.034) (0.045) (0.028) (0.030)
Time to district headquarter 0.001 -0.000 -0.017 0.021
(0.000) (0.001) (0.034) (0.015)
Ratio of certified doctors 0.001 0.077 0.056 0.158**
(0.131) (0.108) (0.099) (0.078)
Distance to nearest health facility 0.033 -0.027 0.057 0.079
(0.036) (0.033) (0.037) (0.048)
Has pharmacy in the village -0.018 0.058 -0.119 -0.038
(0.086) (0.065) (0.074) (0.070)
Distance to pharmacy -0.003 -0.012 -0.040 0.008
(0.047) (0.009) (0.029) (0.032)
Observations 2,281 1,791 3,548 3,040
R-squared 0.269 0.274 0.232 0.250
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported in parenthesis. Mother’s age
in years, child’s age in months, and division fixed-effects are also included in all regressions.
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Table 38: Subsample OLS regressions of child’s height-for-age Z-score
by child’s age.
Dep var: HAZ 2000 2004 2007 2011 2014
Child Age 0
Electrified household 0.268** 0.222* 0.143 0.032 0.130
(0.130) (0.115) (0.144) (0.108) (0.118)
Observations 717 679 570 877 758
R-squared 0.227 0.204 0.206 0.177 0.151
Child Age 1
Electrified household 0.405*** 0.024 0.255** 0.078 0.129
(0.115) (0.112) (0.128) (0.099) (0.114)
Observations 750 721 591 856 878
R-squared 0.194 0.248 0.221 0.189 0.179
Child Age 2
Electrified household 0.149 0.451*** 0.078 0.209** 0.025
(0.140) (0.128) (0.125) (0.102) (0.091)
Observations 688 752 601 859 844
R-squared 0.243 0.206 0.225 0.215 0.244
Child Age 3
Electrified household 0.240* 0.120 0.030 0.155* 0.079
(0.137) (0.108) (0.114) (0.083) (0.099)
Observations 667 755 606 1,100 835
R-squared 0.187 0.198 0.276 0.186 0.221
Child Age 4
Electrified household -0.022 0.312*** 0.283*** 0.059 0.155*
(0.118) (0.115) (0.107) (0.076) (0.085)
Observations 744 743 634 1,043 868
R-squared 0.170 0.218 0.237 0.213 0.191
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the community level are
reported in parentheses. Child age 0 is child being 0-11 months, age 1 is
12-23 months, age 2 is 24-35 months, age 3 is 36-47 months, and age 4 is 48-
59 months. Basic covariates and asset index are included in each regression.
Community covariates are also included in all regressions except for 2000. See
the table notes in Tables 2 and 3 for the definitions of basic and community
covariates.
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Table 39: Subsample OLS regressions of child’s height-for-age Z-score
by child’s sex.
Dep var: HAZ 2000 2004 2007 2011 2014
Girls
Electrified household 0.178** 0.203*** 0.113 0.094 0.081
(0.080) (0.073) (0.078) (0.060) (0.062)
Observations 1,766 1,793 1,522 2,346 2,034
R-squared 0.297 0.264 0.296 0.248 0.278
Boys
Electrified household 0.167* 0.221*** 0.239*** 0.113** 0.139**
(0.088) (0.075) (0.079) (0.055) (0.062)
Observations 1,800 1,857 1,480 2,389 2,149
R-squared 0.237 0.281 0.295 0.254 0.266
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the community level are
reported in parentheses. Basic covariates and asset index are included in
each regression. Community covariates are also included in all regressions
except for 2000. See the table notes in Tables 2 and 3 for the definitions of
basic and community covariates.
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Table 40: Subsample OLS analysis of child’s height-for-age Z-score by moth-
er’s education level
Dep var: HAZ 2000 2004 2007 2011 2014
Mother No Edu
Electrified household 0.172 0.198** 0.050 0.072 0.264***
(0.111) (0.098) (0.126) (0.095) (0.101)
Observations 1,789 1,477 924 1,099 750
R-squared 0.210 0.263 0.305 0.262 0.342
Mother Primary Edu
Electrified household 0.133 0.185* 0.218** 0.160** -0.060
(0.104) (0.100) (0.103) (0.077) (0.077)
Observations 1,065 1,188 1,005 1,531 1,250
R-squared 0.324 0.272 0.310 0.232 0.275
Mother Secondary Edu
Electrified household 0.175* 0.207** 0.219*** 0.082 0.228***
(0.104) (0.096) (0.079) (0.062) (0.071)
Observations 650 876 959 1,912 1,907
R-squared 0.327 0.269 0.315 0.263 0.244
Mother Higher Edu
Electrified household 0.952 1.034 0.549 -0.149 -0.052
(0.000) (0.811) (0.421) (0.384) (0.375)
Observations 62 109 114 193 276
R-squared 1.000 0.903 0.950 0.634 0.487
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent lev-
els, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported
in parentheses. The education levels are mutually exclusive (e.g., mothers with
secondary education are not included in primary education subsample). Basic
covariates and asset index are included in each regression. Community covariates
are also included in all regressions except for 2000. See the table notes in Tables 2
and 3 for the definitions of basic and community covariates.
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Table 41: Subsample OLS analysis of child’s height-for-age Z-score by self-
reported food sufficiency
Dep var: HAZ 2000 2004
Food always deficit
Electrified household 0.453** 0.279
(0.224) (0.196)
Observations 722 522
R-squared 0.287 0.341
Food sometimes deficit
Electrified household 0.059 0.148*
(0.096) (0.089)
Observations 1,540 1,468
R-squared 0.254 0.258
Food no deficit nor surplus
Electrified household 0.252** 0.177*
(0.108) (0.090)
Observations 954 1,204
R-squared 0.343 0.345
Food surplus
Electrified household 0.111 0.262*
(0.182) (0.152)
Observations 344 453
R-squared 0.444 0.435
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively. Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported in
parentheses. Basic covariates and asset index are included in each regression.
Community covariates are also included in all regressions except for 2000. See
the table notes in Tables 2 and 3 for the definitions of basic and community
covariates.
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Table 42: Subsample OLS analysis of child’s height-for-age Z-score
by division
Dep var: HAZ 2000 2004 2007 2011 2014
Barisal
Electrified household 0.563** 0.223 0.121 0.083 0.142
(0.236) (0.207) (0.173) (0.136) (0.151)
Observations 324 456 443 519 516
R-squared 0.535 0.402 0.429 0.374 0.425
Chittagong
Electrified household 0.157 0.209* 0.118 0.011 0.032
(0.128) (0.107) (0.140) (0.110) (0.152)
Observations 730 756 573 907 787
R-squared 0.388 0.422 0.475 0.313 0.398
Dhaka
Electrified household 0.123 0.197 0.044 0.109 0.248
(0.147) (0.131) (0.141) (0.108) (0.166)
Observations 771 712 546 718 568
R-squared 0.340 0.359 0.342 0.349 0.363
Khulna
Electrified household 0.301** 0.297* 0.179 -0.016 0.034
(0.145) (0.153) (0.186) (0.128) (0.109)
Observations 515 477 348 513 438
R-squared 0.388 0.436 0.460 0.367 0.435
Rajshahi
Electrified household 0.294 -0.062 0.195* 0.148* 0.086
(0.228) (0.119) (0.103) (0.079) (0.078)
Observations 691 765 515 1,240 1,130
R-squared 0.268 0.306 0.352 0.263 0.274
Sylhet
Electrified household -0.218 0.296 0.540*** 0.201 0.117
(0.237) (0.193) (0.183) (0.133) (0.124)
Observations 535 484 577 838 744
R-squared 0.348 0.353 0.410 0.340 0.346
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively. Standard errors clustered at the community level are
reported in parentheses. Basic covariates and asset index are included in
each regression. Community covariates are also included in all regressions
except for 2000. See the table notes in Tables 2 and 3 for the definitions
of basic and community covariates.
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Table 44: Detailed GMM IV regression results for Table 6.
Dep var: HAZ 2004 2007 2011 2014
Electrified household 0.007 1.302* -0.158 0.849***
(0.415) (0.750) (0.358) (0.300)
Child is a boy -0.064 0.043 0.001 0.034
(0.039) (0.076) (0.036) (0.036)
Vaccination card for the child seen 0.270** -0.169 -0.023 0.150
(0.127) (0.208) (0.127) (0.099)
Child ever had a vaccination 0.377*** 0.088 0.083 0.269**
(0.127) (0.210) (0.131) (0.105)
ANC visit to a doctor 0.111* 0.017 0.125** 0.045
(0.064) (0.110) (0.050) (0.063)
ANC visit to other health professionals -0.001 -0.034 -0.064 0.036
(0.056) (0.082) (0.048) (0.059)
Four or more ANC visits 0.063 0.038 -0.106* -0.003
(0.075) (0.081) (0.056) (0.061)
ANC visit status missing -0.262*** -0.094 0.042 -0.021
(0.097) (0.210) (0.080) (0.154)
Born in medial facility 0.314*** 0.128 0.101* 0.016
(0.090) (0.125) (0.060) (0.061)
Has elder sibling -0.282*** -0.020 -0.189** -0.158**
(0.081) (0.116) (0.074) (0.075)
Preceding birth interval (mth) 0.006*** 0.004 0.002** 0.002***
(0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother height 0.052*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.047***
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005)
Mother’s education (yrs) 0.019** -0.007 0.014* 0.006
(0.010) (0.011) (0.008) (0.010)
Father’s education (yrs) 0.011 0.002 0.020*** 0.010
(0.007) (0.013) (0.007) (0.007)
% HH with open deification in community -0.301 0.503 -0.454* 0.291
(0.189) (0.696) (0.258) (0.185)
Water source from pipe -0.106 -0.262 0.367** -0.184
(0.315) (0.451) (0.143) (0.201)
No. of surviving children -0.030 0.032 -0.055* -0.034
(0.029) (0.136) (0.028) (0.028)
Dependency ratio -0.001 -0.052 -0.017 0.046
(0.038) (0.082) (0.037) (0.032)
Asset index 0.129*** -0.075 0.121** -0.001
(0.043) (0.099) (0.050) (0.041)
Time to district headquarter 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.016
(0.001) (0.001) (0.029) (0.018)
Ratio of certified doctors -0.007 -0.016 0.052 0.164**
(0.106) (0.096) (0.084) (0.078)
Distance to nearest health facility -0.026 0.019 0.051* 0.054
(0.027) (0.013) (0.027) (0.035)
Has pharmacy in the village -0.026 0.099 -0.154*** 0.058
(0.057) (0.095) (0.052) (0.062)
Distance to pharmacy 0.015 0.001 -0.042** 0.052*
(0.026) (0.026) (0.018) (0.028)
Observations 3,650 3,002 4,735 4,183
R-squared 0.243 0.215 0.187
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported in parentheses. Mother’s age
in years, child’s age in months, and division fixed effects are also included in all regressions.
The electrified household dummy is instrumented by the distance to the nearest PBS headquar-
ter, system loss from the grid, and their interaction terms with mother’s education, father’s
education, boy dummy, and asset index.
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Table 45: OLS regression of the household’s access to electricity on the child’s
weight-for-age Z score (WAZ).
Dep var: WAZ 2000 2004 2007 2011 2014
Electrified household 0.145*** 0.193*** 0.105** 0.124*** 0.148***
(0.051) (0.044) (0.050) (0.034) (0.034)
Child is a boy 0.045 0.020 0.079** 0.064** 0.058*
(0.035) (0.035) (0.039) (0.028) (0.031)
Vaccination card for the child seen -0.006 0.193* 0.042 0.029 0.150*
(0.062) (0.115) (0.176) (0.091) (0.088)
Child ever had a vaccination -0.018 0.287** 0.115 0.067 0.295***
(0.059) (0.114) (0.178) (0.093) (0.089)
ANC visit to a doctor 0.084 0.109* 0.086 0.139*** 0.165***
(0.054) (0.057) (0.057) (0.043) (0.050)
ANC visit to other health professionals -0.099* 0.063 -0.034 0.005 0.095*
(0.056) (0.051) (0.048) (0.044) (0.054)
Four or more ANC visits -0.039 0.013 -0.004 0.009 0.117**
(0.082) (0.071) (0.069) (0.046) (0.057)
ANC visit status missing 0.058 -0.031 0.012 0.125* 0.148
(0.098) (0.087) (0.093) (0.069) (0.132)
Born in medial facility 0.084 0.285*** 0.207*** 0.138*** 0.063
(0.085) (0.083) (0.076) (0.049) (0.054)
Has elder sibling -0.037 -0.101 -0.020 -0.098 -0.173***
(0.064) (0.070) (0.075) (0.061) (0.064)
Preceding birth interval (mth) 0.003*** 0.004*** 0.001 0.001 0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Mother’s height (cm) 0.040*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.038*** 0.035***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
Mother’s education (yrs) 0.021*** 0.019** 0.008 0.016** 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Father’s education (yrs) 0.017*** -0.000 0.011** 0.009* 0.023***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
% HH with open deification in community -0.352*** -0.390*** -0.318* -0.552*** -0.279
(0.100) (0.126) (0.171) (0.205) (0.171)
Water source from pipe -0.526*** 0.198 0.088 0.304*** 0.027
(0.165) (0.129) (0.302) (0.109) (0.124)
No. of surviving children -0.000 -0.006 0.032 -0.025 -0.019
(0.018) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.021)
Dependency ratio -0.063* -0.034 -0.011 -0.032 0.049*
(0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.034) (0.028)
Asset index 0.061*** 0.103*** 0.086*** 0.056** 0.073***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.029) (0.022) (0.022)
Time to district headquarter 0.000 -0.000 0.010 0.005
(0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.014)
Ratio of certified doctors 0.110 -0.049 0.038 0.104
(0.096) (0.072) (0.072) (0.065)
Distance to nearest health facility -0.012 -0.001 0.001 0.032
(0.023) (0.005) (0.020) (0.025)
Has pharmacy in the village -0.008 0.091* -0.135*** 0.005
(0.056) (0.047) (0.047) (0.051)
Distance to pharmacy 0.019 0.006 -0.013 0.020
(0.021) (0.010) (0.014) (0.023)
Observations 3,566 3,650 3,002 4,735 4,183
R-squared 0.179 0.183 0.167 0.191 0.201
Note: ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Clustered
errors at community level are reported in parentheses. Mother’s age in years, child’s age in months, and
division fixed-effects are also included in all regressions. Community covariates are not available for 2000.
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Table 46: OLS regressions of the number of children.
Dep var: No. of Children Ever Born 2000 2004 2007 2011 2014
Electrified household -0.26*** -0.22*** -0.25*** -0.12*** -0.10**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Boy’s ratio -0.09 -0.02 -0.11** -0.01 -0.08**
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Mother’s age (yrs) 0.08*** 0.05 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.08**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Mother’s age sq 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00** 0.00** 0.00**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Father’s age (yrs) 0.12*** 0.09*** 0.07** 0.04** 0.06**
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Father’s age sq -0.00*** -0.00*** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Mother completed primary educ -0.18*** -0.24*** -0.37*** -0.35*** -0.26***
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Mother completed secondary educ -0.50*** -0.53*** -0.68*** -0.68*** -0.57***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.08)
Mother has some higher educ -1.43*** -1.23*** -1.17*** -1.28*** -1.05***
(0.17) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09)
Father completed primary educ -0.08 -0.06 -0.05 -0.16*** -0.02
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.05)
Father completed secondary educ -0.15** -0.21*** -0.16** -0.27*** -0.19***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)
Father has some higher educ -0.37*** -0.37*** -0.23** -0.45*** -0.32***
(0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07)
Observations 2,783 2,949 2,523 3,977 3,812
R-squared 0.64 0.66 0.64 0.62 0.59
Note: Standard errors clustered at the community level are reported in parentheses. ***,
**, and * represent statistical significance at 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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B Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Derivation of the likelihood function for the three-part
model
In total, there are four separate cases to consider to construct the likelihood function
for the three-part model:
Case 1: d = 0.
l1 = P (d ≤ −x′dβd) = Φ(−x′dβd).
Case 2: d = 1, y = y, s = 0.
l2 = P (d = 1, y = y, s = 0)
=
1
y
P (d > −x′dβd, y = log(y)− x′yβy, s ≤ −x′sβs)
=
1
y
P (−d ≤ x′dβd, s ≤ −x′sβs| y = log(y)− x′yβy)f(log(y)− x′yβy),
where f(·) is the density function of y.
We rearrange the distribution of the error terms as follows:
−d
s
y
 ∼ N
0,

1 −ρdsσs −ρdyσy
−ρdsσs σ2s ρysσyσs
−ρdyσy ρysσyσs σ2y .

 .
(−d, s)T given y follows bivariate normal distribution with:
E
 −d
s
∣∣∣∣∣∣ y
 =
 0
0
+
 −ρdyσy
ρysσyσs
 1
σ2y
(y − 0) =
 −ρdyσy y
ρysσs
σy
y
 ,
149
and
Var
 −d
s
∣∣∣∣∣∣ y
 =
 1 −ρdsσs
−ρdsσs σ2s
−
 −ρdyσy
ρysσyσs
 1
σ2y
(
−ρdyσy ρysσyσs
)
=
 1− ρ2dy (ρdyρys − ρds)σs
(ρdyρys − ρds)σs (1− ρ2ys)σ2s
 .
Then, we have:
P (−d ≤ x′dβd, s ≤ −x′sβs| y = log(y)− x′yβy)
= Ψ
x′dβd + ρdyy/σy√
1− ρ2dy
, −x
′
sβs + ρysσsy/σy
σs
√
1− ρ2ys
,
ρdyρys − ρds√
(1− ρ2dy)(1− ρ2ys)
 ,
and
f(log(y)− x′yβy) =
1
σy
φ(
log(y)− x′yβy
σy
).
Thus, the likelihood for this case is:
l2 =
φ(ey)
yσy
·Ψ
x′dβd + ρdyey√
1− ρ2dy
, −x
′
sβs + ρysσsey
σs
√
1− ρ2ys
,
ρdyρys − ρds√
(1− ρ2dy)(1− ρ2ys)
 .
Case 3: d = 1, y = y, s ∈ (0, 1).
l3 = P (d = 1, y = y, s = s)
=
1
y
P (d > −x′dβd, y = log(y)− x′yβy, s = s− x′sβs)
=
1
y
P (−d ≤ x′dβd| y = log(y)− x′yβy, s = s− x′sβs)g(log(y)− x′yβy, s− x′sβs),
where g(·, ·) is the joint density function for y and s.
Let the submatrix Σ11 be
Σ11 =
 σ2y ρysσyσs
ρysσyσs σ
2
s
 .
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Thus, we have
Σ−111 =
1
(1− ρ2ys)σ2yσ2s
 σ2s −ρysσyσs
−ρysσyσs σ2y
 ,
where the determinant of Σ11 is |Σ11| = (1− ρ2ys)σ2yσ2s .
−d given y and s follows normal distribution with:
E (−d|y, s) = 0 + 1|Σ11|
(
−ρdyσy −ρdsσs
) σ2s −ρysσyσs
−ρysσyσs σ2y
 y
s

= − 1
(1− ρ2ys)σ2yσ2s
(
(ρdy − ρdsρys)σyσ2s (ρds − ρdyρys)σ2yσs)
) y
s

= −(ρdy − ρdsρys)σsy + (ρds − ρdyρys)σys
(1− ρ2ys)σyσs
,
and
Var (−d|y, s) = 1− 1|Σ11|
(
−ρdyσy −ρdsσs
) σ2s −ρysσyσs
−ρysσyσs σ2y
 −ρdyσy
−ρdsσs

= 1− 1
(1− ρ2ys)σ2yσ2s
(
−(ρdy − ρdsρys)σyσ2s −(ρds − ρdyρys)σ2yσs
) −ρdyσy
−ρdsσs

= 1− (ρdy − ρdsρys)ρdy + (ρds − ρdyρys)ρds
(1− ρ2ys)
=
1− ρ2ys − ρ2dy − ρ2ds + 2ρdyρdsρys
1− ρ2ys
.
We then have
P (−d ≤ x′dβd| y = log(y)− x′yβy, s = s− x′sβs)
= Φ
x′dβd(1− ρ2ys) + (ρdy − ρdsρys)(log(y)− x′yβy)/σy + (ρds − ρdyρys)(s− x′sβs)/σs√
(1− ρ2ys − ρ2dy − ρ2ds + 2ρdyρdsρys)(1− ρ2ys)
 ,
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and
g(y, s) = g(log(y)− x′yβy, s− x′sβs)
=
1
2piσyσs
√
1− ρ2ys
exp
−1
2
(
y s
) 1
|Σ11|
 σ2s −ρysσyσs
−ρysσyσs σ2y
 y
s

=
1
2piσyσs
√
1− ρ2ys
exp
[
−
2
yσ
2
s − 2ρysσyσsys + 2sσ2y
2(1− ρ2ys)σ2yσ2s
]
=
1
σyσs
√
1− ρ2ys
φ
(
y
σy
√
1− ρ2ys
)
φ
(
s
σs
√
1− ρ2ys
)
exp
(
ρys
ys
(1− ρ2ys)σyσs
)
=
1
σyσs
√
1− ρ2ys
φ
(
log(y)− x′yβy
σy
√
1− ρ2ys
)
φ
(
s− x′sβs
σs
√
1− ρ2ys
)
exp
(
ρys
(log(y)− x′yβy)(s− x′sβs)
(1− ρ2ys)σyσs
)
.
Thus, the likelihood for this case is:
l3 =
1
yσyσs
√
1− ρ2ys
Φ
x′dβd(1− ρ2ys) + (ρdy − ρdsρys)ey + (ρds − ρdyρys)es√
(1− ρ2ys − ρ2dy − ρ2ds + 2ρdyρdsρys)(1− ρ2ys)

·φ
(
ey√
1− ρ2ys
)
φ
(
es√
1− ρ2ys
)
exp
(
ρys
eyes
1− ρ2ys
)
.
Case 4: d = 1, y = y, s = 1.
l4 = P (d = 1, y = y, s = 1)
=
1
y
P (d > −x′dβd, y = log(y)− x′yβy, s ≥ 1− x′sβs)
=
1
y
P (−d ≤ x′dβd, −s ≤ x′sβs − 1| y = log(y)− x′yβy)f(log(y)− x′yβy)
We rearrange the distribution of the error terms as follows:
−d
−s
y
 ∼ N
0,

1 ρdsσs −ρdyσy
ρdsσs σ
2
s −ρysσyσs
−ρdyσy −ρysσyσs σ2y

 .
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(−d,−s)T given y follows bivariate normal distribution with:
E
 −d
−s
∣∣∣∣∣∣ y
 =
 0
0
+
 −ρdyσy
−ρysσyσs
 1
σ2y
(y − 0) =
 −ρdyσy y
−ρysσs
σy
y
 ,
and
Var
 −d
−s
∣∣∣∣∣∣ y
 =
 1 ρdsσs
ρdsσs σ
2
s
−
 −ρdyσy
−ρysσyσs
 1
σ2y
(
−ρdyσy −ρysσyσs
)
=
 1 ρdsσs
ρdsσs σ
2
s
−
 ρ2dy ρdyρysσs
ρdyρysσs ρ
2
ysσ
2
s

=
 1− ρ2dy (ρds − ρdyρys)σs
(ρds − ρdyρys)σs (1− ρ2ys)σ2s
 .
Then, we have
P (−d ≤ x′dβd, −s ≤ x′sβs − 1| y = log(y)− x′yβy)
= Ψ
x′dβd + ρdy(log(y)− x′yβy)/σy√
1− ρ2dy
,
x′sβs − 1 + ρysσs(log(y)− x′yβy)/σy
σs
√
1− ρ2ys
,
ρds − ρdyρys√
(1− ρ2dy)(1− ρ2ys)
 ,
and
f(log(y)− x′yβy) =
1
σy
φ
(
log(y)− x′yβy
σy
)
.
Thus, the likelihood for this case is:
l4 =
φ(ey)
yσy
·Ψ
x′dβd + ρdyey√
1− ρ2dy
,
x′sβs − 1 + ρysσsey
σs
√
1− ρ2ys
,
ρds − ρdyρys√
(1− ρ2dy)(1− ρ2ys)
 ,
where ey =
log(y)−x′yβy
σy
and es =
s−x′sβs
σs
.
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B.2 Derivation of marginal effects
The equation for the expected enrollment is straightforward. The equation for the
conditional expenditure can be derived as follows:
E(y|d = 1) =
∫ ∞
0
yf(y|d = 1)dy =
∫ ∞
0
yf(y|1 > −x′dβd)dy
=
∫ ∞
0
y
1
y
f(y|1 > −x′dβd)dy =
∫ ∞
0
f(y, 1 > −x′dβd)
P (1 > −x′dβd)
dy
=
∫ ∞
0
f(1 > −x′dβd|y)f(y)
P (1 > −x′dβd)
dy
=
∫ ∞
0
Φ
(
x′dβd+ρdyy/σy√
1−ρ2dy
)
φ
(
y
σy
)
/σy
Φ(x′dβd)
dy,
where y = log(y)− x′yβy.
The unconditional expectation of y is:
E(y) = P (d = 1)E(y|d = 1) =
∫ ∞
0
1
σy
Φ
x′dβd + ρdyy/σy√
1− ρ2dy
φ( y
σy
)
dy.
Unconditional expectation of the core expenditure ys is:
E(ys) =
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
ysf(y, s)dyds =
∫ ∞
0
yf(y|1 > −x′dβd)dy
=
∫ ∞
0
y · 1 · f(d = 1, y, s = 1)dy +
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
ysf(d = 1, y, s)dyds
=
∫ ∞
0
1
σy
φ(
y
σy
)Ψ
x′dβd + ρdyy/σy√
1− ρ2dy
,
x′sβs − 1 + ρysσsy/σy
σs
√
1− ρ2ys
,
ρds − ρdyρys√
(1− ρ2dy)(1− ρ2ys)
 dy
+
∫ 1
0
∫ ∞
0
ys
1
yσyσs
√
1− ρ2ys
Φ
x′dβd(1− ρ2ys) + (ρdy − ρdsρys)y/σy + (ρds − ρdyρys)s/σs√
(1− ρ2ys − ρ2dy − ρ2ds + 2ρdyρdsρys)(1− ρ2ys)

×φ
 y
σy
√
1− ρ2ys
φ
 s
σs
√
1− ρ2ys
 exp(ρys ys
σyσs(1− ρ2ys)
)
dyds,
where s = s− x′sβs.
The conditional (on positive educational expenditure) expectation of the core
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expenditure is:
E(ys|d = 1) = E(ys|d = 1) = E(ys)
P (d = 1)
=
E(ys)
Φ (x′dβd)
.
For each of these equations, we can compute the sample analogues by replacing
the parameters (θ) with the ML estimates (θˆML) given covariates.
We obtain the standard errors for the marginal effects by simulation. That
is, we first draw the parameter θ from a multivariate normal distribution, where its
mean and variance respectively follow the point estimate and its variance-covariance
matrix from the ML estimation. We then calculate the marginal effects again with
the drawn value of θ using the expressions above. By repeating this 100 times and
taking the standard deviation of the estimates of the marginal effect, we obtain a
standard error.
In principle, we can calculate the marginal effect for each observation and then
calculate the average marginal effect over all observations. However, we choose to
calculate only the marginal effects at the sample mean, where the sample mean of
the whole sample [subsample of secondary-school enrollees] is used for the marginal
effects on the probability of enrollment and unconditional quantities [conditional
quantities] to mitigate the computational burden.54
B.3 Tuition and quality of education
To understand the relationship between the quality of education and tuition fee, we
would ideally run a regression of tuition fee on an indicator of education quality.
However, we do not have school-level data that can be linked to HES/HIES data.
Instead, we run a regression of the average test score on the average tuition per
student at the school level using the dataset for the Comparing Food versus Cash
for Education (FFE-CFE) program for the years 2000 and 2003 collected by the
International Food Policy Research Institute. While these data are available only
for primary schools, this is the only data set that allows us to link the tuition fee
54Matlab was used for computation of the marginal effects and STATA was used in the rest of
the analysis.
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Figure 6: The scatter plot of the average test score and the average tuition fee
charged by the school for the years 2000 (top) and 2003 (bottom) based on the
FFE-CFE data. The size of each dot is proportionate to the number of enrolled
students in the school and the red line represents the linear fit (weighted). The
slope of the line are significantly different from 0 at a 10 percent level.
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and educational outcome in Bangladesh.
As Figure 6 shows, the average test score is higher in schools that impose a higher
tuition both in 2000 and 2003. Clearly, this does not serve as definitive evidence
that higher tuition reflects higher educational quality at the secondary level for a
number of reasons. First, the data we use here are for the primary level and not the
secondary level. Second, the data are not nationally representative and the sample
selection may be an issue. Third, we do not consider the effect of endogenous school
choice; it may be the case that those children with parents who can afford to pay a
high tuition are those with high innate ability or those who receive complementary
home tutoring. Nevertheless, the evidence that Figure 6 provides is consistent with
the possibility that higher tuition reflects higher educational quality.
It should be noted that the tuition fee is not a simple reflection of school type.
In the FFE-CFE data, there is indeed a substantial variation in the tuition per
student both in private and public schools. Correspondingly, there appear to be
significant variations in quality within each type. Casual observations of schools
indicate that most of top schools are private in Bangladesh. On the other hand, the
BANBEIS database suggests that private schools are not only smaller than public
schools on average but also their quality is lower. For example, the average quality
of teachers in private schools is worse than that for public schools as measured by
the fraction of trained teachers. Student-teacher ratios for private schools were, if
anything, slightly higher than those for public schools at the secondary level in the
past, even though they are very similar today.55 Therefore, the average quality of
private schools appears to be lower than that of public schools.
B.4 Comparison with Heath and Mobarak (2015)
Heath and Mobarak (2015) find no evidence that the FSPs make girls more likely
to remain in school compared with boys. In fact, their triple-difference estimate of
the impact of FSPs is negative (Table 9 of Heath and Mobarak (2015)). However,
55This is not true at the primary level. Private schools are smaller and student-teacher ratios in
private schools are much lower than those in public schools.
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our analysis differs in three important aspects.
First, the data in the current study are national representative and were collected
in 2010, while their data were collected only from Dhaka and Gazipur districts in
2009. Second, the information available in the datasets are different. Heath and
Mobarak (2015) use the school entry age, timing and length of any interruptions
in schooling, and years of completed education to construct the grade level and
enrollment status for each year. The HIES data we use only contains completed
grade and age information. Therefore, we need to make additional assumptions
that all children start schooling at age 6 and that there is no grade repetition.
For example, consider a woman who had completed grade 7 and was 30 years of
age in 2010. Given this information, we infer that she started schooling at age 6
in 1986 and remained enrolled in school until 1992. Based on this inference, we
also know that she was a primary graduate (post5 as shown in the analysis below)
from 1991 onwards.56 After constructing the history of enrollment, we use only the
observations that correspond to the individuals aged between 5 and 18 in each year
to match the sample used in Heath and Mobarak (2015). The results are similar even
when the cohort aged between 6 and 15 is used each year as in our main context.
Finally and most importantly, we take the (third) difference between those who
graduated from primary school—completed grade 5 (“post5”)—and those who did
not after taking the differences between boys and girls and between pre- and post-
1994 periods. On the contrary, Heath and Mobarak (2015) take the difference be-
tween those who had at least 6 years of education (“post6”) and those who did not
in a given year. Therefore, the child in their classification is already enrolled in
secondary school and the potential impact of FSPs on the enrollment decision into
grade 6 among the primary graduates is not taken into account. We argue that our
choice would be more appropriate because the FSPs affect the enrollment decision
as long as the child has graduated from primary schools. That is, the FSPs makes
it more attractive to keep girls enrolled in school after the completion of primary
education. We demonstrate this point by altering the cutoff completed grade, which
56Note that the girl was enrolled in grade 6 in 1991 and she had completed grade 5 in that year.
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Figure 7: The replication of coefficient of triple-difference term with the household
fixed effects presented in Table 9 in Heath and Mobarak (2015) by redefining the
cutoff grade using 2010 HIES data.
is essentially taken as the eligibility for the FSPs, for the third difference in Fig-
ure 7 using HIES 2010 survey data and household fixed effects are controlled in the
analysis.
While Figure 7 shows positive and significant effect at “post5”, it is not immedi-
ately clear how this result can be compared with Heath and Mobarak (2015). We,
therefore, repeated the same analysis with the data used by Heath and Mobarak
(2015). As Figure 8 shows, all the point estimates are insignificant. But more im-
portantly, the figure is broadly consistent with Figure 7 and indicates that their
finding of a negative point estimate is driven by their choice of cutoff grade at grade
6. We also repeated our analysis with a subsample from Dhaka and Gazipur districts
to make the data we use more comparable with those used by Heath and Mobarak
(2015). As Figure 9 shows, we again find a very similar pattern. It also shows that
the impact of FSPs is significantly positive when the completion of grade 5 is used
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Figure 8: The replication of coefficient of triple-difference term with household fixed
effect presented in Table 9 in Heath and Mobarak (2015) by redefining the cutoff
grade using the data used in Heath and Mobarak (2015).
as a cutoff.
The pattern we observe is indeed to be expected. Because the decision of the
grade-5 completers to enroll in a secondary school is affected by the FSPs, the appar-
ent impact of FSPs would go down if they are treated as FSP-ineligible individuals
as Heath and Mobarak (2015). Because there are requirements for continuation
and because it is in general difficult to go back to school once the child drops out
of school, we expect that the impact of FSPs to diminish for higher grades. The
findings in Figures 7-9 indeed support this argument.
B.5 Additional tables for summary statistics and detailed
regression results
Table 47 and 48 provide the same summary statistics as Tables 11 and 12 excep-
t that the former are for the years 2000 and 2005. In Table 49, we provide the
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Figure 9: The replication of coefficient of triple-difference term with household fixed
effect presented in Table 9 in Heath and Mobarak (2015) by redefining the cutoff
grade using 2010 HIES data for Dhaka and Gazipur districts. Heath and Mobarak
(2015) uses 2009 survey data in sub-districts of Dhaka and Gazipur districts.
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complete regression results for the three part model presented in Table 13. The
estimated values of ρ’s were all highly statistically significant, indicating the rele-
vance of allowing for the correlation in the error terms. The estimations for ρdy and
ρds are negatively significant at a 1 percent level from 2000 onwards. One plausible
explanation is that the unobserved academic capability affects the enrollment and
the other two decisions in different directions, possibly because very smart students
need little spending on education. This possibility appears to be consistent with
our estimate of ρys, which is positive and significant from 2000 onwards. Table 50
show that the regression results are similar when the independence of error terms
is assumed. The sign and significance of the coefficients remain similar but the
absolute value of the coefficient for the conditional education expenditure and core
share equations appears to be larger when the dependence structure is allowed for.
We then present the marginal effects of the girl dummy when the independence of
error terms is assumed in Table 51. The results are qualitatively similar to Table 18.
Finally, Table 52 provides the marginal effects of the girl and FSP dummies at the
sample mean for each education expenditure item.
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Table 47: Summary statistics of basic covariates by gender for 2000 and 2005
secondary-school age group
2000 2005
Boy (B) Girl (G) Diff (G-B) All Boy (B) Girl (G) Diff (G-B) All
Variables (1) (2) (2)-(1) (4) (5) (6) (6)-(5) (8)
All children aged 11-15
Enrolled in secondary school 0.331 0.444 0.113 0.386 0.407 0.509 0.102 0.457
(0.471) (0.497) *** (0.487) (0.491) (0.500) *** (0.498)
Child’s age (yrs) 13.012 12.908 -0.104 12.961 13.079 13.001 -0.078 13.041
(1.401) (1.342) *** (1.373) (1.400) (1.350) ** (1.376)
HH per capita expenditure 10.722 11.419 0.697 11.064 14.296 14.717 0.421 14.504
(7.809) (9.013) *** (8.428) (10.282) (11.578) (10.943)
Household size 6.405 6.559 0.154 6.480 5.990 6.102 0.112 6.046
(2.347) (2.392) ** (2.371) (2.232) (2.162) * (2.198)
Father’s education (yrs) 2.841 3.104 0.263 2.970 3.045 3.186 0.141 3.115
(4.130) (4.198) ** (4.165) (4.187) (4.208) (4.198)
Mother’s education (yrs) 1.725 1.939 0.214 1.830 2.224 2.322 0.098 2.272
(3.095) (3.198) ** (3.148) (3.501) (3.532) (3.517)
Number of children 3.533 3.635 0.102 3.583 3.243 3.336 0.093 3.289
(1.741) (1.758) ** (1.750) (1.568) (1.584) ** (1.576)
Urban 0.318 0.339 0.021 0.328 0.341 0.342 0.001 0.341
(0.466) (0.473) (0.470) (0.474) (0.474) (0.474)
Female head 0.073 0.080 0.007 0.076 0.095 0.093 -0.002 0.094
(0.260) (0.271) (0.265) (0.293) (0.290) (0.292)
Head is a wage worker 0.381 0.393 0.012 0.387 0.414 0.444 0.030 0.429
(0.486) (0.488) (0.487) (0.493) (0.497) ** (0.495)
Head’s age (yrs) 46.988 46.877 -0.111 46.933 47.671 47.602 -0.069 47.637
(10.738) (10.957) (10.845) (10.623) (10.445) (10.535)
Muslim 0.919 0.922 0.003 0.921 0.890 0.893 0.003 0.892
(0.272) (0.268) (0.270) (0.313) (0.309) (0.311)
Hindu 0.076 0.071 -0.005 0.073 0.093 0.093 0.000 0.093
(0.265) (0.256) (0.261) (0.290) (0.290) (0.290)
Obs 2,488 2,390 4,878 2,848 2,790 5,638
Enrolled in secondary school children aged 11-15
Govt school 0.25 0.23 -0.02 0.24 0.25 0.23 -0.02 0.24
(0.44) (0.42) (0.43) (0.44) (0.42) (0.43)
Private school 0.68 0.70 0.02 0.69 0.66 0.69 0.03 0.67
(0.47) (0.46) (0.46) (0.47) (0.46) (0.47)
Other 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.09
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Obs 824 1,061 1,885 1,159 1,420 2,579
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the mean. ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote that the means of girl and boy are different at 1, 5, 10
percent significant level, respectively. The unit for household per capita expenditure is thousand taka. Other in school type include other
types of schools, such as religious schools (like madrasa) and NGO schools. The summary statistics of basic covariates for 2000 and 2005
are presented in Table 11 in Section 2.4.
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Table 48: Summary statistics of education expenditure by items for secondary school
enrollees in 2000 and 2005
2000 2005
Boy (B) Girl (G) Diff (G-B) % Zeros Boy (B) Girl (G) Diff (G-B) % Zeros
Taka (1) (2) (2)-(1) (4) (5) (6) (6)-(5) (8)
Core 2,116.3 1,681.4 -434.9 1% 2,785.7 2,377.5 -408.2 1%
(2,091.7) (1,723.0) *** (2,451.5) (2,405.2) ***
Tuition 320.7 131.0 -189.7 48% 374.2 162.2 -212.0 50%
(384.0) (308.0) *** (489.2) (491.9) ***
Home Tutor 1,031.2 821.2 -210 49% 1,437.7 1,289.4 -148.3 42%
(1,665.1) (1,366.7) *** (2,056.6) (2,046.3) *
Material 764.4 729.2 -35.2 1% 973.8 925.9 -47.9 1%
(526.6) (486.2) (589.1) (579.0) **
Peripheral 917.5 877.9 -39.6 1% 1,166.4 1,067.5 -98.9 0%
(930.0) (901.0) (1,383.4) (1,103.1) **
Admission 170.1 152.4 -17.7 26% 202.4 188.8 -13.6 26%
(232.6) (218.4) * (310.1) (349.0)
Exam 152.1 142.5 -9.6 4% 173.0 177.6 4.6 4%
(166.4) (121.1) (137.1) (180.8)
Uniform 238.7 257.2 18.5 46% 342.8 343.7 0.9 35%
(315.2) (291.8) (450.0) (390.6)
Meal 175.9 176.3 0.4 63% 193.2 155.3 -37.9 68%
(368.1) (349.1) (408.5) (359.0) **
Transportation 120.8 111.3 -9.5 84% 119.1 129.1 10.0 86%
(420.1) (401.1) (491.6) (506.5)
Others 59.8 38.2 -21.6 75% 136.0 73.1 -62.9 66%
(312.3) (214.4) * (793.5) (251.0) ***
Total 3,033.8 2,559.3 -474.5 3,952.1 3,445.0 -507.1
(2,664.8) (2,318.8) *** (3,127.3) (2,979.2) ***
Core Share 0.68 0.63 -0.05 0.69 0.65 -0.04
(0.18) (0.20) *** (0.18) (0.19) ***
Obs 824 1,061 1,159 1,420
Note: Standard errors are reported in parentheses below the mean. ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote that the means of girl and boy are different
at 1, 5, 10 percent significant level, respectively. The summary statistics is for subsample of children who were enrolled in
secondary school at the time of survey. Core share stands for the ratio of core components over total education expenditure.
The admission fee here include admission, annual session and registration fee based on the component classification in 1995
HES questionnaire. The summary statistics of education expenditure by items for enrolled secondary-school age group in
1995 and 2010 are presented in Table 12 in Section 2.4.
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Table 50: ML Estimation of Three-part Model of Different Error Structure
d Cond y Cond s
1995
Independence -0.003 -0.086*** -0.030***
(0.042) (0.032) (0.009)
Dependence -0.001 -0.085*** 0.001
(0.042) (0.032) (0.032)
2000
Independence 0.331*** -0.111*** -0.047***
(0.041) (0.032) (0.009)
Dependence 0.339*** -0.174*** -0.082***
(0.039) (0.049) (0.014)
2005
Independence 0.309*** -0.131*** -0.027***
(0.037) (0.025) (0.007)
Dependence 0.291*** -0.154*** -0.071***
(0.034) (0.027) (0.012)
2010
Independence 0.295*** -0.101*** -0.031***
(0.035) (0.024) (0.006)
Dependence 0.289*** -0.131*** -0.067***
(0.033) (0.025) (0.009)
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1,
5, 10 percent levels. Standard errors clustered at
household level are reported in parentheses. The
estimations are obtained using three-part model
constructed in Section 2.3. The independence mod-
el assumes ρdy, ρds and ρys are all zeros. Additional
covariates are the same as discussed in Table 13.
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Table 51: Marginal Effects of the Girl Dummy at the Mean
Marginal effects E(d) E(y|d = 1) E(y) E(ys|d = 1) E(ys)
at the mean (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Girl -0.001 -179.245*** -40.798 -178.410*** -27.547***
1995 (0.015) (67.804) (25.872) (48.393) (10.206)
Obs 5,011 1,798 5,011 1,798 5,011
Girl 0.124*** -269.487*** 134.390*** -285.579*** 34.790**
2000 (0.015) (79.523) (31.346) (55.136) (16.395)
Obs 4,878 1,885 4,878 1,885 4,878
Girl 0.122*** -433.665*** 154.744*** -374.411*** 32.632
2005 (0.014) (84.342) (45.672) (60.282) (20.393)
Obs 5,638 2,579 5,638 2,579 5,638
Girl 0.117*** -612.691*** 304.818*** -582.444*** 44.740
2010 (0.014) (145.621) (88.339) (103.683) (38.249)
Obs 6,205 3,172 6,205 3,172 6,205
Note: ∗∗∗,∗∗ ,∗ denote statistical significance at 1, 5, 10 percent levels. Standard errors
clustered at household level are reported in parentheses. The marginal effects are calcu-
lated using marginal effect code in STATA based on three-part model with independence
estimates.E(·) stands for the expectation of the variable in the brackets. Estimates in
column (1) are the marginal effect of the girl dummy on the expected enrollment in sec-
ondary school for the children in the secondary-school age group. The marginal effects
presented in Columns (2) to (5) are in taka in nominal terms. Unconditional [Conditional]
expectations are evaluated at the mean of the full sample [subsample of secondary-school
enrollees]. The marginal effects at the sample mean for three-part model constructed in
Section 2.3 are presented in Table 18 in Section 2.5.
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